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INTRODUCTION

Drug diversion litigation continues to grow and evolve by leaps and
bounds. While the practice has seen an increase in complexity over the years,
the speed and scope of some recent developments have been striking, and in
some respects confounding. Since the publication of the 2015 article about
diversion practice in the Albany Law Review,1 diversion practice under the

* Judge Mulrooney is the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration Chief
Administrative Law Judge, and co-author of Drug Diversion Administrative Revocation and
Application Hearings for Medical and Pharmacy Practitioners: A Primer for Navigating Murky,
Drug-Infested Waters, 78 ALB. L. REV. 327 (2015). He has previously practiced law as an Assistant
United States Attorney, a Department of Justice/INS Trial Attorney, an Assistant District Attorney, a
Navy Judge Advocate, and a Judicial Law Clerk, as well as a Judge on the Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Criminal Appeals and an Administrative Law Judge at the Social Security Administration. Judge
Mulrooney received his Juris Doctorate (cum laude) at Albany Law School in 1985. The views and
legal analysis expressed in this Article reflect the views of the Authors in their private, not official
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Administrative Procedure Act (APA)2 has been buffeted by the accounts in the
press,3 Congress,4 and swerves in legal interpretation in the published final
orders issued by the Drug Enforcement Administration (the DEA or the
Agency).5 Whether viewed as clarifications, enhancements, or afflictions, the
modifications visited on diversion enforcement by Congress and the DEA itself
will require some significant course adjustments by the practicing bar on both
sides of the litigation equation.
This update is divided into three parts: Part II will address diversion law
alterations crafted by Congress and signed by President Barack Obama; Part III
will analyze new legal interpretations by the Agency in its final orders; and Part
IV will parse the legal landscape for a current location check, some possible
clues for what lies over the horizon for the enforcers, the regulated community,
and the attorneys on both sides of the aisle, as well as some thoughts about why
where we are now seems so different from where we were previously headed.
Even without legal sonar or a crystal ball, there is merit to engaging in a
measured level of informed reckoning about where rocks and hazards are likely
to linger below the surface of the murky, drug-infested waters of diversion
litigation.

capacities, and not those of the Department of Justice and/or Drug Enforcement Administration. Cases
are decided by existing legal authority and the facts presented by the parties. This Article is not
intended to indicate, and does not reflect, how a particular issue of law or fact will be (or has been)
decided in any litigation where the Author is (or was) the assigned judge.
** Ms. Legel was a Judicial Law Clerk at the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice
from 2015 to 2017. She received her Juris Doctorate (magna cum laude) at Marquette University Law
School, where she served as a Comment Editor on the Marquette Law Review. The views and legal
analysis expressed in this Article reflect the views of the Authors in their private, not official capacities,
and not those of the Department of Justice and/or Drug Enforcement Administration.
1. John J. Mulrooney, II & Andrew J. Hull, Drug Diversion Administrative Revocation and
Application Hearings for Medical and Pharmacy Practitioners: A Primer for Navigating Murky,
Drug-Infested Waters, 78 ALB. L. REV. 327 (2015).
2. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Lenny Bernstein & Scott Higham, Investigation: The DEA Slowed Enforcement
While the Opioid Epidemic Grew Out of Control, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2016, at A1; Editorial Board,
Locating Blame in the Opioid Epidemic, WASH. POST: THE POST’S VIEW (Oct. 30, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-the-dea-partly-to-blame-for-the-opioidepidemic/2016/10/30/ [https://perma.cc/D7WS-RYVG] (insert URL into Google.com search engine;
then follow “Locating blame in the opioid epidemic – The Washington Post” hyperlink) [hereinafter,
THE POST’S VIEW].
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.
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II. CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
On April 19, 2016, President Obama signed the Ensuring Patient Access
and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 (EPAEDEA) into law.6 The cosponsors of the EPAEDEA touted the amendment as a measure to “bring muchneeded clarity to several key provisions of the Controlled Substances Act” and
to “facilitate greater collaboration between registrants and relevant Federal
actors in combatting prescription drug abuse.”7
The EPAEDEA amends the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in three
respects: (1) any registrant served with an order to show cause (OSC) may now
submit a corrective action plan (CAP) to the Agency, which the Agency must
consider in order to determine whether it justifies the discontinuance or deferral
of administrative proceedings; (2) the term “imminent danger to the public
health or safety,”8 a prerequisite finding to justify the issuance of an immediate
suspension order, has been defined, or some would say, born; and (3) the phrase
“factors as may be relevant to and consistent with the public health and safety,”
which is the language used in the catch-all public interest factors to be
considered by the Agency in determining whether to register or maintain
registration for manufacturers9 and distributors10 of controlled substances, has
been defined.11
A. The Corrective Action Plan (CAP)
1. The EPAEDEA’s CAP Provision’s Additions, Justifications, and Problems
Previously, the OSC to be served on the applicant or registrant was only
required to “contain a statement of the basis” for the Agency’s proposed denial,
revocation, or suspension of registration, and to provide a time and place for
the applicant or registrant to appear.12 The EPAEDEA added the requirement
that every OSC issued by the DEA must “notify the applicant or registrant of

6. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-145,
130 Stat. 353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(j), 824(c), (d)).
7. 162 CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
8. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(d)(1)).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 823(a)(6), (d)(6) (2012).
10. Id. § 823(b)(5), (e)(5). The language is also similar to the catch-all factor for distributors of
List I chemicals, but is not exactly the same. Id. § 823(h)(5) (“[S]uch other factors as are relevant to
and consistent with the public health and safety.” (emphasis added)).
11. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(j), 824(c), (d)).
12. 21 U.S.C. § 824(c).
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the opportunity to submit a corrective action plan on or before the date of
appearance.”13 The EPAEDEA also added the requirement that, if a CAP is
timely filed by a registrant, the Agency is required to consider it to “determine
whether denial, revocation, or suspension proceedings should be discontinued,
or deferred for the purposes of modification, amendment, or clarification to
such plan.”14 Stated differently, before the DEA can proceed to secure an
administrative sanction against a registration holder or deny an application for
registration, it must now consider a written improvement plan, filed by the
registrant or applicant, which outlines that registrant or applicant’s intentions
to correct the regulatory transgressions alleged in the OSC.15
Co-sponsors of the EPAEDEA promoted the CAP provisions as
“provid[ing] the DEA with the clarity to collaborate with the very people
responsible for ensuring that [controlled substances] get to the patients who
need them without hurting and harming th[e] distribution chain and while
clamping down on diversions and abuse.”16 It was touted as “a mechanism for
companies who inadvertently violate the Controlled Substances Act . . . to
remediate the violation before their registration is suspended and the supply of
drugs to patients is interrupted.”17 It was explained that the EPAEDEA would
“encourage greater self-reporting of violations,” while helping to “ensure that
supply chains remain intact for legitimate uses such as the alleviation of pain
and illness.”18 One co-sponsor described the CAP as “a mechanism for
companies that violate the Controlled Substances Act to correct their practices”
before their registration is suspended or revoked, noting that “[e]ven
inadvertent violations may lead to suspension or revocation, disrupting the
supply chain for the company’s prescription drugs[, which] in turn can cause
hardship for patients who rely on the company’s drugs for treatment and
cure.”19 In sum, the CAP was touted primarily as a method to ensure that
patients continue to retain access (hence the “ensuring patient access” feature

13. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(2)(C)).
14. Id. (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(3)).
15. See id.
16. 161 CONG. REC. H2330 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2015) (statement of Rep. Blackburn).
17. 162 CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch). While the cosponsors repeatedly emphasized the benefits of the CAP for “companies,” the bill does not limit the
classes of registrants or applicants who can submit a CAP, and thus all registrants and applicants—
individual practitioners, pharmacies, distributors, and manufacturers—can submit a CAP to the
Agency.
18. Id.
19. 162 CONG. REC. S2006 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
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of the bill’s cumbersome title) to controlled substances in the event of
“inadvertent violations”20 of the Controlled Substances Act by “companies”21
in the distribution supply chain.22
The stated justification for the CAP is significantly undermined, however,
by an absence of evidence in the Congressional Record or elsewhere to support
the position that pending administrative proceedings in any way limit even a
single patient’s access to medication, the purported reason the bill was
introduced in the first place.23 By the terms of the statute, the CAP provisions
do not apply to the Administrator’s determination regarding an immediate
suspension pending resolution,24 and in every other adjudication, registrants
retain their authority to conduct regulated activities until the Agency issues its
final order.25 In other words, if a registrant or applicant is served with an OSC
but believes that it has made sufficient improvements to its operating
procedures to ensure that the transgressions charged do not re-occur (or if it
believes that the transgressions charged did not actually occur), it has—and had
before the EPAEDEA—the right to request an administrative hearing and
present evidence on its own behalf before any sanction can be imposed upon
it.26 Registrants and applicants have always been afforded the opportunity to
20. Id.; 162 CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
21. 162 CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 162 CONG. REC.
S2006 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
22. 162 CONG. REC. S2007 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell); see 162
CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
23. See 162 CONG. REC. S2006–07 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell);
162 CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
24. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-145,
§ 2, 130 Stat. 353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(5)). When served on a registrant, an
Immediate Suspension Order (ISO/OSC) is accompanied by an OSC, affording the opportunity for
post-deprivation due process. See Mulrooney & Hull, supra note 1, at 364–65 (describing immediate
suspension proceedings). The decision to immediately suspend a registration is a final decision by the
Agency, and while a registrant could potentially submit a CAP in response to the accompanying OSC,
a determination on that CAP could in no way affect the already-final decision to immediately suspend
the registration. However, inasmuch as every ISO/OSC has an accompanying OSC, the CAP
provisions are available to respondents in all administrative proceedings, whether commenced with an
ISO/OSC or an OSC. It would, thus, be inaccurate to broadly state that the CAP provisions do not
apply to immediate suspension cases.
25. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(1)); see 21 U.S.C. § 824(c) (2012) (“Before taking action pursuant to
this section, or pursuant to a denial of registration under [21 U.S.C. § 823], the Attorney General shall
serve upon the applicant or registrant an order to show cause why registration should not be denied,
revoked, or suspended.” (emphasis added)).
26. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(1)); see also 21 U.S.C. § 824(c).
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present evidence of any corrective actions they have taken to ensure that the
charged conduct does not continue, including plans to avoid future
transgressions, and the Agency has always considered such evidence in making
its final determination on whether to preclude or curtail the applicant’s or
registrant’s regulated activities.27 Similarly, the parties have always been able
to discuss the merits of the case amongst themselves, either before a request for
a hearing is made or during the pendency of the administrative proceedings,
and if an applicant or registrant offers a proposed plan of corrective action and
the Agency (through counsel representing it in the administrative proceeding)
determines that it is no longer prudent to continue administrative proceedings,
then the Agency (the party which initiated proceedings in the first place) is free
to seek termination of the case, which the DEA Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) will grant. Inasmuch as DEA administrative proceedings are remedial28
and non-punitive in nature,29 a written proposal to correct alleged deficiencies
should, of course, merit special consideration by the Agency in its evaluation
of the prudence and expense of continuing to seek preclusion or curtailment of
regulated activity, but there was no apparent reason for the EPAEDEA to direct
that such a proposal be considered and ruled upon in isolation, outside of an
ongoing administrative proceeding. If, in the Agency’s view, a proposed plan
of action merits discontinuation or deferral of proceedings, it is (and has always
been) free to seek termination of administrative proceedings at any time, or it
can decide by final order that no sanction is appropriate based on all of the facts,
including any remedial actions taken and plans put in place. Thus, the
EPAEDEA’s CAP provisions present as a solution to a problem that did not
(and does not) seem to exist.
Furthermore, the CAP provisions create no incentive (and potentially create
a disincentive) for regulated companies or individuals to “selfreport[] . . . violations,”30 to correct wrongdoing before an OSC is filed, or even
to follow or continue following whatever plan is deemed sufficient to
discontinue or defer proceedings once the proceedings are discontinued or
27. See, e.g., Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. 29053, 29066 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015);
Terese, Inc., 76 Fed. Reg. 46843, 46848 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 3, 2011). While the Agency only
considers evidence of remedial measures if a registrant accepts responsibility for past transgressions,
Krishna-Iyer, 74 Fed. Reg. 459, 464 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 6, 2009) (“Because of the grave and
increasing harm to public health and safety caused by the diversion of prescription controlled
substances, even where the Agency’s proof establishes that a practitioner has committed only a few
acts of diversion, this Agency will not grant or continue the practitioner’s registration unless he accepts
responsibility for his misconduct.”), a registrant who submits a corrective action plan is necessarily
admitting that there is something to be corrected.
28. Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. at 29066.
29. Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S., 72 Fed. Reg. 23848, 23853 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 24, 2007).
30. 162 CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement from Sen. Hatch).
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deferred. Instead, the EPAEDEA is akin to a state legislature mandating that
law enforcement authorities allow shoplifting suspects caught in the act to
outline how they intend to replace purloined items on store shelves; allow
intoxicated drivers to pull to the side of the road and park their previously
swerving vehicles; or perhaps allow bank robbers to round up and return inkstained money and agree not to rob any more banks—all before any of those
wrongdoers actually admit fault and without any consequence that might deter
such behavior in the future. Such mandates sound absurd because they would
be absurd. The ability to submit a written plan for improvement may provide
incentive for registrants to step up their compliance once charges are filed—or
at least, outline a plan and promise to do so—but before that time, they can act
freely knowing that they can always come up with a convincing plan to fix their
problems later and avoid sanction.31 And, even in cases where the Agency does
elect to discontinue proceedings based on a CAP, the statutory mechanism
designed by Congress in the EPAEDEA provides no guarantee that the
promises made in the CAP will be fulfilled, or for how long.32 Assurances by
the CAP filers are not required, and the EPAEDEA provides no consequences
to unfulfilled CAP representations—even in cases where those representations
result in the discontinuation of proceedings.33 The only thing assured by the
Agency’s discontinuance of proceedings through the acceptance of a CAP is
that administrative proceedings will be discontinued.34 The benefits for the
industry are plain, but for the public, the benefits are not as clear.
To the extent the legislation was driven by the hypothetical potential that
the flow of painkillers could be interrupted due to improvident Agency
31. One co-sponsor explained that “the best example of why [the EPAEDEA] is needed is a story
that comes from home,” going on to detail an account of a constituent who tried to obtain seizure
medications for her son in anticipation of an ice storm (lamenting that it was one of many that winter,
which “seemed as if [they] would never stop”), but—although the pharmacist was sympathetic—the
pharmacy would not fill the prescription because “it was too early” and “there would be problems with
the DEA and other agencies” if it were filled. 161 CONG. REC. H2330 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2015)
(statement of Rep. Blackburn). It is unclear exactly how such a registrant (if an OSC was filed for
filling such prescriptions) would propose any convincing corrective action for that violation, other than
maybe the pharmacist would feel less sympathetic next time and would refuse to fill the prescription.
A considered reflection of the story reveals it to be a sort of advocacy for an after-the-fact forgiveness
for actions founded in sympathy which ultimately result in “ensur[ing] that patients who have a
legitimate need for medications can receive them,” id., even if those actions are clear, intentional
violations of the CSA. Id. Whatever heart strings are pulled by the story of the reluctantly compliant
pharmacist, it would be challenging to fashion the morale of the tale into any objectives supported by
the provisions of the EPAEDEA as it was enacted.
32. See generally Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, Pub.
L. No. 114-145, 130 Stat. 353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(j), 824(c), (d)).
33. See id.
34. Id.
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revocations supported only by inadvertent, even minor, isolated violations, the
law could have been crafted to achieve that objective. For example, the focus
of the bill could have been directed to imbuing the CSA with a sanctions
framework founded in Congress’s assessment of the seriousness of specific
violations. Congress could have supplied guidance to the exercise of Agency
discretion in particular types of cases or where conduct rose to a certain level.
Likewise, the Agency could have been directed to give additional weight to
remedial evidence in weighing the sanction decision, or Congress could have
otherwise modified the CSA to address concerns regarding medication
availability when a registration is ultimately revoked or limited by the Agency.
The list of possible methods to address patient access to controlled substances
under these limited circumstances is potentially limitless, but the path chosen
instead was to enact legislation that created new rights for industry, and left the
Agency without guidance as to how to implement the new laws.
2. The Agency’s Treatment of the CAP Provisions
The new legislation provides only that, “[u]pon review of any [CAP]
submitted by an applicant or registrant . . . the Attorney General shall determine
whether denial, revocation, or suspension proceedings should be discontinued,
or deferred for the purposes of modification, amendment, or clarification to
such plan.”35 It does not specify what date is meant by the filing deadline of
“on or before the date of appearance,”36 and it provides neither a procedure for
the filing of a CAP, nor the standards to be applied to adjudicate it. The
EPAEDEA likewise does not provide guidance to the Agency about the
supervisory level within the organization at which the CAP should be
evaluated, and it does not provide an indication of the criteria by which the
Agency is to evaluate filed CAPs, or the procedure or timeline for the Agency
to follow once it determines whether (or not) to discontinue or defer
proceedings. The CAP legislation provides for no review of the plan by a DEA
ALJ in the event that proceedings are not discontinued or deferred, and it is
silent on whether administrative proceedings should be abrogated or delayed in
the event of a CAP filing, or if they should continue to proceed concurrently
with whatever timeline on which the CAP review proceeds.
Enabling regulations have not yet been promulgated. In the absence of
regulations, the Agency has supplied instructions regarding EPAEDEA CAP
rights (CAP advisals) on OSCs it has issued since EPAEDEA became

35. Id. (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(3)).
36. Id. (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(2)(C)).
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effective.37 However, at least in one case, the manner in which the Agency has
adjudicated a CAP raises an interesting issue.
In Thomas Horiagon, M.D., the Agency explained that its OSC “notified
[r]espondent of his right under 21 U.S.C. [§] 824(c)(2)(C) to submit a corrective
action plan [CAP] to the Deputy Assistant Administrator and [provided] the
procedure for doing so.”38 This is a strong indicator of the Agency’s intent to
avoid the creation of an appealable final order by having the CAP issue decided
by the Deputy Assistant Administrator, rather than the Administrator. The
Horiagon final order noted that the Deputy Assistant Administrator did issue a
CAP decision, but it also included a CAP determination by the Administrator
that was based on an alternate legal theory.39 Thus, the CAP determination was
ultimately rendered by the Agency head.
The APA provides that:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court
are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or
intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is
subject to review on the review of the final agency action.40
Apart from interlocutory appeals considered and decided by the
Administrator,41 administrative decisions rendered by its ALJs42 and program
heads43 have historically been considered preliminary, procedural, or
37. See, e.g., Marcus W. Anderson, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 42117, 42118–19 (Drug Enf't Admin.
Sept. 6, 2017); Binh M. Chung, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 40601, 40602 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 25, 2017);
Arnold E. Feldman, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg., 39614, 39616 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 21, 2017).
38. Thomas Horiagon, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 79051, 79051 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 10, 2016).
39. Id. at 79052 (concluding “that there [were] adequate grounds for denying [the CAP]” so the
Administrator therefore “rejecte[ed] [the respondent’s] CAP.”).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
41. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.62 (2017).
42. E.g., id. § 1316.47(b) (giving ALJ discretion to rule upon a request to enlarge the time
granted to a respondent to answer an OSC); id. § 1316.50 (giving ALJ discretion to require notarized
power of attorney from representative regarding scope of authority); id. § 1316.52 (providing nonexhaustive list of discretionary determinations entrusted to ALJs during DEA administrative
proceedings); id. § 1316.57 (giving ALJ discretion to exclude, or upon good cause, admit evidence not
timely disclosed by a party); id. § 1316.58 (giving ALJ discretion to direct pre-hearing summaries of
proposed witness testimony); id. § 1316.62 (giving ALJ discretion to rule upon a motion seeking leave
to file an interlocutory appeal).
43. E.g., id. § 1301.16 (requiring permission from the Agency for certificate of registration
application withdrawals after the issuance of an OSC); Matthew Valentine/Liar Catchers, 80 Fed. Reg.
50042, 50042–43 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2015) (noting that DEA Administrator had previously
remanded case involving an application withdrawal denial issued by the Deputy Assistant
Administrator for Diversion Control (DAADC) for additional detail; reviewed and disregarded the
discretionary decision issued by the DAADC; granted the applicant’s withdrawal application, and
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intermediate—and thus, are not directly reviewable. If the Agency elected to
leave a decision regarding the CAP up to the Deputy Assistant Administrator
(or some other subordinate official)—rather than the Administrator—it would
likely avoid the unintentional issuance of an appealable final order. However,
to the extent the Agency has already issued written CAP denials signed by the
Agency head (in addition to ruling on a CAP in a final order dispositive of a
whole case), it may have inadvertently created a path for ready review by the
federal courts. If a CAP denial issued by the DEA Administrator constitutes a
final order of the Agency, a denial of the requested relief (discontinuance or
deferral of proceedings) could be subject to potential review in the courts.
Congress has authorized “any person aggrieved by a final decision of the [DEA
Administrator]” under the CSA to seek review “in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia or for the circuit in which his principal
place of business is located.”44
If an order issued by the Administrator is not a final action, under the APA,
then it must be a “preliminary, procedural, or intermediate action” that is
“subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”45 However, the
final agency action in DEA administrative cases is the ultimate determination
by the Administrator regarding the disposition of administrative sanction
action.46 The final action may be informed by a recommended decision by a
DEA ALJ where a hearing was requested and held.47 Because the CAP is filed
separately from a request for hearing (or waiver),48 it is not automatically part
of the administrative record to be reviewed by the Agency—and neither is any
decision issued regarding the CAP. In order for the CAP and the Agency’s
decision to continue proceedings despite a filed CAP to even be considered in
the Agency’s final order, the aggrieved party would need to somehow appeal
the “preliminary” decision made to continue proceedings49 to the Administrator
through the process of the administrative hearing. In the instance where the
Administrator signed a decision wherein the Agency declined to discontinue or
determined that the entire case was moot); see also Bobby D. Reynolds, N.P., 80 Fed. Reg. 28643,
28643–44, 28643 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 2015) (acting absent any request by either party to
do so, DEA administrator sua sponte reviewed application withdrawal request that had been filed
exclusively with the DAADC).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 877 (2012).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
46. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.46, 1316.67.
47. Id. §§ 1301.43, 1316.47, 1316.65(a).
48. See id. § 1301.43 (authorizing responses to an OSC); Thomas Horiagon, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg.
79051, 79051 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 10, 2016) (referencing the OSC instruction to “submit a [CAP]
to the Deputy Assistant Administrator and the procedure for doing so”).
49. See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.43; Horiagon, 81 Fed. Reg. at 79051.
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defer proceedings at some point prior to consideration of the administrative
record, this would place the parties in the position of appealing the
Administrator’s own determination to the same Administrator to determine
whether to affirm his previous decision, or would at least create the anomalous
result of having the DEA Administrator review his own decision at the time a
final order is issued—with no warrant for doing so in the EPAEDEA or the
regulations. While the APA affords an agency head authority to issue a final
order in administrative proceedings, the specter of having an appeal of the
Administrator’s decision to himself risks an imprudent buffeting of the
Supreme Court’s admonition that “no man can be a judge in his own case.”50
The CAP is a new phenomenon, and it is reasonable to assume that the
Agency’s approach will benefit from some level of evolution. That said, to the
extent that the DEA elects to have its Administrator review CAP submissions
in the first instance, it enhances the opportunity for judicial review of any
decision declining to discontinue or defer proceedings.
In view of the highly-regulated and technical nature of the registrants who
engage in controlled substance regulated activity, the determination by
Congress that the regulating agency is required (not merely permitted) to
consider a remedial plan that is submitted to it,51 by even the most egregious
violators of standards that have been static and in place for decades, before
proceeding with administrative proceedings, is a remarkable step. The CAP
decision to discontinue or defer proceedings—a decision entirely separate from
the formal administrative process that affords pre- or post-deprivation due
process to all registrants and potential registrants of the Agency52—is
undoubtedly now an important one for the Agency. If, as may well be the case,
CAP submissions and the Agency’s decision of whether to discontinue or defer
proceedings based upon those submitted CAPs are ultimately subject to review
by the courts, the regulated community may eventually enjoy the benefits of an
evolving body of case law that mandates the discontinuation or deferral of
administrative proceedings where various levels of remediation are
convincingly proposed. To the extent it blossoms, judicial review of CAP
determinations will likely provide decades of fertile litigation opportunities for
the regulated community and will add an additional litigation burden on DEA
regulators.

50. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
51. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-145,
§ 2, 130 Stat. 353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(c)(2)(C)).
52. See id. (codified as amended at § 824(c)(3)).
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B. Imminent Danger to Public Health and Safety for Immediate Suspension
Orders
Under the CSA, the DEA Administrator has authority53 to immediately
suspend a registration, and to keep that registration suspended during the
pendency of administrative revocation proceedings, in any case “where he finds
that there is an imminent danger to the public health or safety.”54 The
EPAEDEA created, for the first time, a statutory definition for the phrase
“imminent danger to the public health or safety.”55
The Administrator has always been required to determine that an
“imminent danger to the public health or safety” exists before immediately
suspending a registration.56 However, before the EPAEDEA, that language
was not specifically defined in the statute,57 and it was broad enough to afford
the Agency head with latitude to make a determination as to whether, informed
by the Agency’s expertise and experience, particular conduct or circumstances
posed such a threat.58 In fact, given that this extraordinary measure depends on
post-deprivation due process, it is remarkable that during the more than four
decades that a long line of Administrators had been determining whether there
was an “imminent danger to the public health or safety” to justify immediately
suspending a registration before that phrase was defined in the EPAEDEA,
apart from a forty-year-old case from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,59 and
a small handful of isolated unpublished exceptions from the district courts,60
the courts have historically sustained the Administrators’ pre-EPAEDEA

53. The statute assigns this authority to the Attorney General, who has delegated it to the DEA
Administrator. 28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b), 0.103(a) (2017).
54. 21 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2012); see 21 C.F.R. § 1301.36(e).
55. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. 824(d)(2)).
56. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1256 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 304).
57. See 21 U.S.C. § 824(d).
58. The regulations provide that the immediate suspension order “shall contain a statement of
[the Administrator’s] findings regarding the danger to the public health or safety.” 21 C.F.R.
§ 1301.36(e).
59. Norman Bridge Drug Co. v. Banner, 529 F.2d 822, 824–25, 828–29 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding
that the Administrator’s ISO was unsupported due to staleness based on a seven-month delay in its
issuance).
60. See, e.g., Bates Drug Stores, Inc. v. Holder, No. CV-11-0167-EFS, 2011 WL 1750066, at *3
(E.D. Wash. May 6, 2011); Memorandum Decision and Order, MacKay v. Bolman, No. 2:09-cv-285
CW (D. Utah Apr. 7, 2009), ECF No. 13; Order and Findings of Law and Fact, Apothecary Arts
Pharmacy, Inc. v. Gonzales, Civ. No. 06-119 (RCL) (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2006), ECF No. 5.
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determinations of an imminent threat to public health or safety.61 It is equally
remarkable that, notwithstanding the dearth of court review of this publicsafety tool, or any other readily apparent reason, Congress determined that the
“imminent danger to the public health or safety” standard required a statutory
definition that imposed a dramatic diminution of the Agency’s authority to
issue Immediate Suspension Orders (ISOs)62 at a time when, by all accounts,
opioid abuse, addiction, and deaths were increasing markedly.63
In an effort to supply additional definition to the phrase “imminent danger
to the public health or safety,” the EPAEDEA enhanced the required showing
to secure an ISO with the following language:
[T]he phrase ‘imminent danger to the public health or safety’
means that, due to the failure of the registrant to maintain
effective controls against diversion or otherwise comply with
the obligations of a registrant under [the CSA], there is a
substantial likelihood of an immediate threat that death, serious
bodily harm, or abuse of a controlled substance will occur in
the absence of an immediate suspension of the registration.64
In the post-EPAEDEA era, for the Agency to support the Administrator’s
determination that the public health and safety is imperiled without a cessation
of regulated activity while (often lengthy) administrative revocation
proceedings are conducted, the Agency now bears the high burden of
establishing that there is a “substantial likelihood” that a registrant’s failure “to
maintain effective controls against diversion,” or non-compliance with the
CSA, will result in an “immediate threat” of specific, enumerated harms, to wit:
“death, serious bodily harm, or abuse of a controlled substance.”65
Even apart from the onerous task of demonstrating a link between a
registrant’s alleged transgressions and an impending death, serious bodily
harm, or abuse, the Agency now must shoulder the burden of showing that the
“likelihood” of those evils, based on the purported transgressions, is
“substantial.”66 The courts have concluded in other contexts that “substantial
61. See, e.g., Novelty Distribs. v. Leonhart, 562 F. Supp. 2d 20, 27–29 (D.D.C. 2008); Neil
Laboratories, Inc., v. Ashcroft, 217 F. Supp. 2d 80, 87 (D.D.C. 2002).
62. See Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114145, § 2, 130 Stat. 353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(d)(2)).
63. See, e.g., Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States Continue to Increase in 2015, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic [https://perma.cc/AKA4-52SR] (last visited Sept. 21,
2017).
64. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 824(d)(2)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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likelihood” means that the referenced event or circumstance is “considerably
more likely.”67 Thus, before a single witness is produced or any piece of
evidence admitted at a hearing, to sustain its ISO, the DEA is now required to
establish by substantial evidence that the transgression(s) or violation(s) it has
encountered will render death, serious bodily harm, or abuse considerably and
imminently more likely.68 However unlikely the Agency is to successfully bear
this heavy burden in the case of individual practitioners or pharmacies, it is all
but logically impossible, due to the obvious attenuation between the distributor
or manufacturer registrant and the potential victims, to make the requisite
showing up the production chain, in the case of a distributor or manufacturer.
Stated differently, there are simply too many levels between distributors and
manufacturers to logically establish any causation of death, serious bodily
harm, or abuse to a specific patient down the chain to support an immediate
suspension after the EPAEDEA. If it had been the intent of Congress to
completely eliminate the DEA’s ability to ever impose an immediate
suspension on distributors or manufacturers, it would be difficult to conceive
of a more effective vehicle for achieving that goal.
C. Defining “Factors As May Be Relevant to and Consistent with the Public
Health and Safety”
The new definition of “imminent danger to the public health or safety” and
the CAP provisions received the most attention when the EPAEDEA was
signed by President Obama on April 19, 2016.69 In fact, even the White House
Statement that issued on the day that the EPAEDEA was signed by President
Obama fails to mention the third change that the EPAEDEA made to the CSA.70
Although it received scant attention when compared with the other two
changes, the EPAEDEA’s addition of a definition for “factors as may be
relevant to and consistent with the public health and safety,” which is the
language used in the catch-all public interest factor to be considered by the
67. See, e.g., United States v. Thorn, 317 F.3d 107, 117 (2d Cir. 2003), aff’d in relevant part,
446 F.3d 378, 382–84 (2d Cir. 2006) (considering the term “substantial likelihood” in the context of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Mathis, 738 F.3d 719, 740 (6th Cir. 2013) (same).
68. Mathis, 738 F.3d at 740.
69. See Harriet Ryan & Kim Christensen, Amid Opioid Epidemic, Rules for Drug Companies
are Loosened, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-pharma-bill20160728-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/MCG8-DUXW]; Harris Gardner & Emmarie Huetteman,
Actions by Congress on Opioids Haven’t Included Limiting Them, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/us/politics/opioid-dea-addiction.html [https://perma.cc/VJK7CU5H].
70. Statement by the Press Secretary on S. 192, S. 483, S. 2512, 2016 WL 1567506 (White
House) (Apr. 19, 2016).
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Agency in determining whether to register or maintain registration71 for
manufacturers72 and distributors73 (but not prescribers, pharmacies, and
researchers)74 of controlled substances, is worth examining.
Under the CSA, the Agency “shall register an applicant” to manufacture
controlled substances in schedule I or II “if [it] determines that such registration
is consistent with the public interest and with [the country’s] obligations under
international [agreements],”75 and “shall register an applicant” to distribute a
controlled substance in schedules I–V or manufacture controlled substances in
schedules III–V “unless [it] determines that the issuance of such registration is
inconsistent with the public interest.”76 The CSA provides six factors that
“shall be considered” in determining the public interest with regard to
manufacturers,77 and five factors that “shall be considered” in determining the
public interest with regard to distributors.78 For both manufacturers and
distributors, one of the factors to be considered is a catch-all factor that
encompasses “such other factors as may be relevant to and consistent with the
public health and safety.”79 The separate section of the CSA addressing
suspension and revocation of existing registrations lists, as one of the grounds
for suspension or denial, “a finding that the registrant . . . has committed such
acts as would render his registration under section 823 . . . inconsistent with the
public interest as determined under such section,”80 and thus the public interest
factors in Title 21, Section 823 are relevant to the inquiry of whether applicants
shall be registered as well as the inquiry regarding whether current registrations
should be suspended or revoked. Therefore, for both (and only) manufacturer
and distributor applicants and registrants, the Agency can consider “factors as
may be relevant to and consistent with the public health and safety,”81 in
71. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 § 2 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(j)), 824(c), (d)); 21 U.S.C. § 823(a)–(f) (2012).
72. 21 U.S.C. § 823(a)–(a)(6), (d)–(d)(6) (2012).
73. Id. § 823(b)–(b)(5), (e)–(e)(5).
74. Id. § 823(f)(5).
75. See id. § 823(a).
76. Id. § 823(b), (d), (e).
77. Id. § 823(a), (d).
78. Id. § 823(b), (e).
79. Id. § 823(a)(6), (b)(5), (d)(6), (e)(5). There are similar catch-all factors for practitioner
(doctor and pharmacy) registrants and List I distributor registrants, but they do not contain the same
language that was defined by the EPAEDEA. See id. § 823(f)(5) (“Such other conduct which may
threaten the public health and safety.” (emphasis added)); id. § 823(h)(5) (“[S]uch other factors as are
relevant to and consistent with the public health and safety.” (emphasis added)).
80. Id. § 824(a), (a)(4).
81. Id. § 823(a)(6), (b)(5), (d)(6), (e)(5).
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addition to other enumerated factors, when reviewing whether to grant an
application or sanction a registration.82
Before the EPAEDEA, “factors as may be relevant to and consistent with
the public health and safety” was not statutorily defined.83 The EPAEDEA
adds the following: “In this section, the phrase ‘factors as may be relevant to
and consistent with the public health and safety’ means factors that are relevant
to and consistent with the findings contained in [21 U.S.C. § 801].”84
Co-sponsors of the EPAEDEA, like the media and the White House in its
press release, did not emphasize the new definition to the extent they did the
other two changes. One co-sponsor, apparently referencing this new definition,
stated that the EPAEDEA “will better delineate the standards a company must
satisfy in order to obtain a [CSA] registration,”85 although he did not explain
why such delineation was needed. A few months later, at another session, he
more explicitly explained that the EPAEDEA “makes three important changes
to the [CSA],” and, as relevant to this definition, explained that “it clarifies the
factors that the Attorney General is required to consider when deciding whether
to register an applicant to manufacture or distribute controlled substances.”86
He continued:
The current text of the [CSA] instructs the Attorney General to
consider factors that “may be relevant to and consistent with
the public health and safety,” but it does not provide any
guidance as to what those factors might be. This vague
language creates uncertainty among advocates regarding the
standards they must meet to obtain a registration.
[The EPAEDEA] reduces this uncertainty by tying those
standards to Congress’s findings in [21 U.S.C. § 801]
regarding the benefits, harms, and commercial impact of
controlled substances. This change will bring clarity to the
registration process and provide better guidance to regulators
as they consider applications to manufacture or distribute
controlled substances.87

82. Id. § 823(a)–(e).
83. See id. § 823.
84. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-145,
§ 2, 130 Stat. 353, 354 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 823(j)).
85. 162 CONG. REC. S954 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
86. 162 CONG. REC. S2006 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2016) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
87. Id. at S2006-07.
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Therefore, the single basis of support offered for the addition of this definition
was that it would purportedly make the catch-all factor clearer for potential
registrants.88
To the extent that this portion of the EPAEDEA was aimed at providing a
supplemental definition because the catch-all factors used by the Agency were
too vague, it is not altogether clear why the insertion of a definition that extends
only to manufacturers and distributors was adequate to achieve that goal. It
might seem that if the catch-all language for manufacturers and distributors
created such “uncertainty among advocates”89 for those registrants that it
required a more specific definition linking it to certain congressional findings,
then it is likely that advocates for pharmacies, physicians, and List I distributors
would also be uncertain about the catch-all language in the equivalent factors
applicable to those applicants/registrants, as the language is remarkably similar.
However, Congress elected to leave the existing catch-all language for
practitioners90 and List I distributors91 in place—and to leave it undefined.
Thus, the EPAEDEA either created an enhanced definition for two types of
applicants/registrants that was not truly necessary, or it created an enhanced
definition only for those types of registrants, while failing to address the same
problem for the remaining applicants and registrants covered by the CSA.
Additionally, to the extent that Congress had perceived a need to do so, it
certainly had the ability to supplement the public interest factors with specific,
enumberated sub-factors.
While it has yet to be tested, this newly-defined factor should be watched
closely in the years to come. Time will tell if the CSA enhancements supplied
by Congress in the EPAEDEA achieved its espoused beneficial objectives, or
whether the entire effort proves to have been a solution in search of a problem.
Whether the new language serves as a helpful clarifier or creates wide potential
for manufacturers and distributors—but, notably, not other types of
registrants—to dramatically constrict the range of evidence available for
regulators to properly consider within the confines of § 801 (or whether it will
do both or neither) will only be discernible after all sides take the new statute
for a test drive.
III. AGENCY PRECEDENT
Agency legal thinking, as expressed through the final orders it has issued
recently, has taken dramatic swings and detours that are certain to affect
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id.
Id.
21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(5) (2012).
Id. § 823(h)(5).
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diversion litigation, the options chosen by prosecutors, and the advice given to
clients. Both sides of the litigation equation should be familiar with other
nuanced details, set forth only in Agency final orders, that may affect the
parties’ relative positions.
The most tectonic shifts in recent Agency legal interpretation arguably
occurred in the field of practitioners in general, and pharmacies in particular.
In a relatively brief period of time, the DEA, through its final order precedent,
has modified numerous legal standards, the bulk of which may ultimately
increase the challenges faced by its own agents and prosecutors to prevail in its
enforcement efforts.
A. The Public Interest Factors for Practitioners
In the course of supplying a framework for the granting and sanctioning of
DEA controlled substance registrations for practitioners, Congress directed that
the Attorney General92 must consider and balance five factors (the Public
Interest Factors).93 The Public Interest Factors regarding practitioners are as
follows:
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing
board or professional disciplinary authority[;]
(2) The applicant’s [or registrant’s] experience in dispensing,
or conducting research with respect to controlled substances[;]
(3) The applicant’s [or registrant’s] conviction record under
Federal or State laws relating to the manufacture, distribution,
or dispensing of controlled substances[;]
(4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws
relating to controlled substances[; and]
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health
and safety.94
While the text of the CSA relating to the Public Interest Factors has not
been changed, the Agency’s interpretation of the public interest standard for
practitioners generally, and certain aspects of Public Interest Factors One and
Two95 in particular, have been evolving.

92. This authority has been delegated to the Administrator. 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.100(b), 0.103(a)
(2017). The Administrator, in turn, may delegate this authority to the Deputy Administrator. Id.
§ 0.104.
93. 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(f), 824(a)(4).
94. Id. § 823(f)(1)–(5).
95. Id. § 823(f)(1)–(2).
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1. The Re-Re-Tweaking of Public Interest Factor One
In Wesley Pope, M.D., the Agency directed some attention to explaining
how it intends to handle evidence under Public Interest Factor One in the
future.96 Public Interest Factor One requires the Agency to consider, in
determining the public interest, “[t]he recommendation of the appropriate State
licensing board or professional disciplinary authority.”97 Inasmuch as the
ultimate responsibility to determine whether a registration is consistent with the
public interest has been delegated exclusively to the DEA and not to entities
within a state government,98 it is not surprising that the actions of state licensing
and disciplinary authorities have not historically played a case-dispositive role
in diversion cases under Factor One.99 Notwithstanding the seeming simplicity
of the language utilized by Congress in this straightforward provision, final
orders from the Agency regarding this factor have presented a surprising level
of inconsistency.100
The plain language of Public Interest Factor One reflects that Congress
made the existence of a “recommendation of the appropriate State licensing
board or professional disciplinary authority”101 the clear condition precedent
for consideration of evidence under this factor. Where a “recommendation” by
one of those bodies exists and is part of the record,102 it is to be considered in
the Agency’s determination of whether granting or continuing a registration is
in the public interest, and where the record does not contain a recommendation
from a state licensing authority or disciplinary board, no evidence may be
96. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14965 n.36 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017).
97. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(1).
98. Edmund Chein, M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 6580, 6590 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 12, 2007), pet. for
rev. denied, Chein v. DEA, 533 F.3d 828, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1139 (2009).
99. See, e.g., George Mathew, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 66138, 66145 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 27,
2010) (declining to adopt as dispositive under Factor One the state medical board’s sanction of
suspending respondent’s medical license, the Agency then stayed the suspension in a case where
respondent was prescribing controlled substances without physically examining patients or
maintaining medical records); Patrick W. Stodola, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 20727, 20730 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. May 5, 2009) (considering the Agency’s acknowledgement that “the record contain[ed] no
evidence that the [state] ha[d] taken action against [r]espondent’s medical license” as a Factor One
consideration and dismissed the issue without analysis). This is not to say that state licensing and
disciplinary actions do not ever play a case-dispositive role. In situations where a registrant or
applicant lacks the requisite authority to handle controlled substances in his or her state, the Agency
has determined that revocation or denial is mandatory. E.g., Rezik A. Saqer, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 22122,
22126 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 14, 2016); see Mulrooney & Hull, supra note 1, at 333–34.
100. See Mulrooney & Hull, supra note 1, at 338–43.
101. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(1) (emphasis added).
102. See, e.g., John Porter Richards, D.O., 61 Fed. Reg. 13878, 13878 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar.
28, 1996) (relying upon a letter containing a recommendation from the Ohio State Board of Medicine).
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considered under Factor One.103 The plain language of the statute thus renders
a binding, binary choice based on whether or not the appropriate state agency
has made a recommendation.104
Notwithstanding the apparent clarity of congressional intent, over time
some, but not all, agency precedent progressively morphed into a “broader
view” of the term “recommendation.”105 This broader view embraced the
principle that, through an analysis of the actions of state licensing authorities,
the Agency may be able to divine what the state would have recommended to
the DEA regarding the disposition of a registration application or revocation if
it had actually made a recommendation, in cases where it did not actually make
such a recommendation.106 Under the broader interpretation, the Agency has,
at times, found that various forms of disciplinary action107 provide evidence
from which a recommendation against registration or continued registration
may somehow be extrapolated and then considered under a Factor One
analysis.108 Similarly, under this broad approach, the Agency has held that the
103. See 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(1).
104. Even if the straightforward language used by Congress did not render resort to legislative
history regarding Factor One superfluous, a review of the legislative history does not alter the result.
An isolated reference to a House Committee hearing notes that the inclusion of the state
recommendation among the mandatory factors to be considered by the DEA, and the placement of it
first among the Factors, was designed to ensure that “deference would continue to be given to the
opinions of the state licensing authorities.” Diversion of Prescription Drugs to Illegal Channels and
Dangerous Drug Diversion Control Act: Hearing on H.R. 4698 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 122–23 (1984) (statement of Gene R. Haislip, Deputy Assistant
Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration). This testimony
supports the obvious intent of the language to incorporate the “recommendation” of state authorities
regarding the disposition of DEA application and revocation decisions.
105. Compare Ralph J. Chambers, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 4962, 4969 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 30,
2014) (quoting Tony T. Bui, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 49979, 49986 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 16, 2010)),
with Scott D. Fedosky, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 71375, 71377 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 17, 2011), and
Gilbert Eugene Johnson, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 65663, 65666 n.3 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 26, 2010).
106. See cases cited supra note 105.
107. E.g., Tyson D. Quy, M.D., 78 Fed. Reg. 47412, 47417 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 5, 2013)
(state license placed on probation); Daniel Koller, D.V.M., 71 Fed. Reg. 66975, 66981 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. Nov. 17, 2006) (state license suspended); Gregory D. Owens, D.D.S., 67 Fed. Reg. 50461,
50463 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 2, 2002) (state license placed on probation); Robert M. Golden, M.D.,
65 Fed. Reg. 5663, 5664 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 4, 2000) (state license subjected to consent order);
Saihb S. Halil, M.D., 64 Fed. Reg. 33319, 33320–21 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 22, 1999) (state license
revoked); Jude R. Hayes, M.D., 59 Fed. Reg. 41785, 41786 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 15, 1994) (state
license placed on probation); Wilbert McClay, Jr., M.D., 59 Fed. Reg. 30612, 30614 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. June 14, 1994) (state license suspended); Myrtle L. Miller, D.O., 58 Fed. Reg. 64005, 64006
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Dec. 3, 1993) (state license revoked).
108. Chambers, 79 Fed. Reg. at 4969 (“DEA precedents have typically taken a broader view as
to the scope of [Factor One].” (quoting Bui, 75 Fed. Reg. at 49986)); Kenneth Harold Bull, M.D., 78
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restoration of a respondent’s state license,109 or the mere fact that a respondent
holds a state medical license,110 can be interpreted as a recommendation in favor
of registration or continued registration.
In Pope, the Agency included a footnote that may signal how it will
consider state actions that do not constitute recommendations to the DEA,111 at
least insofar as those actions ultimately result in the registrant or applicant
retaining state authority.112 Citing two cases decided by the Agency in 2002,113
the Agency explained that “the Agency’s case law contains some older
decisions which can be read as giving more than nominal weight in the public
interest determination to a [s]tate [b]oard’s decision (not involving a
recommendation to the DEA) either restoring or maintaining a practitioner’s
state authority to dispense controlled substances,”114 but noted that “these cases
cannot be squared with the Agency’s longstanding holding” that the
Administrator must make a determination independent from any state
determination as to whether “controlled substance privileges would be in the
public interest.”115 In the same footnote, the Agency, referencing several more
Fed. Reg. 62666, 62672 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 22, 2013) (“DEA has interpreted [F]actor [O]ne more
broadly and thus considers disciplinary actions taken by a state board as relevant in the public interest
determination . . . .”).
109. E.g., Quy, 78 Fed. Reg. at 47417; Vincent J. Scolaro, D.O., 67 Fed. Reg. 42060, 42064–65
(Drug Enf’t Admin. June 20, 2002); William E. Brown, D.O., 58 Fed. Reg. 64004, 64005 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. Dec. 3, 1993).
110. E.g., Margy Temponeras, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 45675, 45684 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 1,
2012) (“Although not dispositive, [r]espondent’s possession of a valid unrestricted medical
license . . . weighs against a finding that [r]espondent’s registration would be inconsistent with the
public interest.”). But see Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. 29053, 29058 n.13 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May
20, 2015) (ruling by Agency where it “considered” evidence that the respondent pharmacy was
registered with the state and that the state board took no action against the pharmacist license of its
owner and pharmacist-in-charge, but stating that the evidence does not “constitute a
recommendation . . . as to whether the DEA should grant the [pharmacy’s] application” for a DEA
registration).
111. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14965 n.36 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017).
112. Id. While Pope only explicitly addressed how a state authority’s reinstatement of a state
license (or inaction as to a state license) would be considered, if the state board revokes or suspends
the practitioner’s ability to handle controlled substances in the state in which the practitioner is
registered with the DEA, the Agency routinely holds that such practitioner “does not meet the CSA’s
essential requirement for maintaining a practitioner’s registration,” e.g., Steven Bernhard, D.O., 82
Fed. Reg. 23298, 23300 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 22, 2017), and thus no consideration under Factor
One is necessary to the disposition of the case.
113. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14965 n.36 (citing Gregory D. Owens, 67 Fed. Reg. 50461, 50463
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 2, 2002); and then citing Scolaro, 67 Fed. Reg. at 42065).
114. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14965 n.36 (citing Owens, 67 Fed. Reg. at 50463).
115. Id. (quoting Mortimer Levin, D.O., 57 Fed. Reg. 8680, 8681 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 11,
1992)).
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recent cases, acknowledged that “in other cases, [it] has given some weight to
a [state board’s] action in allowing a practitioner to retain his state authority
even in the absence of an express recommendation,”116 but noted that “the
Agency has repeatedly held that a practitioner’s retention of [his or her] state
authority is not dispositive of the public interest inquiry.”117
Based on its language in the footnote in Pope, the Agency appears to be
signaling that it may be willing to consider evidence that a state entity has
reinstated (or not acted upon) a registrant’s or applicant’s state license under
Factor One, but that it may give such evidence no more than “nominal
weight,”118 and, in any event, such evidence will not be dispositive. Inasmuch
as the Agency has long held that retention of state authority is a threshold
statutory requirement for entitlement to hold a DEA registration,119 this analysis
may result in more confusion than clarity, because the line between assessing
threshold state controlled substance authority and evidence to be considered
under Factor One is arguably somewhat blurred. If this footnote signals a
deliberate navigation to a more consistent application of how evidence will be
considered (or not considered) under Factor One, this aspect of Pope would
likely be welcomed by the practicing bar and the regulated community. After
many years and no small amount of vacillation, it now appears that the Agency
may be considering a swerve back to the plain language provided by Congress
relative to Factor One, meaning that for a state action to be considered with any
measurable weight under Factor One, it must constitute a recommendation from
a state licensing or disciplinary board, not merely some action related to state
licensure. The Factor One language in Pope does specifically note that the
respondent’s state board “has not made a recommendation to the Agency with
respect to whether his [DEA registration] application should be granted,”120
which sounds like some movement towards a plain-language Factor One
approach, but the decision stopped short of settling the matter. However, a
subsequent final order, David D. Moon, D.O., provides some reason to believe
that the Agency is moving in a cognizable direction back towards a plainlanguage requirement for an actual state recommendation, with less reliance on

116. Id. (citing Paul Weir Battershell, N.P., 76 Fed. Reg. 44359, 44366 (Drug Enf’t Admin.
July 25, 2011)).
117. Id. (citing Battershell, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44366).
118. Id. (citing Owens, 67 Fed. Reg. at 50463 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 2, 2002); and then citing
Scolaro, 67 Fed. Reg. at 42065).
119. James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 71371, 71372 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 17, 2011),
pet. for rev. denied, Hooper v. Holder, 481 F. App’x 826 (4th Cir. 2012).
120. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14965 n.36.

CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT)

356

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101

[101:333

trying to distill intent from non-recommendations.121 For all sides of the
litigation aisle, less dependence on legal alchemy is likely welcome.
Another interesting Factor One question addressed by the Agency is
whether an adverse action taken, or recommendation given, by a state authority
other than the state in which the applicant seeks to be registered (or the
registrant seeks to maintain his registration) could ever be considered by the
Agency and, if so, what weight it would be given. In Zizhuang Li, M.D., the
Agency rejected the Government’s argument that revocation of the
practitioner’s state license in Mississippi should be considered in determining
whether to grant an application for licensure in California,122 holding that the
Mississippi Medical Board was not the “appropriate” state licensing board.123
Li thus appears to foreclose consideration of adverse actions taken in states
other than the state in which a respondent seeks a new or continued registration
under Factor One. The practicing bar on both sides will likely wonder why the
Agency’s interpretation seems to preclude any consideration of an adverse
action taken by a state, merely because it is a different state than the one in
which the registrant seeks to hold a DEA registration. However, it is still
unclear whether the Agency would extend Li so far as to ignore such evidence
if it were in the format of an actual recommendation made to the DEA regarding
a registration by a different state’s licensing authority.
Although rarely pursued by litigants on either side, a recommendation
garnered from a state tribunal for or against a DEA sanction, depending on the
facts of the case and the strength of the recommendation, could potentially
constitute powerful evidence for the Government or a respondent, and Pope at
least suggests that from now on, such a recommendation may be the only
evidence that will be considered with any weight under Factor One. The
takeaway here is that, in a post-Pope world, both sides should be looking harder
at Factor One.
2. Is Public Interest Factor Two Shrinking, Melding, Both, or Neither?
The Pope case also presented a fascinating next chapter in what could
arguably be characterized as the Agency’s progressive constricting of evidence
properly considered “experience” under Public Interest Factor Two in
practitioner cases.124 Factor Two compels consideration of “[t]he applicant’s

121.
27, 2017).
122.
123.
124.

See, e.g., David D. Moon, D.O., 82 Fed. Reg. 19385, 19387 n.5 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr.
Zizhuang Li, M.D., 78 Fed. Reg. 71660, 71663 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 29, 2013).
Id.
See Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14964–65 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(2) (2012)).
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experience in dispensing, or conducting research with respect to controlled
substances.”125 Inasmuch as the statutory definition of “dispense” includes
“prescribing” and “administering,”126 this Section addresses experience
regarding those regulated activities as well.127
Before discussing the Factor Two aspects of Pope, a consideration of the
language and history of Factor Two is pertinent. It is axiomatic that the
interpretation of any statute begins and ends with an examination of clear,
directive language.128 “[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted
as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,”129 and “[w]here
language is clear and unambiguous, it must be followed except in the most
extraordinary situation where the language leads to an absurd result contrary to
clear legislative intent.”130 The plain language of Factor Two supplies a
mandate by Congress for the Agency, in determining the public interest, to
consider “[t]he applicant’s experience in dispensing, or conducting research
with respect to controlled substances.”131 The simplicity of the language directs
no more than a mandatory evaluation of the experience that an applicant brings
to the regulated activity the applicant seeks to conduct within the scope of a
DEA certificate of registration. Congress did not limit or qualify the experience
that the Agency is required to consider under this factor, nor did Congress
authorize the Agency to ignore offered evidence on the subject by caprice. If a
party to an administrative registration adjudication offers relevant evidence
regarding the applicant’s or registrant’s experience that is not otherwise
inadmissible, the language selected by Congress appears to unequivocally
require its admission and consideration under Factor Two.
125. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(2).
126. Id. § 802(10).
127. For general background regarding the language and reach of Factor Two, see Mulrooney &
Hull, supra note 1, at 343–46.
128. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (“We
begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute
is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,
that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”); see also Woods v. Standard Ins. Co., 771
F.3d 1257, 1265 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating that if a court finds statutory language clear, its inquiry ends;
only if language is “ambiguous” does court turn to legislative history); Falvo v. Owasso Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. I-011, 233 F.3d 1201, 1203 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000) (same). It is well-settled that “words should
be given their ‘ordinary meaning.’” Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (citing Richards
v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)).
129. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
130. United States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873, 876 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Tagore,
158 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 1998)); see Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 571–72
(1982); Comm’r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965).
131. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f)(2).

CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT)

358

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101

[101:333

It could be persuasively argued that the precision of the language employed
by Congress in Factor Two all but precludes resort to any source beyond the
statute itself, but even if it were not so, a review of the legislative history
specific to this provision reveals no intention to impose limitations on the
evidence to be considered under this Factor. The single reservation evident in
the legislative history was a clarification that an absence of any prior
experience, at least in the case of a recently-graduated practitioner, should not
be considered negatively against such a practitioner.132
Some context regarding the Agency’s and the courts’ treatment of Factor
Two is also helpful in navigating the Agency’s current course. Historically, the
Agency placed evidence of an applicant’s past experience engaging in the
regulated activity under its Factor Two discussion, but eventually reasoned that
a robust level of benign, or even commendable, experience could be easily
outweighed by other evidence demonstrating that granting a registration
application was inconsistent with the public interest.133 Even though the
132. Specifically, a House of Representatives committee hearing report clarifies that Factor Two
“shall not, of course, be construed in [any way] to hinder registration of recent graduates of professional
schools who may have no professional experience dispensing or conducting research with controlled
substances.” H.R. REP. NO. 98-835, pt. 1, at 14 (1984). This brief statement resulted from input by
the American Pharmaceutical Association (APhA), stemming from its concern that the absence of
experience would bar the registration of recent pharmacy school graduates. Hearing, supra note 104,
at 334 (statement of Maurice Q. Bectel, Interim President, American Pharmaceutical Association).
Thus, it is clear that the Factor Two language signified to the APhA that, unless its concerns on the
point were addressed, the draft language chosen (and ultimately adopted) by Congress would require
the Agency to consider the applicant’s prior experience in the regulated field—or lack thereof—in
order to gauge applicant suitability. During the legislative hearing process, the American Veterinary
Medical Association (AVMA) also expressed a reservation that the draft Factor Two language
(ultimately retained by Congress) would address conduct also covered by Factor Three (conviction of
a felony related to controlled substances) and Factor Four (compliance with laws relating to controlled
substances), thus rendering consideration of evidence under this factor duplicative. Id. at 425 (written
statement of the American Veterinary Medical Association). As discussed later in this Section, the
interpretive evolution currently embraced by the Agency regarding the application of the Public
Interest Factors to all evidence of record has rendered the AVMA prescient in this regard. See
discussion infra pp. 366–68.
133. See, e.g., Med. Shoppe–Jonesborough, 73 Fed. Reg. 364, 386 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 2,
2008) (acknowledging, under its discussion of Factor Two, that the respondent had 17,000 patients,
but finding that established misconduct, which related to only a relatively small portion of the
respondent’s patient population, outweighed any other conduct); Paul J. Caragine, Jr., 63 Fed. Reg.
51592, 51600 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 28, 1998) (acknowledging, in its discussion of Factor Two,
that during twenty years of practice, the respondent saw over 15,000 patients, but noting that, “even
though the patients at issue are only a small portion of [r]espondent’s patient population, his
prescribing of controlled substances to [the patients at issue] raises serious concerns regarding [his]
ability to responsibly handle controlled substances in the future”); see also Ivan D. Garcia-Ramirez,
M.D., 69 Fed. Reg. 62092, 62093 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 22, 2004) (finding Factor Two irrelevant
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Agency has considered the experience of List 1 applicants134 on the issue of
whether they possess the level of experience and subject area knowledge to
discharge effectively the obligations of a registrant,135 it has dismissed the
notion of applying this rationale to practitioner cases.136
In 2006, in its discussion of Factor Two in Krishna-Iyer, M.D., the Agency
discussed only the established transgressions, and did not mention evidence in
the record regarding other experience or weigh the wrongdoings against such
evidence.137 On appeal, in Krishna-Iyer v. DEA,138 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted (in an unpublished per curiam decision)
that “the DEA is required to consider the [Public Interest Factors] to determine
if continued certification is against the public interest,”139 and criticized the
Agency for failing to adequately consider evidence admitted to the record of
proceedings under Factor Two.140 In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit held:
In considering [p]etitioner’s experience in dispensing
controlled substances under [F]actor [Two], the DEA
identified only four visits by three undercover “patients,” who
were all attempting to make a case against her. The DEA failed
to consider [p]etitioner’s experience with twelve patients
whose medical charts were seized by the DEA, or with
thousands of other patients. In short, the DEA did not consider
any of [p]etitioner’s positive experience in dispensing
controlled substances. This is an arbitrary and unfair analysis
of [p]etitioner’s experience. We vacate the order of the
to public interest determination because “there is no information in the investigative file relative to
[r]espondent’s lawful handling of controlled substances in his professional practice” where practitioner
pled guilty to one felony count of possession with intent to import heroin).
134. 21 U.S.C. § 823(h).
135. See, e.g., TNT Distribs., Inc., 70 Fed. Reg. 12729, 12731 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 15,
2005); Volusia Wholesale, 69 Fed. Reg. 69409, 69410 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 29, 2004); K & Z
Enters., Inc., 69 Fed. Reg. 51475, 51476 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 19, 2004); Island Wholesale, Inc.,
68 Fed. Reg. 17406, 17407 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 9, 2003).
136. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Cadet, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 19450, 19450 n.3 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr.
7, 2011) (noting only that List 1 distributors are “a different category of registrant[s],” the Agency
proceeded to dismiss the comparative rationale).
137. Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 71 Fed. Reg. 52148, 52158 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 1, 2006),
vacated, Krishna-Iyer v. DEA, 249 F. App’x 159 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), remanded to Jayam
Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 459 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 6, 2009). In its findings of fact, the
Agency noted that the practitioner testified that she had around 800 to 1000 recurring patients and saw
around 3,000 patients per year. Id. at 52149. It also made findings regarding her education, training,
and experience at various hospitals. Id.
138. 249 F. App’x 159.
139. Id. at 159.
140. Id. at 160.
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[Agency] and remand the case for reconsideration of this
factor, where the DEA should pay particular attention to the
entire corpus of [p]etitioner’s record in dispensing controlled
substances, not only the experience of undercover officers.
The five factors should accordingly be re-balanced.141
The court’s directive to the Agency seemed clear enough: on remand,
rebalance the evidence considered under Factor Two in light of the entire
corpus of the prescriber’s experience, and rebalance the five factors
accordingly.142 The Agency could have easily done what it had historically
done: briefly discuss the evidence under Factor Two, but ultimately find that
the established misconduct outweighed the positive or benign conduct.143
Instead, the Agency pushed back somewhat on the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis,
stating:
[E]vidence that a practitioner has treated thousands of patients
does not negate a prima facie showing that the practitioner has
committed acts inconsistent with the public interest. While
such evidence may be of some weight in assessing whether a
practitioner has credibly shown that she has reformed her
practices, where a practitioner commits intentional acts of
diversion and insists she did nothing wrong, such evidence is
entitled to no weight.144
Thus, the Agency’s reply to the Circuit Court of Appeals was essentially
that it would obey its directive to consider positive experience, but that it would
only do so as a matter of sanction discretion in cases where the respondent
accepts responsibility for the transgressions alleged against it, not under Factor
Two when determining whether the Government has met its prima facie burden
that registration is not in the public interest.145 The Agency emphasized its
qualified acceptance of the court’s mandate with this additional statement:
[E]ven where the Agency’s proof establishes that a practitioner
has committed only a few acts of diversion, this Agency will
not grant or continue the practitioner’s registration unless he
accepts responsibility for his misconduct. Put another way,
even where the Government proves only a few instances of
illegal prescribing in the “entire corpus” of a practitioner’s
experience, the Government has nonetheless made out a prima
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See Paul J. Caragine, Jr., 63 Fed. Reg. 51592 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 28, 1998).
144. Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 459, 463 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 6, 2009) (second
emphasis added).
145. See id.
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facie case and thus shifted the burden to the registrant to show
why he should be entrusted with a new registration.146
Thus, in its second order, the Agency essentially adhered to its previous
(pre-remand) analysis, with the additional wrinkle that, in a case where the
Government had established acts of intentional misconduct, the Agency would
not consider the entire corpus of a practitioner’s experience in its analysis of
Factor Two, nor would it consider benign or positive experience at all unless
the respondent has manifested an unconditional acceptance of responsibility.147
While true that, if writing upon a clean slate, it may not have been unreasonable
for the Agency to insist upon an acceptance of responsibility to render evidence
of benign or commendable conduct more probative to a registrant’s defense that
established misconduct was an aberration and he should be entrusted with a
registration, the analysis is remarkable in that it risks the appearance of the
Agency substituting its own structure of analysis for that created by Congress
(the body that required consideration of this evidence without qualification in
Factor Two) and for the legal interpretation set forth in the decision of the
Eleventh Circuit.
Inasmuch as the Agency’s second final order in Krishna-Iyer granted the
doctor in that case a registration with conditions,148 the case was never reappealed to the Eleventh Circuit, and the final order was maintained as a
recurrent bedrock of Agency precedent.149 In MacKay v. DEA, the Tenth
Circuit upheld an Agency final order that included the Agency-created
Krishna-Iyer analysis, but the Agency’s failure to consider experience evidence
under Factor Two was not a significant focus of the court’s affirmance
opinion;150 instead, the Tenth Circuit found that the Agency “considered the
entire record” to include the hypothetical situation that the doctor “had provided
proper medical care to all of his other patients” and found that it did not
outweigh the evidence of negative experience.151 Likewise, in McNichol v.
DEA152 the Eleventh Circuit found that the Agency’s decision, which had
146. Id. at 464 (footnotes omitted).
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14982–85 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23,
2017); T.J. McNichol, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 57133, 57144–49 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 17, 2012), pet.
for rev. denied, McNichol v. DEA, 537 F. App’x 905 (11th Cir. 2013); Beau Boshers, M.D., 76 Fed.
Reg. 19401, 19402–13 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 7, 2011); Dewey C. MacKay, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg.
49956, 49973–78 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 16, 2010), pet. for rev. denied, MacKay v. DEA, 664 F.3d
808 (10th Cir. 2011).
150. See MacKay, 664 F.3d at 819.
151. Id.
152. 537 F. App’x 905.
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included the Krishna-Iyer analysis, was supported by substantial evidence and
was not arbitrary and capricious.153 However, the Eleventh Circuit did not
mention the Krishna-Iyer analysis, or even Factor Two specifically, in its
unpublished decision.154
After Krishna-Iyer, the Agency’s reliance upon its own interpretation of
Factor Two has become increasingly restrictive, and the Agency has become
increasingly critical of any ALJ who recommends a different analysis of it to
the Administrator when considering the facts of a particular case.155 In JM
Pharmacy, the Agency held that it was error for the DEA ALJ to find in a
recommended decision that Factor Two calls for the Agency to analyze “the
qualitative manner and the quantitative volume in which an applicant has
engaged” in regulated activity.156 By placing italics on the “quantitative
volume” aspect of the recommended decision, the Agency presumably signaled
that, under Factor Two, it only wishes to receive and consider evidence
regarding the “qualitative manner” in which regulated activity has been
conducted, and will exclude any consideration relative to the “quantitative
volume.”157 Based on that language, it now seems apparent that a registrant
153. Id. at 906.
154. See McNichol, 537 F. App’x 905. In Pope, the Agency discussed another case, Lynch v.
DEA, 480 F. App’x 946 (11th Cir. 2012), which it said also rejected an alternative view of the Agency’s
Krishna-Iyer analysis. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14983. While the Agency discussed arguments raised
by the practitioner in his briefs before the Eleventh Circuit in that case, neither the Agency’s decision
nor the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision mentions Krishna-Iyer or discusses the Agency’s
decision to not consider evidence of positive experience under Factor Two. See Ronald Lynch, M.D.,
75 Fed. Reg. 78745 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Dec. 16, 2010), pet. for rev. denied, Lynch v. DEA, 480 F.
App’x 946.
155. See, e.g., Syed Jawed Akhtar-Zaidi, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 42962, 42962 n.2 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. July 20, 2015) (scolding ALJ by saying that “every Administrator and Deputy Administrator
who has exercised [Agency authority] . . . has rejected the ALJ’s view”); Clair L. Pettinger, M.D., 78
Fed. Reg. 61591, 61597 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 3, 2013) (describing ALJ’s reasoning as “illogical”
for analyzing Factor Two in terms of “both the qualitative and quantitative volume of the
[r]espondent’s experience”); McNichol, 77 Fed. Reg. at 57144 (excoriating ALJ publicly throughout
the Agency final order for legal and factual analysis, to include the ALJ’s attempt to follow the
directives of the Eleventh Circuit in Krishna-Iyer v. DEA, 249 Fed. App’x 159, 160 (11th Cir. 2007)),
aff’d per curiam, T.J. McNichol v. DEA, 537 Fed.Appx. 905 (11th Cir. 2013) (lacking discussion in
affirmance regarding Factor Two analysis); Randall L. Wolff, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 5106, 5121 (Drug
Enf’t Admin. Feb. 1, 2012) (rejecting respondent’s contention that he was prejudiced by the denial of
his ability to access his own seized medical charts to establish his experience under Factor Two in light
of the purported irrelevance of such evidence under Krishna-Iyer); Jeri Hassman, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg.
8194, 8235 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 23, 2010) (characterizing ALJ’s analysis as “erroneous” for
including a comparison between the two acts of substandard prescribing with the over nine-hundred
presumably benign prescribing events).
156. JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 28667, 28667 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 2015).
157. See id.
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seeking to demonstrate that the established non-compliance was an anomaly
can no longer introduce evidence that the misconduct represented only a small
percentage of the registrant’s body of compliant regulated activity, even though
Congress mandated that such evidence be considered under Factor Two.
In Pope, the Agency vehemently rejected the suggestion that the Agency
had narrowed Factor Two beyond its plain meaning and in contravention of
Congress and the Eleventh Circuit’s directives.158 In doing so, the Agency cited
multiple definitions of the word “experience” from two dictionaries159 and
distilled no obligation to consider the quantity of benign regulated activity to
any extent.160 Confusingly, in addressing Congress’s reservation regarding new
registration applicants in the legislative history, the Agency posited that “if
Factor Two’s meaning was so plain,” there would have been “no need to
express that it should not be construed to deny registrations to newly-licensed
practitioners, most of whom can point to no volume of dispensing other than
by observing a physician during clinical rotations.”161 Additionally, the
Agency bristled at the notion that it failed to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s
direction in Krishna-Iyer, proposing instead that “the Administrator carefully
reviewed” the additional files in evidence and assumed that the rest of the
prescriptions the practitioner had issued were lawful, but that the additional
files “did not negate the Government’s prima facie showing that the physician
had knowingly diverted drugs to others.”162
By adjusting the analysis through its adjudications, the Agency has, in
essence, decided that its examination of a registrant’s experience under Factor
Two will be generally limited to the Government’s established allegations
regarding the quality of an applicant’s activities.163 Stated differently, the only
experience to be considered will be the transgressions supported by the

158. See Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14982.
159. Id. at 14982 n.54. The definitions provided by the Agency as “those most relevant in
assessing” the meaning of “experience” in the context of Factor Two are:
(1) The “direct observation of or participation in events as a basis for knowledge,”
(2) “the fact or state of having been affected by or gained knowledge through
direct observation or participation,” (3) “practical knowledge, skill, . . . or
participation in events or in a particular activity,” and (4) “the length of such
participation.”
Id. (citing Experience, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1998)).
160. See id. at 14982.
161. Id. at 14982 n.55. It is difficult to understand what the Agency intended to convey by this
statement.
162. Id. at 14982–83.
163. See id. at 14982.
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preponderant evidence of record.164 Further, to the extent the universe of
experience is further constricted, Factor Two analysis, in the majority of
Agency cases, consists largely of a reprise of adverse evidence also considered
under Factor Four (compliance with laws pertaining to controlled
substances),165 to wit: experience that shows proven misconduct in violation of
state and federal laws. The Agency’s affinity for the merging of Public Interest
Factors Two and Four was signaled in Syed Jawed Akhtar-Zaidi, M.D., a recent
case where the Agency held that “[p]roof that a physician knowingly diverted
controlled substances is the best evidence for assessing his experience in
dispensing controlled substances, although it is also relevant in assessing his
compliance with applicable laws related to controlled substances.”166 Thus, the
Agency’s precedent has, in effect, morphed Factor Two into a consideration
where the only evidence to be considered is evaluated once under Factor Two,
and then again under Factor Four.
By framing its analysis in terms of whether the registrant or applicant can
“negate the Government’s prima facie showing”167 with evidence of positive
dispensing experience, the Agency has signaled that evidence of positive
experience will not be considered in the Public Interest Factor analysis—the
analysis which determines whether the Government has met its prima facie
burden—but will instead be considered at some later point, after the Agency
has shifted the burden to the respondent.168 In Pope, the Agency noted that,
“[a]s in past cases, the parties may continue to introduce evidence as to the
extent of both a practitioner’s lawful or unlawful dispensing activities,”169 but
also reminded litigants that, “in past cases, [the] Agency has given no more
than nominal weight to a practitioner’s evidence that he has dispensed
controlled substances to thousands of patients in circumstances which did not
involve diversion.”170 A practitioner may understandably be left to wonder
whether to seek the introduction of evidence of positive experience at all and,
if so, how to demonstrate the extent of such lawful dispensing to the ALJ when
the Agency has previously declared such evidence to be essentially irrelevant.
If, as JM Pharmacy concluded, analysis of the “quantitative volume” of benign,

164.
165.
166.
20, 2015).
167.
168.
169.
170.

See id.
21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2012).
Syed Jawed Akhtar-Zaidi, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 42962, 42969 n.17 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July
Pope, 82 Fed.Reg. at 14983.
See id. at 14982–83.
Id. at 14982.
Id.
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compliant conduct is per se irrelevant,171 then it may not be altogether clear how
to establish admissibility for the evidence such that the Agency would be able
to consider it in its sanction determination. Additionally, if the volume of
benign, compliant conduct is not relevant to the Agency’s analysis, then a
practitioner who seeks to juxtapose several acts that fall below the applicable
standard with evidence of an expansive otherwise-compliant history stands in
the same position no matter whether the registrant has practiced for decades or
for less than a month.
While not altogether clear how the Agency intends to consider evidence of
a history of benign conduct outside of Factor Two, the Agency has provided
some clues. In Roy S. Schwartz, the Agency, in discussing the issue of sanction
in a non-hearing case, utilized language that was eerily similar to Factor Two
analysis language and found that “the Government produced no evidence that
the [r]egistrant has engaged in any other misconduct related to controlled
substances during the course of his professional career, which has spanned
more than fifty years.”172 In Pope, the Agency more explicitly stated that “in
these proceedings, the Agency will assume, without requiring the production
of any evidence by a respondent, that the practitioner has lawfully issued every
prescription other than those alleged by the Government to be unlawful.”173 In
Roberto Zayas, M.D., the Agency stated that the Public Interest Factors
simply shape the scope of the relevant evidence in the
proceeding, and given the nature of this inquiry, the Agency
properly considers a respondent’s evidence of a lengthy history
of compliance after the Government makes out its prima facie
case, as determining what sanction is necessary to protect the
public interest is the ultimate purpose of these provisions.174
Thus, the Agency has signaled to the regulated community that, where the
Government produces no evidence of other misconduct over the course of a
lengthy career as a registrant, the Agency, in its final order, may be willing to
assume it to be benign and may be willing to consider it as a matter of sanction
discretion.175 Both sides of the litigation equation should thus be prepared to
make their case for the Agency to exercise its discretion—apparently outside
the bounds of the Public Interest Factors—in their favor.

171.
2015).
172.
173.
174.
175.

See JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 28667, 28667 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19,
Roy S. Schwartz, 79 Fed. Reg. 34360, 34363 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 16, 2014).
Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14984.
Roberto Zayas, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 21410, 21422 n.27 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 8, 2017).
See id.

CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT)

366

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101

[101:333

3. The Blurring of the Factors
Perhaps foreshadowed by the blurring of the line between Factor Two and
Factor Four over time,176 in Zayas, the Agency announced what many
experienced practitioners may have quietly feared: that it does not matter to the
Agency which factor or factors evidence is considered under, and the Agency
believes that it has no obligation to parse out which evidence is considered
under what factor.177 This is so, the Agency posits, because “misconduct is
misconduct whether it is relevant under Factor Two, Factor Four, or Factor
Five, or multiple factors,” and because “the inquiry focuses on protecting the
public interest; what matters is the seriousness of the registrant’s or applicant’s
misconduct.”178 Regarding the danger that, under such an interpretation, the
Agency could consider the same evidence multiple times under multiple
factors, the Zayas order tenders the Agency’s assurance that, because its own
prior final orders “ha[ve] repeatedly explained that it does not mechanically
count up the [Public Interest F]actors and determine how many favor the
Government versus how many favor the respondent,” there is no danger to the
regulated community that their transgressions will be given additional weight
if considered multiple times under multiple factors.179 A representation that the
Agency is disinclined to “mechanically count up the [Public Interest
F]actors,”180 even if accepted at its face value, is not a phrase that is readily
understandable in the context of a legislative format that requires the balancing
of public interest factors. It is challenging to perceive why this phrase would
supply comfort to litigants and courts concerned about the risk that the same
evidence will be or has been considered more than once under multiple factors,
yielding results that militate in favor of the sanction sought by the enforcement
arm of the Agency. For example, in a hypothetical case where the same
evidence is considered under both Factors Two and Four, and the Agency final
order explains that both of these factors weigh in favor of a sanction, legal and
evidentiary analysis on appeal can become obfuscated, and assurances by the

176. E.g., Randall L. Wolff, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 5106, 5121 n.26 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 1,
2012) (“[W]hether conduct is considered under [F]actor [T]wo—the experience factor, or [F]actor
[F]our—the compliance factor, or both factors, is of no legal consequence because the fundamental
question is whether the registrant ‘has committed such acts as would render [his]
registration . . . inconsistent with the public interest.’” (final and penultimate alterations in original)
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4) (2012))).
177. Zayas, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21420.
178. Id. at 21422 (footnote omitted).
179. See id.
180. Id.
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Agency “that it does not mechanically count up the [Public Interest F]actors”181
or that “misconduct is misconduct”182 will bring little to the analysis.
The Zayas analysis is potentially nettlesome in several respects. Congress,
obviously recognizing the potential that the term “public interest” could be
viewed as sufficiently amorphous as to unfairly deprive the regulated
community of fair notice, or unfairly empower the regulators with too broad a
role in interpretation, supplied a specific definitional framework to the term as
it is used in determining whether to register (or continue the registration of)
practitioners under the CSA.183 At least at first blush, it is difficult to perceive
where blurring the lines cast by Congress would be helpful in guiding either
regulators or the regulated community in discerning the limits of acceptable
activity conducted under the authority of a DEA registration. There is a
potentially huge divide between consideration of evidence in specific
categories supplied by the statute,184 and a blanket pronouncement that
“misconduct is misconduct”185 could conceivably authorize a level of after-thefact Agency discretion that well exceeds congressional intent. Further, in terms
of defending adjudications on appeal, a past willingness by the courts to affirm
sanctions based on evidence considered under any one or more of the Public
Interest Factors,186 which is the rationale tendered by the Agency in its analysis
of why it need not specify what evidence is being considered under which
factors,187 may not translate into a willingness by the courts to embrace a
“misconduct is misconduct” approach to determining whether granting or
maintaining registration status is “inconsistent with the public interest.”188
Additionally, despite the Agency’s assurance that it does not count up the
factors to determine which weigh in favor of or against the respondent, where
Congress has declared that the public interest is defined by consideration of
record evidence under specific factors,189 those factors must inescapably be
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2012). Similar frameworks are used in determining whether to register
or sanction manufacturers, distributers of controlled substances, as well as distributors of List I
chemicals. See generally id. § 823. It is not altogether clear whether the Agency would follow the
same path that it has taken with practitioners if faced with similar cases regarding the other types of
registrants.
184. See Mulrooney & Hull, supra note 1, at 336–37.
185. Zayas, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21422.
186. See, e.g., Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165,
173–74 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Trawick v. DEA, 861 F.2d 72, 76 (4th Cir. 1988).
187. Zayas, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21422.
188. 21 U.S.C. § 823(f).
189. Id. (“In determining the public interest, the following factors shall be considered . . . .”).
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weighed and balanced against each other. The assurance that the Agency “does
not mechanically count up the [Public Interest F]actors”190 may provide scant
comfort to the regulated community, and even less guidance to regulators and
the diversion bar, about how misconduct will be considered against them.
4. The X Factor?
While Zayas suggested that the Agency is moving away from
differentiating between the factors when considering evidence of misconduct,
the Pope decision also contained a statement that was brief in terms of verbiage,
but potentially extremely consequential. In the same footnote where the
Agency discussed Factors One and Three, which it found to be insignificant to
its determination that the Government satisfied its prima facie burden, the
Administrator included the following statement: “While I have considered
[F]actor [F]ive, I deem it unnecessary to make any findings.”191 The
Administrator’s choice of words signals that the Agency apparently considered
evidence under Factor Five but “deem[ed] it unnecessary”192 to explain what
evidence was considered or in what manner it was analyzed, because it
ultimately concluded that “the Government’s evidence with respect to Factors
Two and Four satisfies its prima facie burden.”193 While the failure to consider
all Public Interest Factors has not garnered negative attention from the courts
on review,194 and the absence of any evidence offered or considered under a
particular factor is not uncommon, the declaration that the factor was
considered but its significance is not explained raises a potential analytical red
flag. The Supreme Court has made it clear that, in reviewing administrative
determinations rendered by federal agencies, “[t]he grounds upon which an
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses
that its action was based,” and that review in the courts will be “confin[ed] . . . to
a judgment upon the validity of the grounds upon which [an agency] itself based
its action.”195 If no consideration was given to Factor Five, or if no evidence
was offered or considered under Factor Five, then no review would be
necessary. But with the chosen language, it may be analytically impossible to
determine the total body of considerations upon which the sanction was based.
This language, or similar language that omits or obscures the bases upon which
190. Zayas, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21422.
191. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14965 n.36 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017).
192. See id.
193. Id. at 14965.
194. See, e.g., Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); Morall v. DEA, 412 F.2d 165,
173–74 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Trawick v. DEA, 861 F.2d 72, 76 (4th Cir. 1988).
195. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87–88 (1943).
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an Agency sanction is based, is particularly unhelpful in reviewing its legal
sufficiency, and renders its defense in the courts potentially unwieldy. Stated
differently, there is no analytical flaw in a final Agency order that determines
that no evidence is relevant under a given Public Interest Factor, but where an
Agency has indicated that evidence has been considered under a Factor, it must
explain what evidence was considered and how it was analyzed under that
Factor.196
B. The Pharmacy’s Corresponding Responsibility and Willful Blindness
The DEA regulations have long explained that the responsibility required
of a pharmacy registrant in ensuring that controlled substance prescriptions are
legitimately issued is not identical to the responsibility of prescribers, but is
instead a “corresponding responsibility.”197 Recent final orders issued by the
Agency have increased the quantum and nature of evidence that now must be
demonstrated to establish a violation of a pharmacy registrant’s corresponding
responsibility.198 In JM Pharmacy, the Agency set forth that it must establish
“willful blindness” in order to meet its (own) burden to demonstrate a violation
of a pharmacy’s corresponding responsibility.199 This is a higher standard than
it required of itself in prior cases.200 The willful blindness standard requires
that, at the time of the alleged transgression(s), the pharmacy registrant
(generally through its pharmacists) subjectively believed that there was a high
probability that a particular fact existed, and took “deliberate actions to avoid
learning that fact.”201 The Agency’s adoption of the higher standard in
administrative pharmacy enforcement cases was unexpected, particularly given
that in Global-Tech Appliances Inc. v. SEB S.A., the single authority cited by
the Agency to support this increased standard,202 the court dealt exclusively
with the doctrine to be applied in civil lawsuits for induced patent infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b),203 a statute that bears no readily-apparent relation to

196. See id.
197. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2017).
198. See, e.g., JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 28667, 28672 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19,
2015).
199. Id. at 28670.
200. See, e.g., Holiday CVS, L.L.C., 77 Fed. Reg. 62316 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 12, 2012);
see also Mulrooney & Hull, supra note 1, at 354–56 (discussing the corresponding responsibility of
pharmacy registrants).
201. JM Pharmacy, 80 Fed. Reg. at 28672 (citing Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,
563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011)).
202. Id.
203. Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 760 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012)).
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the Controlled Substances Act204 or the corresponding responsibility
regulation.205 In fact, the corresponding responsibility regulation and the patent
infringement statute do not share common elements, structure, or language.206
This was a considerable, voluntary step up from the Agency’s previous
interpretation, which required only a demonstration that a pharmacy’s
controlled substance dispensing fell below the standard of care for dispensing
in the particular state.207 This higher standard may make it less burdensome for
pharmacy registrants to defend enforcement actions brought against them, and
harder for the Agency enforcers to bring and prevail in actions based on a
violation of the corresponding responsibility. Litigants representing members
of the regulated community who are careless or sloppy (even very sloppy) with
required paperwork obligations under the regulations will doubtless find
comfort in JM Pharmacy and the Agency’s interpretation that it is no longer
sufficient for the Government to merely demonstrate practice below the
prevailing state standard, but that it instead must demonstrate willful blindness.
1. Red Flags and Willful Indifference
The Agency has long held that a pharmacy can violate its corresponding
responsibility by ignoring red flags raised by prescriptions and the
circumstances in which they are presented.208 However, in Superior Pharmacy
I and Superior Pharmacy II, again citing Global-Tech, the Agency held that, to
satisfy its new willful indifference standard for corresponding responsibility
violations, it is not enough to show that a pharmacist dispensed a controlled
substance prescription in the face of a red flag.209 This is because, according to
the Agency, “[a]ll red flags do not have the same hue,”210 and although some
red flags may create only a “reasonable suspicion” that a prescription lacks
legitimate medical purpose—which is less than what is required to show willful
blindness211—“where there are multiple red flags, none of which alone would
204. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801–904 (2012)).
205. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2017).
206. Compare 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a), with 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
207. See, e.g., Holiday CVS, L.L.C., 77 Fed. Reg. 62316 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 12, 2012).
208. The Agency has defined a “red flag” to mean “a circumstance that does or should raise a
reasonable suspicion as to the validity of a prescription.” Superior Pharmacy I and Superior Pharmacy
II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310, 31335 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 18, 2016).
209. Superior I & II, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31335 n.5 (citing Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB
S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011)).
210. Id.
211. Id. (“[A]s the Supreme Court’s decision in Global-Tech makes plain . . . a ‘reasonable
suspicion’ . . . is not enough to establish that a pharmacist acted with the requisite scienter.”).
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establish the requisite scienter, the combination of red flags may well create a
subjective belief that there is a high probability that a prescription lacks a
legitimate medical purpose.”212 Hills Pharmacy L.L.C., citing liberally to
Superior I & II, likewise held that “establishing the requisite scienter for a
violation requires more than simply showing that a [controlled substance]
prescription presented a[n unresolved] red flag.”213 Thus, to meet the new
requisite scienter, the Agency has decided that it will now impose upon its
prosecutors the requirement to demonstrate more than pharmacy registrants
were doling out controlled substances below the state standard; DEA
prosecutors must now show that the medications were dispensed in the face of
willful indifference on the part of the registrant.214
2. Willful Indifference and Evidence/Absence of Red Flag Resolution
The evidence required by the Agency regarding willful indifference is also
undergoing some measure of evolution. In Superior I & II, notwithstanding the
unrefuted testimony of the Government’s expert “that, in the practice of
pharmacy, a red flag which is resolved must be documented and that the
documentation should be placed on the prescription itself,”215 the Agency held
that the failure to document red flags on prescriptions is not alone sufficient to
establish that the pharmacists failed to resolve the red flags, and thus, that they
deliberately failed to avoid learning that the prescriptions lacked a legitimate
medical purpose.216 The Agency stated that, “while evidence of a custom
certainly has probative value, it is not conclusive proof,”217 and that
[w]hile it would be reasonable to draw an adverse inference
that a pharmacist failed to resolve a red flag (or flags) from the
failure to document the resolution in any manner, the
Government offered no evidence that the [investigators] even
asked the pharmacists . . . if they documented their resolution
of red flags, and if so, where they did so.218
Thus, although the Government’s expert provided unmet evidence that the
failure to document red flag resolution on the back of prescriptions meant that
those red flags were not resolved, the Agency announced that it is incumbent
upon Agency investigators to query pharmacy employees about where else the
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Hills Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 49816, 49839 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 28, 2016).
See Superior I & II, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31335; Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49839.
Superior I & II, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31335.
Id.
Id. at 31335 n.55.
Id. at 31335.
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information could be documented, essentially calling upon them to prove the
negative.219 No witness testified that red flag resolution was or should be
documented elsewhere, but because the prosecution’s case did not eliminate
other potential repositories at the pharmacy, its evidence came up short.220
In Hills Pharmacy, the Agency held to its position that a lack of
documentation alone is insufficient to establish that the pharmacy failed to
fulfill its corresponding responsibility by resolving red flags, again despite the
Government’s expert’s testimony that any resolution should have been
documented on the prescriptions themselves.221 Unlike in Superior I & II,
however, the Agency went on to discuss “additional evidence, which
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence” the requisite scienter—
evidence that included a pharmacist’s testimony, which was offered by the
respondent, and partial medical records, also supplied by the respondent.222
The Agency acknowledged that it rejected similar allegations in Superior I &
II, where the evidence only included absence of documentation, noting that “in
that matter, neither party called any of the pharmacists who dispensed the
prescriptions” and that the respondent “had the option of not putting forward
evidence on the dispensing allegations[] . . . [but] nonetheless chose to present
[the pharmacist’s] testimony and submit the partial medical records.”223 Thus,
the Agency held that documents submitted as part of the respondent’s case, as
well as the testimony of a pharmacist—put on the stand by the respondent
pharmacy—can be used to shore up the Government’s case when it otherwise
relies upon a lack of documentation.224
What made the Agency’s announcement that it would use evidence
presented in the respondent’s case in Hills Pharmacy particularly poignant, and
particularly painful for the respondent, is that at the hearing, the respondent, in
an exercise of caution, moved for a partial summary disposition based on its
(ultimately vindicated) position that the Government had not established its
case because there was no evidence that red flags had not been resolved.225 The
ALJ denied the motion, not because it was devoid of merit, but because the ALJ
was unable to identify a basis in the hearing regulations to grant the requested
relief.226 Notwithstanding the cautious manner in which the respondent’s

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See id. at 31337 n.60.
Id. at 31336–37.
Hills Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 49816, 49835–36 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 28, 2016).
Id. at 49836.
Id. at 49840 n.41.
Id. at 49836.
See id. at 49840 n.41.
Id.

CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT)

2017]

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101

CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW

373

counsel proceeded, the Agency was at once unsympathetic and ambiguous as
to the availability of a summary disposition motion in similar circumstances in
the future. The following analysis was set forth by the Administrator in his
final order:
Even if the ALJ committed error when she denied
[r]espondent’s motion, [r]espondent had the option of not
putting forward evidence on the dispensing allegations.
Respondent nonetheless chose to present . . . testimony and
submit [exhibits]. Cf. United States v. Sherod, 960 F.2d 1075,
1076 (1992) (“It is the universal rule in the federal circuits that
‘a criminal defendant who, after denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s case-inchief, proceeds to the presentation of his own case, waives his
objection to the denial.” (quoting United States v. Foster, 783
F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc)). Thus, I am not
required to ignore this evidence in adjudicating the dispensing
allegations.227
This analysis is of particular significance in light of the fact that the Agency,
as already discussed, has previously created an evidentiary framework in
enforcement cases wherein the respondent is precluded from avoiding a
sanction if the Government has established its prima facie case and the evidence
is not met with an acceptance of responsibility and a demonstration of remedial
steps aimed at the avoidance of future transgressions.228 The Agency has also
embraced the viability of adverse inferences borne of missing evidence, even
where a respondent declines to testify based on self-incrimination concerns at
the advice of counsel.229 Thus, the respondent faces the unpleasant specter of
a three-option choice: (1) presenting no evidence on a given charge and having
a prima facie case established with the assistance of an adverse inference; (2)
presenting no evidence and having an established prima facie case stand
unrebutted by an absence of any demonstration of acceptance of responsibility
or remedial steps; or (3) presenting evidence, only to have it used to potentially
shore up a deficient Government presentation. In an environment where
virtually all factual and legal determinations rendered by the ALJ are
increasingly supplanted by the Agency (more fully discussed elsewhere in this
227. Id. To most fairly demonstrate the cases the Administrator relied upon, the quoted text,
including its citations, is lifted exactly as it exists in the final order.
228. Jeri Hassman, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 8194, 8236 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 23, 2010); see supra
Section III.A.2.
229. Joseph Baumstarck, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 17525, 17528 n.3 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 15,
2009).

CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT)

374

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101

[101:333

Article),230 it would seem that some measure of clairvoyance has become a
required skill for the registrants’ bar in evaluating whether and how to meet the
Government’s case. Even if a conscientious respondent’s counsel were to
procure a ruling on a timely-rendered motion for a partial summary disposition,
there is no present guarantee that such a motion is authorized, or even that
counsel possesses the luxury of assuming that the Agency would uphold the
ALJ’s determination. The only two fixed points of certainty seem to be that the
respondent cannot prevail if the Agency finds that the Government has met its
prima facie burden without the respondent meeting the evidence, and that the
Agency will supplement the Government’s prima facie case with the
respondent’s evidence if any is presented.231
The approach for both parties to the litigation equation must shift along
with this new Agency precedent. For its part, the Government can no longer
rely on an expert’s testimony regarding where the resolution of red flags should
be documented under applicable state standards. Instead, to prevail now, it
must insure that its agents and investigators scour through all documentation
that exists in a pharmacy and, if its case is based upon an absence of evidence
of red flags—or at least those which, in combination, can establish the requisite
scienter—the Government must be prepared to show proof that the red flags
were not resolved and documented anywhere in the pharmacy operation, paper
files, or computer databases. The respondent’s counsel, on the other hand, must
be prepared to engage in a candid discussion with his client and determine
whether offering the testimony of any pharmacists or staff members could
potentially backfire in support of the Government’s case. Whether the
availability of a motion for a summary disposition based on the Government’s
failure to meet its burden exists in DEA administrative proceedings remains an
open question.
The new willful indifference standard embraced by the DEA in its
pharmacy final orders is positive news for pharmacy registrants and those who
represent them, but the Agency’s newly expressed willingness to shore up the
Government’s case with evidence presented by respondents, coupled with its
unwillingness to provide a reliable framework for summary disposition motions
made at administrative hearings, presents new perils for the regulated
community. Government counsel should expect to defend the higher patentinfringement/Global-Tech standard of willful blindness, and registrant’s
counsel should be seeking to demonstrate that the higher burden has not been
met—before calling its first witness.

230. See infra Sections III.L–M.
231. See Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49818.
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3. Verification of a Prescriber’s Registration
In a further tightening of the standards applied to its own enforcement
efforts, the Agency has announced that it will no longer rely on a pharmacy
registrant’s failure to verify that a prescriber possessed a valid DEA registration
prior to dispensing in finding a violation of the pharmacy’s corresponding
responsibility.232
About a decade ago, in United Prescription Services, Inc., the Agency
called the testimony of an expert “nonsense”233 when that expert testified “that
it was ‘probably’ not inappropriate to fill a prescription for controlledsubstances issued by a practitioner whose DEA registration had expired even if
the pharmacy had a copy of the expired registration on file.”234 The Agency
opined that “filling a prescription issued by a practitioner whose registration
has recently expired might be excusable,” but admonished the pharmacy
respondent for filling prescriptions “long after the expiration” of the
practitioner’s registration, stating that it “clearly was not appropriate and was
unlawful.”235 This statement, that the Agency might excuse a pharmacy’s
failure to refuse prescriptions when a registration issue arose “recently,” but not
“long after” it arose, suggested that the Agency expected pharmacies to verify
registrations at least somewhat regularly.
Shortly thereafter, in Medicine Shoppe–Jonesborough, the Agency stated
unequivocally that “[a] pharmacy has a duty to periodically check to see that a
practitioner retains the authority to practice medicine and dispense a controlled
substance.”236 Four years later in Holiday CVS, without referencing Medicine
Shoppe–Jonesborough, the Agency stated that “[i]t would be difficult to
imagine a duty of a pharmacy registrant that is more fundamental to the law
and spirit of the CSA than the obligation to ensure that controlled substance
prescriptions are issued only on the authority of those empowered to prescribe
by the DEA.”237 However, the Agency went on to explain that “the expiration
of a COR [Certificate of Registration] is a clear red flag that a prescription
issued pursuant to that COR is invalid,” and stated that “the question becomes
whether the expirations of the CORs were recognized, or should have been

232.
233.
2007).
234.
235.
236.
237.

See JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 Fed Reg. 28667, 28671 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 2015).
United Prescription Servs., Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 50397, 50408 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 31,
Id. at 50406.
Id. at 50408–09.
Med. Shoppe–Jonesborough, 73 Fed. Reg. 363, 381 n.45 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 2, 2008).
Holiday CVS, L.L.C., 77 Fed. Reg. 62316, 62341 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 12, 2012).
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recognized, by the [pharmacies].”238 After finding that the pharmacies “knew
or should have known of the relevant registration statuses,” the Agency
addressed the “third prong of the inquiry—resolution,” and determined that the
pharmacies did not conclusively resolve the red flag prior to dispensing.239
Thus, the Agency concluded that the pharmacies dispensed controlled
substances in the face of red flags “that put them on notice that the controlled
substance prescriptions were not issued in the usual course of a professional
practice,” and held that “[s]uch acts are sufficient for the Government to sustain
its burden in establishing its prima facie case for revocation.”240 The Agency’s
statement that the “obligation to ensure that controlled substance prescriptions
are issued only on the authority of those empowered to prescribe by the DEA”
is “fundamental”241 seemed to contrast with its three-prong approach in
determining whether a violation occurred, because a registrant that never
attempted to verify a prescriber’s registration could seemingly shield itself by
arguing that it did not know—and had no reason to know—that the registration
had expired. Holiday CVS therefore left the regulated pharmacy community
with the conflicting impressions that the duty to determine that a prescriber is
appropriately registered is “fundamental,” but that a pharmacy registrant with
no knowledge or reason to know of a problem with the prescriber’s registration
status can seemingly escape liability for filling prescriptions from that
prescriber.242
Two and a half years later, the DEA explicitly stated in JM Pharmacy that
“a pharmacist is not obligated to verify whether every prescription he fills has
been issued by a practitioner who holds a valid DEA registration.”243 The JM
Pharmacy decision specifically acknowledged the Agency’s statement in
Medicine Shoppe–Jonesborough requiring pharmacy registrants to
“periodically check” the dispensing authority of prescribing practitioners,244
and even held that a failure to verify a controlled substance prescriber’s
registration at any time during a three-year period (where the prescriber’s
prescriptions were dispensed pursuant thereto) is a breach of that duty,245 but
rejected the Government’s allegations that such failure constituted a violation
238. Id. at 62342.
239. Id.
240. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2017)).
241. Id. at 62341.
242. See id.
243. JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 Fed Reg. 28667, 28671 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 2015).
244. Id. at 28671 n.18 (quoting Med. Shoppe–Jonesborough, 73 Fed. Reg. 363, 381 n.45 (Drug
Enf’t Admin. Jan. 2, 2008)).
245. Id. at 28673.
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of federal law or regulations.246 In coming to that conclusion, the Agency stated
that, just because there is no duty to verify the prescriber’s status on every
prescription, the pharmacy still must meet its corresponding responsibility
obligation to fill only those prescriptions that conform to the requirements of
the CSA and DEA regulations, including the requirement that the prescribing
practitioner be appropriately registered,247 but faulted the Government’s case
because it “did not prove that [the pharmacy’s] misconduct was intentional or
knowing.”248 In discussing the duty to verify a prescriber’s registration, the
Agency stated that it would “place only nominal weight on this aspect of [the
pharmacy’s] misconduct” in part because “the lack of specific guidance as to
what steps are necessary to comply with this duty diminishe[d] its
egregiousness to some degree.”249 It then lectured (itself) that, “if the Agency
intends to enforce this duty in other cases, it must provide the regulated
community with guidance as to its scope,” but declined to offer any guidance
in the decision.250
In Farmacia Yani, a decision released the day after JM Pharmacy, the
Agency reemphasized that “no Agency regulation requires that a pharmacist
ascertain that each prescription presented to [him or her] has been issued by a
practitioner who possesses a valid DEA registration,”251 and again noted that
the Agency has not “published any guidance to the regulated community setting
forth the parameters of [the] duty.”252 The Agency then explicitly stated that
“the corresponding responsibility does not impose strict liability on pharmacists
but rather requires proof that a pharmacist filled a controlled-substance
prescription either knowing that it was unlawful or with willful blindness or
deliberate ignorance of the fact that the prescription was unlawful.”253 It also
noted, in a footnote, that liability may potentially arise if the pharmacy acted
outside its usual course of professional practice in failing to verify a prescriber’s

246. Id.
247. Id. at 28671.
248. Id. at 28673.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. 29053, 29063 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015).
252. Id. at 29063 n.26.
253. Id. at 29063. It then rejected the Government’s allegations that a pharmacy that filled more
than two hundred controlled substance prescriptions issued by a practitioner whose registration had
been expired for more than seven months violated its corresponding responsibility because there was
no evidence that the pharmacist who filled the prescriptions “either knew or was willfully blind to the
fact that [the prescriber] was no longer registered.” Id.
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registration, but dismissed that possibility because the Government did not rely
on that theory.254
Inasmuch as the Agency has not yet published a standard for the intervals
at which prescribing authority must be checked, actual knowledge (or willful
blindness) appears to be the applicable standard for demonstrating a breach of
corresponding responsibility based on dispensing controlled substances on a
prescription signed by a prescriber who is no longer authorized to prescribe.255
The Agency’s suggestion in Farmacia Yani that failure to verify the
prescriber’s registration might potentially render dispensing “outside of ‘the
usual course of professional practice,’”256 leaves some opportunity for the
Government to rely on that theory, but it will need to establish, likely through
expert testimony, that there is an applicable standard for how often a
prescriber’s registration must be verified. In light of the Agency’s intriguing
pronouncement in JM Pharmacy that “while [prescriber license check
frequency] guidance can be announced in an adjudicatory proceeding, the
process of adjudication is not well suited for doing so,”257 it appears that the
enforcement of this issue must wait for duly promulgated regulations following
APA notice and comment proceedings.258 Until then, Government counsel
should come prepared to argue the patent unreasonableness of long periods of
unlicensed conduct or other factors that show that a pharmacy’s pharmacists
knew or were willfully blind to a prescriber’s registration issue. Pharmacy
254. Id. at 29063 n.26.
255. In Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., the Agency offered the following
observation:
While it is true that in Holiday CVS, the Agency found that pharmacies
knowingly filled prescriptions issued by two physicians who were no longer
registered and did so well after the pharmacies should have known that the
physicians were no longer registered, that was only a small part of the case.
Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 79188, 79198 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 10,
2016) (referencing Holiday CVS, L.L.C., 77 Fed. Reg. 62316, 62316–17 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 12,
2012)). Interestingly, it would be challenging to tease that nuance from the actual language in the cited
portion of the Holiday CVS decision, which states that “[i]t is manifest that [r]espondents’ conduct in
filling prescriptions issued by a practitioner whose registration had been revoked undermines the
Congressional scheme;” the scheme being a “comprehensive and closed system for regulating the
distribution of . . . controlled substances.” Holiday CVS, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62317.
256. Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. at 29063 n.26 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 1306.06 (2014)).
257. JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 28667, 28673 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 2015).
258. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). While it is likely that such
parameters likely could have been correctly issued through an adjudication with appropriate facts, the
Agency’s determination that regulations must precede enforcement would seem to foreclose
adjudication as an appropriate vehicle. At the very least, notwithstanding the arguably cumbersome
APA rulemaking process, in light of the strident manner in which the Agency addressed the issue in
JM Pharmacy, sorting out the issue through an adjudication would, at the very least, be confusing.
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registrant counsel should come equipped with a copy of JM Pharmacy and a
motion to exclude evidence of dispensing on prescriptions issued by prescribers
with expired registrations.
4. Can Prescriber’s Actions Immunize Pharmacy Registrants?
In continuing the torrent of seemingly heartening news for the pharmacy
bar, in Hills Pharmacy, the Agency’s final order contained the declaration that
“it is true that a pharmacist [sic] cannot violate his corresponding responsibility
if a [controlled substance] prescription was nonetheless issued for a legitimate
medical purpose.”259 This seemingly unequivocal proposition runs contrary to
one of the central tenets that all parts of diversion regulation and litigation had
understood: a pharmacy registrant’s actions are judged by what he or she knew
or should have known at the time a controlled substance was dispensed.260
Because the training and execution of the duties of the pharmacist have
historically controlled the question of whether the pharmacy registrant has
complied with his or her obligations,261 it was theoretically possible for a
pharmacy registrant who dispensed a prescription issued by a doctor in good
faith to be non-compliant by not identifying, addressing, resolving, and
documenting red flags. Contrariwise, if all red flags encountered were resolved
within the parameters of state standards, and a pharmacist otherwise complied
with his or her obligations, even a bad prescription that was issued by a noncompliant prescriber should not result in a sanction on a pharmacy registrant.
Prior to the Hills Pharmacy final order, the touchstone for assessing whether
the regulatory corresponding responsibility262 had been satisfied had always
been an objective analysis of whether the pharmacy registrant (through
pharmacists and other key employees) had acted within the standard of care
based on the indicia presented or available.263 Now, unless the Agency issues
a clarification of the language it utilized in Hills Pharmacy, it appears that even
a patently non-compliant, reckless pharmacy registrant could potentially be
immunized by a validly-issued prescription, irrespective of what was done or

259. Hills Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 49816, 49836–37 n.33 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 28,
2016). The DEA issues registrations to practitioners, which include pharmacies, not pharmacists. 21
U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f) (2012).
260. JM Pharmacy, 80 Fed. Reg. at 28681.
261. Id. at 28673 n.24.
262. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2017).
263. Holiday CVS, L.L.C., 77 Fed. Reg. 62316, 62322 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 12, 2012) (“[I]t
is clear that if the red flags presented by a prescription could not be resolved, then the Government
satisfied the third element of its prima facie burden.”).
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not done prior to or at the moment controlled substances are dispensed.264 In
other words: if the prescriber issued a good prescription, dispensing it can bring
no liability on the pharmacy registrant.
This sea change comes with a potentially powerful procedural ramification.
It is currently routine practice for ALJs to deny sometimes copious subpoena
requests for prescribing physicians and their patients.265
Under the
longstanding theory that it is the knowledge available to the pharmacy at the
time of dispensing that controls the assessment of whether its corresponding
responsibility has been breached, testimony regarding the actual medical
purpose and legitimacy of a prescription was irrelevant, and patients are
incompetent to offer opinions about whether dispensing was compliant with
applicable regulations and standards.266 However, this new language in Hills
Pharmacy calls the current approach into serious question. If it is true that a
pharmacy cannot, as a matter of law, violate its corresponding responsibility
obligations whenever a controlled substance prescription was, in fact, issued
for a legitimate medical purpose—no matter how illegitimate it appears to be
at the time of dispensing—then the irrelevancy argument long-utilized by ALJs
to eschew the issuance of en masse subpoena requests to compel the attendance
of every prescriber and every patient whose prescriptions are at issue in the
hearing by compulsory process to establish the legitimacy of those
prescriptions is substantially undermined. If a witness can support a potential
defense raised by a party in the proceeding, and the testimony is likely to elicit
evidence that is “competent, relevant, material and not unduly repetitious,” it
would be manifest error to deny the subpoena request.267 This may mean that
in a post-Hills Pharmacy world, dozens or even hundreds of prescribers and
patients are potentially subject to compulsory process.268 Inasmuch as the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) affords every respondent at a hearing the
right “to present his case or defense,”269 it may be difficult for ALJs to justify
denying registrants the ability to present the defense, suggested by the Agency
264. See Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49836–37, 49836 n.33.
265. See, e.g., id. at 49817; Superior Pharmacy I and Superior Pharmacy II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310,
31312–13, 31317 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 18, 2016); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 555(d) (2012).
266. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 1316.59(a)–(b).
267. Humphreys v. DEA, 96 F.3d 658, 663 (3d Cir. 1996); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1316.59(a); 5
U.S.C. § 555(d).
268. For example, in Hills Pharmacy, the respondent proposed calling 1,461 patients whose
prescriptions had been seized by the DEA as witnesses, along with more than 130 doctors. Hills
Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49817. The respondent “estimated that it would require [forty-five] to
[sixty] days to present its” case-in-chief. Id.
269. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d).
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for the first time in Hills Pharmacy, that all of the prescriptions under scrutiny
were, in fact, legitimately issued.
Government counsel should be prepared to distinguish Hills Pharmacy, or
minimize its exposure by bearing down on those aspects of the hearing
regulations that limit “unduly repetitious” evidence,270 and be prepared to
persuade the assigned ALJ to exercise his authority to “regulate the course of
the hearing.”271 Respondent’s counsel should spend their pre-hearing hours
tracking down the names and addresses of all prescribers and patients that
pertain to the allegations, and determining whether those otherwise-uninvolved
persons might be able to supply a defense for the pharmacy client. The ALJs
should prepare for longer hearings and an increased level of subpoena litigation.
C. Medical Practice Standards
More than a decade ago, in Gonzales v. Oregon,272 the Supreme Court
categorically dictated that Congress and the CSA do not regulate the practice
of medicine generally, noting the following:
The [Controlled Substances Act] and our case law amply
support the conclusion that Congress regulates medical
practice insofar as it bars doctors from using their prescriptionwriting powers as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and
trafficking as conventionally understood. Beyond this,
however, the statute manifests no intent to regulate the practice
of medicine generally. The silence is understandable given the
structure and limitations of federalism, which allow the [s]tates
“[]great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons.[]”273
Thus, in regulating its registrants, the DEA is required to apply medical
practice standards that emanate from the states as part of their police powers.274
This division of regulatory power is particularly important when the Agency
seeks to rely on an allegation that a registrant or applicant fell below a state
medical standard in its administrative enforcement proceedings.275
270. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.59(a).
271. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(5).
272. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
273. Id. at 269–70 (citations omitted).
274. Id. at 270 (“The structure and operation of the CSA presume and rely upon a functioning
medical profession regulated under the [s]tates’ police powers.”).
275. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (“A prescription for a controlled substance to be effective must
be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of
his professional practice.” (emphasis added)).
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Where a sanction is sought by DEA’s regulators based on a failure to
comply with an applicable state standard, it is incumbent upon the Government
to demonstrate both what the state standard is and that a registrant has
committed acts or practiced in a manner that falls short of that standard.276 This
is typically, but not always, accomplished through the use of expert
testimony.277 However, expert testimony is not always required, and in Jack A.
Danton, D.O., the Agency outlined the other ways in which cases without
expert testimony can be proved:
[W]here the Government fails to provide expert testimony to
support a finding that a practitioner acted outside of the usual
course of professional practice and lacked a legitimate medical
purpose, it can nonetheless prove a violation by: (1)
[p]roviding evidence that a practitioner committed a violation
of a state medical practice standard which is sufficiently tied
to a state law finding of illegitimacy to support a similar
finding under federal law[;] (2) providing evidence showing
that [a registrant] knowingly diverted drugs[;] . . . [or, (3)
providing evidence that a registrant] violat[ed] . . . a state
medical practice standard which has a substantial relationship
to the CSA’s purpose of preventing substance abuse and
diversion.278
In Lawrence E. Stewart, M.D., the Agency recently reaffirmed that expert
testimony is “typically necessary” to establish that a physician fell below the
standard for writing controlled substance prescriptions when the physician
made “some attempt to comply with various state medical practice standards
and the adequacy of those efforts is at issue,” but that “the facts and
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the prescription” established on the
record in that case could also support such a charge.279 As discussed below,
other recent Agency cases have added additional nuances to the area of medical
practice standards in DEA proceedings that both sides should be aware of.

276. T.J. McNichol, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 57133, 57147–48 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 17, 2012).
277. Id. at 57147 (“‘[W]here a physician makes some attempt to comply with various state
medical practice standards and the adequacy of those efforts is at issue,’ expert testimony is typically
necessary to establish that a physician violated 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) . . . .” (quoting Jack A. Danton,
D.O., 76 Fed. Reg. 60900, 60904 & n.13 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 30, 2011))).
278. Danton, 76 Fed. Reg. at 60901; see also Joe W. Morgan, D.O., 78 Fed. Reg. 61961, 61978
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 8, 2013) (reaffirming Danton).
279. Lawrence E. Stewart, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 54822, 54824 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 17, 2016)
(quoting McNichol, 77 Fed. Reg. at 57147–48).
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1. Investigators as Experts?
In Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., the Government’s expert
testified regarding payment in cash as an indicator of diversion, specifically
testifying that it is indicative of diversion when a patient asks the pharmacy not
to bill his or her insurance and instead requests to pay cash.280 Based on that
testimony, the ALJ found that paying cash was a red flag, but the respondent
pharmacy challenged that finding because there was no evidence that patients
requested that the pharmacy not bill their insurance—a seemingly essential
component of what the expert testified constitutes a red flag.281 In the Agency’s
final order, with no apparent prior warning to the respondent, the Agency held
that a diversion investigator, who, at the hearing, also “testified that ‘paying
cash’ is a ‘red flag[] of diversion,’”282 possessed sufficient expert knowledge to
supplement the expert’s opinion in order to find that when a pharmacy customer
pays cash it constitutes a red flag of diversion that should have been
acknowledged and acted upon by the pharmacy registrant.283 While the
diversion investigator’s testimony was used to bolster the expert’s opinion,284
the decision suggests that the Agency may be amenable to finding that its
investigators possess sufficient knowledge and experience such that they may
offer expert testimony on certain subjects in future cases. This is something for
both sides of the litigation equation to consider as they prepare their cases.
2. When “Should” Means “Must”
While the Agency disagreed with the Government’s expert and the findings
of the ALJ that certain documentation should exist in a certain location in
Superior Pharmacy I & Superior Pharmacy II,285 in Wesley Pope, M.D., the
280. Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 79188, 79191 (Drug Enf’t Admin.
Nov. 10, 2016).
281. Id.
282. Id. (alteration in original).
283. See id.
284. Id.
285. As discussed, in Superior I & II, the Agency discounted the unchallenged testimony of the
Government’s expert witness (the only expert witness to testify at the hearing) that a pharmacy
encountering circumstances that raise suspicion about the validity of a prescription must be resolved
prior to dispensing, and that such resolution would customarily be documented on the prescription
itself. See Superior Pharmacy I & Superior Pharmacy II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310, 31335 & n.55 (Drug
Enf’t Admin. May 18, 2016); Section III.B.2. The Agency, while not outright rejecting the testimony,
emphasized that the expert did not (and conceded that he could not) point to any statute or regulation
requiring such documentation in any particular location, and held that just because documenting
resolution of a red flag on the prescription is “customary in the profession . . . does not make it improper
to document the resolution someplace else.” Superior I & II, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31335 n.55.
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Agency was willing to agree with the Government’s expert—over the ALJ’s
findings—that certain documentation that state code provisions provided
should exist was, in fact, mandatory.286 In Pope, the Government’s expert
testified that the practitioner’s documentation deficiencies placed him outside
of the standard of care, as that standard is described in certain provisions of the
Oklahoma Administrative Code.287 The Oklahoma provisions at issue directed
that “[a] medical history and physical examination must be obtained, evaluated
and documented in the medical record,” and went on to list specific areas that
the “medical record should document,”288 and further directed that “[r]ecords
should remain current” and that “[t]he physician should keep accurate and
complete records.”289 The Government’s expert testified that all of the
documentation requirements listed in the code provision are mandatory (and
that such documentation was missing from the prescriber’s records), despite the
fact that the code provisions used the word “should,” rather than “shall” or
“must,” in describing numerous aspects of the documentation to be kept.290
While finding the expert credible, the ALJ declined to give weight to certain
aspects of the expert’s testimony interpreting the code provisions, instead
finding that his testimony was based upon a mistaken understanding of the
Oklahoma Board’s documentation and recordkeeping standards in finding that
“should” was mandatory, not permissive.291
The Agency disagreed with the ALJ’s interpretation of the Oklahoma
provisions, and held that “should” does not really mean “should,” at least in
those provisions, but actually means “must,” and connoted a mandatory
obligation in the context of the provisions at issue.292 The Agency based its
decision on its interpretation of cases from the Seventh Circuit, the D.C. Circuit,
a federal district court in Florida, and a dictionary definition of “should,” as
well as an analysis of the Oklahoma Medical Practice Act and a Policy
Statement.293 Interestingly, a Tenth Circuit (which includes Oklahoma) case
which held that “‘should’ indicates a recommended course of action, but does
not itself imply the obligation associated with ‘shall,’” received no mention in

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14945 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017).
Id.
Id. (quoting Okla. Admin. Code § 435:10-7-11(1) (2016)).
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Okla. Admin. Code § 435:10-7-11(6)).
Id.
Id. at 14946.
Id.
Id. at 14945–46.
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the Agency’s decision in Pope.294 Thus, contrary to the Agency’s view, the
pertinent Circuit Court of Appeals holds the view that the most reasonable
interpretation of the word “should” is really “should”—a discretionary term.295
The Agency did not discuss the fact that there is some level of conflict in the
circuit courts about whether to treat “should” as mandatory or permissive,296
but the Agency has apparently taken the position that, if the state law supplying
the practice standard in a DEA case uses the word “should,” the Agency is
likely to read that word as “must,” irrespective of federal circuit law on the
issue.297
While Pope dealt with codified evidence of a standard which dictated that
certain information “should” be documented and Superior I & II dealt with
testimonial evidence of a standard which dictated that certain information
“should” be documented in a certain location, the Agency found that one
standard was mandatory, while the other was permissive.298 On that backdrop,
if the Government’s theory of a case is grounded in the absence of certain
documentation, both parties will need to dedicate substantial energy to a
thorough examination of the codified standards to determine what aspects are
mandatory or merely permissive, and both parties will need to narrowly focus
their expert witnesses—or the other party’s expert witnesses on cross
examination—to the full extent of any given standard.
3. “General” Practice Standards?
Although, as previously discussed, the Supreme Court has unambiguously
clarified that the authority to set medical standards rests exclusively with the
states, and is nowhere within the purview of the DEA,299 some recent Agency
final orders have embraced the application of what the Agency has termed
“general-practice standards” in ascertaining whether a practitioner has acted in

294. Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F.3d 1191, 1200 (10th Cir. 2001). In Qwest, the Tenth Circuit
considered an FCC statute which, like the Oklahoma Administrative Code provisions at issue in Pope,
began with an overarching “shall,” a mandatory instruction, followed by a subset of items that “should”
be considered under that “shall” provision. Id. at 1199–1200.
295. See id. at 1200.
296. E.g., United States v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing circuit split and
declining to follow decisions of the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, which found that the use of the
word “shall” in a sentencing guideline imposed a mandatory requirement).
297. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14945.
298. Id.; Superior Pharmacy I and Superior Pharmacy II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310 (Drug Enf’t Admin.
May 18, 2016).
299. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006).

CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT)

386

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101

[101:333

the course of a professional practice.300 In one such case, Fiaz Afzal, M.D., the
Agency accepted the findings and legal conclusions of a state medical board,
which, in a decision that occurred after the close of the DEA administrative
hearing, suspended the respondent’s state medical privileges.301 In the course
of its reliance on the state board, citing its own prior final orders and a criminal
diversion case,302 the Agency held that:
[T]he prescribing of a controlled substance (and the continued
prescribing of a controlled substance) under the following
circumstances establishes that a physician lacked a legitimate
medical purpose and acted outside of the usual course of
professional practice and therefore violated the CSA:
• [w]ithout performing an appropriate physical
examination,
• without utilizing appropriate diagnostic testing,
• failing to devise and document a written treatment plan,
• failing to periodically reassess the effectiveness of the
treatment,
• continuing to prescribe controlled substances without
pursuing alternative therapies,
• repeatedly and continually prescribing without referring
the patient to appropriate specialists, and
• failing to keep and maintain records which contain
adequate findings to support a diagnosis and the need to
prescribe one or more medications.303
The Agency has also indicated a willingness to use its own prior final orders
to establish that registrants should know that particular circumstances are
suspicious, particularly in the area of establishing a pharmacy’s corresponding
responsibility in filling prescriptions with “red flags” of diversion. In Jones
Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., the Agency found that it was unnecessary
to determine whether anyone had discussed with the pharmacists their duties
and obligations under the Agency’s corresponding responsibility rule, declaring
that “the Agency’s corresponding responsibility rule has been in force for
300. E.g., Grider Drug #1 & Grider Drug #2, 77 Fed. Reg. 44070, 44093 n.73 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. July 26, 2012); Bienvenido Tan, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 17673, 17681 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar.
30, 2011).
301. Fiaz Afzal, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 61651, 61652 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 14, 2014). The
Government filed notice of the state board’s action with the Administrator’s office after the conclusion
of hearing procedures before the Agency ALJ, and it was considered over the objection of the
respondent. Id.
302. Id. at 61653 (citing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 135, 142–43 (1975)).
303. Id. at 61654.
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decades and numerous decisions of both the courts and the Agency have
provided ample guidance as to the scope of a pharmacists duty under the
rule.”304 Also, in Jones Total Health, the Agency, seemingly separate from
those “red flags” outlined by the Government’s expert,305 found “[a]dditional
[i]ndicators of [d]iversion,”306 including a finding that “high prices and copious
dispensing of controlled substances can be an indicator of possible diversion
because it elucidates a customer base willing to pay exorbitant prices for a drug
the customer could otherwise purchase at a nearby pharmacy for much less,”
based on “federal court precedent” evidently cited by the Government in its
brief.307 In Hills Pharmacy, the Agency rejected testimony by a pharmacist that
he was unfamiliar with the concept and significance of a “drug cocktail,” citing
prior Agency orders where the “DEA had identified this combination of
drugs . . . as being highly abused” before the pharmacist filled the prescriptions
at issue.308
In Pope, the Agency further tested the limits of the Supreme Court’s
holding in Gonzales309 with the inclusion of the following language:
[W]hile [s]tates have the primary responsibility for the
regulation of the medical profession, many of the profession’s
norms were created by the profession itself. Thus, on such
issues as the adequacy of a clinical evaluation for a particular
pain complaint and the necessary documentation to support the
prescribing of controlled substances, the standard of medical
practice would not seem to vary to any material degree
between [s]tates, especially between [s]tates that border each
other.310
Read broadly, these cases may provide an indication that the Agency,
Gonzales notwithstanding, is willing to draw from its own body of prior final
orders and court precedents to establish “general practice standards” applicable
to all DEA registrants. Pope is not a case where comparison of multiple state
standards was in issue and litigated, but a case where the Agency drew a general
conclusion, with no evidentiary support in the record of the pertinent
proceeding, and included it as a sort of rumination. To the extent the Agency

304. Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 79188, 79190 (Drug Enf’t Admin.
Nov. 10, 2016) (citations omitted).
305. Id. at 79218–19 (discussing expert’s testimony regarding “red flags”).
306. Id. at 79219.
307. Id. at 79219 & n.67.
308. Hills Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 49816, 49837 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 28, 2016).
309. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269–70, 274–275 (2006).
310. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14976 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017).
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continues to test the waters of establishing a set of the DEA’s own medical
standards, it risks confusion where its standards conflict with those of the states
where misconduct is alleged to have occurred. While it is a safe bet that the
courts will follow Gonzales and apply the state standard where it conflicts with
any general practice standards created by the DEA,311 not every case will make
it to the courts, and litigants on both sides of the aisle will need to stay vigilant
in discerning which standards are argued and supported by record evidence. If
there is a take away from the recent Agency decisions regarding state medical
practice standards, it probably is that where state standards are in issue, both
sides would be prudent to support their relative positions with identifiable state
medical standards expressed in statute, regulation, and state board opinions, and
to secure competent expert testimony.
D. When “Legitimate Medical Purpose” Means “Outside the Usual Course
of Professional Practice” and Vice Versa
Under longstanding regulations drafted by the Agency, “[a] prescription for
a controlled substance to be effective must be issued for a legitimate medical
purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his
professional practice.”312 Among the more striking of the Agency’s recent final
orders is its pronouncement in Pope,313 that “legitimate medical purpose” and
“usual course of professional practice,” two terms listed separately as
requirements under the regulations, and thus forming a conjunctive requirement
in order for a prescription to be “effective,”314 have the same meaning—not
similar meanings, but the same meaning315—rendering them interchangeable
and indistinct.
The dichotomy present in the regulatory definition of an “effective”
controlled substance prescription is reasonably rooted in the reality that
controlled-substance prescribing accomplished outside a prescriber’s
professional practice is as potentially dangerous as controlled-substance
prescribing accomplished within a prescriber’s professional practice where
there is no legitimate purpose for the medication. While both features are
311. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 269–70.
312. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2017).
313. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14967 n.38.
314. United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[A] practitioner is
authorized to dispense controlled substances only if he acts with a legitimate medical purpose and in
the usual course of professional practice. Conversely, a practitioner would be unauthorized to dispense
a controlled substance if he acts without a legitimate medical purpose or outside the usual course of
professional practice.”).
315. See Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14967 n.38.
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required to render a prescription legitimate,316 the components are distinct and
are separately delineated for good reason. By way of example, a practitioner
registrant who prescribes an opioid to someone who demonstrates an etiology
consistent with a need for pain treatment (e.g., a broken back, recent surgery,
intractable pain) may have prescribed the medication for a legitimate medical
purpose, but when it is done without the establishment of a bona fide doctorpatient relationship, without the creation of a chart, or without the requisite
documentation, it is likely to have been issued outside the course of a
professional practice. Conversely, a practitioner who has a bona fide doctorpatient relationship with a patient and who keeps meticulous and detailed notes
about controlled pain medications that the practitioner prescribes where there
is no apparent organic pain source, the potency and frequency of the medication
are unwarranted, or the patient has manifested objective indications of
addiction, may well be prescribing in the usual course of a professional practice,
but not for a legitimate medical purpose. The two bases may be (and frequently
are) co-morbidly present, but that does not support the proposition that the
phrases are interchangeable.
In Pope, the Government noticed its case exclusively on the theory that the
prescriptions in issue were issued outside the “usual course of professional
practice.”317 No allegation was tendered that the prescriptions were not “for a
legitimate medical purpose.”318 In essentially rolling over any notice issue, the
Agency held that “there is no material difference between the phrases ‘usual
course of a professional practice’ and ‘legitimate medical purpose,’”319 relying
on criminal cases where, it said, “the courts have sustained convictions for
violating the regulation . . . notwithstanding that an indictment charged the
defendant” with violating only one of the two elements, “as well as where the
jury instructions only referenced” one of the two elements.320 Ignoring the
Tenth Circuit’s statement that it was “hesitant to say that [the distinction
between the two phrases] never could make a difference,”321 as well as the fact
that the court in that case considered the argument rather than rejecting it
outright and holding that the phrases mean the same thing,322 the Agency quoted
only the court’s statement that “[i]t is difficult to imagine circumstances in
which a practitioner could have prescribed controlled substances” in violation
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a).
Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14967 n.38.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Fuchs, 467 F.3d 889, 898–901 (5th Cir. 2006)).
United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1231–33.
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of one element, but not the other.323 However, the cited cases may not reach as
broadly as the Agency suggests, and importantly, the cited cases are not cases
where the Government alleged only one theory, to the exclusion of the other,
as was the situation in Pope.324 The cases stand only for the irrefutable
proposition that evidence under either theory will suffice to prove a violation
of 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a).
Both elements—that a prescription was issued in a usual course of
professional practice and for a legitimate medical purpose—are required for a
prescription to be “effective.”325 It is true that the Government only needs to
prove that one of the elements was missing in order to support its prima facie
case that the prescription was not “effective,”326 but this is not the same as
holding (as the Agency did) that a respondent had sufficient notice as to both
theories if the Government only relies on one theory in its charging document
and prehearing filings.327 Courts have not been willing to extend Chevron328
deference to the Agency’s view that certain words in phrases used in the CSA
constitute mere surplusage,329 but if the Agency’s interpretation of its
prescription regulation is challenged, it will be interesting to see if the courts
are more inclined to extend regulatory deference to the DEA in this regard
under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.330
In view of the frequency with which both aspects of illegitimate
prescriptions are alleged and established in practice, as a practical matter, there
323. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14967 n.38 (alteration in original) (quoting Nelson, 383 F.3d at 1231).
324. See id. (citing the ALJ’s recommended decision, which provided that “the Government
noticed a theory based in the issuance of prescriptions outside the course of a professional
practice . . . not that any prescriptions were not issued for a legitimate medical purpose,” wherein the
ALJ held that a violation under the unnoticed theory, which was alleged for the first time in the
Government’s post hearing brief, was unavailable to support a sanction).
325. Nelson, 383 F.3d at 1233 (“[A] practitioner is authorized to dispense controlled substances
only if he acts with a legitimate medical purpose and in the usual course of professional practice.”
(analyzing 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2017))).
326. Id. (“[A] practitioner would be unauthorized to dispense a controlled substance if he acts
without a legitimate medical purpose or outside the usual course of professional practice.” (analyzing
21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a))).
327. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14947.
328. See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
329. In Novelty, Inc. v. DEA, a majority of the D.C. Circuit was unwilling to extend Chevron
deference so far as to assume that “principal,” as used by Congress in the phrase “principal place of
business” in 21 U.S.C. § 822(e), constituted surplusage. 571 F.3d 1176, 1187–88 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(Tatel, J., concurring).
330. 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (“[T]he rulings, interpretations, and opinions of [an agency head],
while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do consititute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”).
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may be little risk to the Agency in electing to merge the terms—and using one
phrase interchangeably to actually mean both phrases—even in the face of a
clearly-drafted regulation which requires both elements to be present for a
prescription to be legitimate. In terms of the practicing bar, both sides would
do well to prepare theories in support of and against each aspect of the
legitimate prescription equation. A practitioner whose prescriptions are only
alleged to have been issued without a legitimate medical purpose may wish to
defend himself quite differently than a practitioner whose prescriptions are only
alleged to have been issued outside the usual course of professional practice,
but Pope should serve as a warning for respondents’ counsel to prepare a
defense to both theories, even if only one is charged. For the time being, the
Agency has indicated its willingness to treat the dual components as an
amalgam and support a sanction based on either, irrespective of which is
alleged in the OSC.331 But if the Government intends to proceed on a theory
that a particular practitioner violated both or either of the elements, it may want
to consider charging the elements in the disjunctive, in the event that its
evidence only supports one of the theories.
E. DEA-222s and the Absence of Delivery/Receipt Evidence
To track the movement of schedule I and II controlled substances within
the closed regulatory system, the DEA requires the use of a Controlled
Substance Order Form (hereinafter DEA-222).332 In keeping with its trend of
requiring additional evidence to sustain allegations against pharmacy
registrants regarding the exercise of their corresponding responsibility, the
Agency has also recently imposed heightened requirements on its prosecutors
for allegations relating to DEA-222s.333

331. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14967 n.38.
332. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1305.03, 1305.12 (2017).
333. Upon request by an authorized registrant-purchaser, the DEA sends the registrant-purchaser
DEA-222 forms with the purchaser’s name, address, registration number, and authorized activity and
schedule information pre-printed. Id. § 1305.11. Each individually-numbered order form comes in a
three-copy stack—a brown copy (Copy 1), a green copy (Copy 2), and a blue copy (Copy 3)—with
interleaved carbon sheets so that anything written on the top copy (Copy 1) transfers to the lower two
copies. Id. §§ 1305.11, 1305.12; DEA, U.S. OFFICIAL ORDER FORMS—SCHEDULES I & II, FORM-222
(May
2008)
(form
can
be
found
at
https://www.research.uky.edu/ori/human/DEA%20presentation.pdf) [hereinafter DEA-222]. Aside
from their color and copy number, Copies 1 and 2 are identical. See id. Each of them contains two
sections, one “to be filled in by purchaser” and another “to be filled in by supplier.” Id. The
information “to be filled in by supplier” on Copies 1 and 2 includes the supplier’s DEA registration
number, the National Drug Code, and “Packages Shipped” and “Date Shipped” information for each
item that the supplier sends to the purchaser. Id. The purchaser’s copy, Copy 3, does not have an area
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A long and established body of Agency final orders held that evidence of
DEA-222s maintained in a purchaser’s files that were not completed in
accordance with the regulations could constitute a basis for a registration
sanction.334 However, in Superior Pharmacy I & Superior Pharmacy II, the
Agency added an apparently new element to the mix. Reading the plain
language of the regulation, the Agency divined that incomplete forms alone
could not prove a regulatory violation; instead, it required additional proof that
the purchaser actually had an obligation, triggered by the receipt of the ordered
drugs, to complete the forms, but that it did not do so.335 This interpretation
was reaffirmed by the Agency in Hills Pharmacy.336
In Superior I & II, the Government presented evidence demonstrating that
several DEA-222s on file at the pharmacies were missing information
regarding the number of packages received and the date on which they were
received.337 There, the Agency declared the Government’s case infirm because
“the Government offered no evidence that any portion of the two orders listed

“to be filled in by supplier.” Instead, in that section of the form where Copies 1 and 2 reflect that they
are “to be filled in by supplier,” Copy 3 contains correspondingly-located National Drug Code,
packages, and date columns, but on Copy 3, the packages and date columns, entitled “No. of Packages
Received” and “Date Received,” indicate that they are “to be filled in by purchaser.” Id. To order
controlled substances, the purchaser fills in all portions of the form except the area designated “to be
filled in by supplier” on Copy 1 and signs and dates the form. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1305.12, 1305.13;
DEA-222, supra. Because of the interleaved carbon sheets, all of the information written by the
purchaser in those designated areas is also reflected on Copies 2 and 3. Pursuant to DEA regulations,
the purchaser then separates the bottom copy, Copy 3, from the stack; retains that copy in the
purchaser’s files; and sends Copies 1 and 2 to the supplier, with the carbon sheets intact. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 1305.13(a). When the supplier fills the order, it annotates both of its copies with details of the
controlled substances that it shipped and the date on which each was shipped. Id. § 1305.12(b). The
supplier then retains Copy 1 for its records and sends Copy 2 to the DEA. Id. § 1305.13(d). When the
purchaser receives the shipment from the supplier, the purchaser is required to record the number of
packages received and the date the packages were received on its copy, Copy 3, which was retained at
the time of the order. See id. § 1305.13(e). When viewed together, the various copies should reflect
that each package shipped by the supplier was received by the purchaser, which creates a record
reflecting which controlled substances each registrant is accountable for.
334. See, e.g., Med. Shoppe, 79 Fed. Reg. 59504, 59516 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 2, 2014);
Alexander Drug Co., Inc., 66 Fed. Reg. 18299, 18303 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 6, 2001); D-Tek
Enters., 56 Fed. Reg. 28926, 28926 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 25, 1991); Wayne Nichols, D.V.M., 54
Fed. Reg. 37167, 37167–68 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 7, 1989); York Pharmacy, Inc., 41 Fed. Reg.
10933, 10933 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 15, 1976); David M. Higgins, 39 Fed. Reg. 26758, 26759
(Drug Enf’t Admin. July 23, 1974).
335. Superior Pharmacy I and Superior Pharmacy II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310, 31335, 31338 (Drug
Enf’t Admin. May 18, 2016).
336. Hills Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 49816, 49842–43 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 28, 2016).
337. Superior I & II, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31338.

CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT)

2017]

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101

CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW

393

on the form were filled.”338 The Agency was unpersuaded by the testimony
presented by the Government that an absence of a shipment should have yielded
an entry on the form of “a zero and the date they put the zero[] on the form” to
indicate that nothing ever arrived; the Agency simply noted that the regulations
do not require that step.339 Thus, because the Government “did not identify a
single instance in which a line item had actually been shipped to [the
r]espondent and the entry had not been made,” the Agency found that the
Government had not proven that the forms were incorrectly filled out such that
they would warrant a sanction.340
Shortly after Superior I & II was issued, the Agency issued its decision in
Hills Pharmacy, reaffirming the requirement of additional proof that an order
was actually filled, shipped, and received in order to sustain a finding that an
incomplete DEA-222 was in violation of the regulations’ requirements.341 In
Hills Pharmacy, the Agency again rejected a diversion investigator’s testimony
that, if the registrant did not “‘receive a drug,’ it was required ‘to write a zero’
in the column for the number of packages received.”342 Like in its decision in
Superior I & II, the Agency did not sustain the allegations regarding all of the
DEA-222s in evidence which contained no entries whatsoever in the “No. of
Packages Received” or “Date Received” columns.343 However, unlike in
Superior I & II, two of the DEA-222s in evidence in Hills Pharmacy contained
a number in the “No. of Packages Received” column, but did not contain an
entry for the date that the package(s) were received.344 The Agency sustained
those allegations, apparently accepting the registrant’s notations in the “No. of
Packages Received” column as sufficient evidence that the registrant actually
received the drugs and, therefore, that it had the obligation to fill out the DEA222s completely.345 Thus, under the Agency’s current interpretation of its
338. Id. Interestingly, there is no indication that the potential that the orders were not filled was
even raised by the respondent in that case. See Superior I & II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310.
339. Id. at 31338 (internal quotation marks omitted).
340. Id.
341. Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49843. The Agency’s decision in Hills Pharmacy does
not cite the Superior I & II decision for its requirement that additional evidence be provided to show
that the registrant “had actually received any of the drugs listed in the line items which were left blank.”
Id. at 49843 n.49. Instead, it references only the language of the regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 1305.13(e).
Id. at 49843.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 49843 & n.49.
344. Id. at 49843.
345. See id. Although the Agency found that the two forms violated the regulations, it noted
that they (along with one violation of the requirement that the registrant keep the original DEA-222
Copy 3, not a copy) were “of minor consequence.” Id. It is unclear whether that statement, which
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regulations, the existence of an entirely incomplete form is superfluous in the
absence of evidence that the controlled substance order was actually filled and
shipped to the purchaser, while a partially complete DEA-222 may be sufficient
to support the Government’s allegation regarding the same.
The Agency’s own precedent in Superior I & II and Hills Pharmacy
presents at least the potential for something of an evidentiary conundrum for
the Government. Although the burden imposed by Superior I & II is couched
in terms of whether the order was “filled”346 or “shipped,”347 the purchaser’s
obligation to complete the form only arises when it receives the order, as
recognized in Hills Pharmacy.348 While, in theory, the Government could
provide the copy of the DEA-222 sent to it by the supplier that shows when the
controlled substances order was filled,349 that would not demonstrate when or
whether controlled substances were received by the pharmacy, but only that the
vendor shipped them. The best logical evidence for the Government to meet
its burden under Superior I & II would be the purchaser’s copy of the DEA222.350 However, when all of the receipt information is missing from the
purchaser’s forms, it will still remain incumbent upon the Government to
present reliable evidence that the controlled substances described in the DEA222 were actually received by the respondent pharmacy.351 Under Superior I
& II, where the only repository for product receipt information is the
incomplete DEA-222, establishing a prima facie case for a violation of this

arguably stands in some tension to its prior precedent regarding the importance of accurate
recordkeeping, see, e.g., Satinder Dang, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 51424, 51429 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug.
18, 2011); Paul H. Volkman, 73 Fed. Reg. 30630, 30644 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 28, 2008), reflects
a determination on the part of the Agency that multiple violations of like nature are “of minor
consequence” or that this type of violation of the DEA-222 recordkeeping requirement is “of minor
consequence.”
346. Superior Pharmacy I and Superior Pharmacy II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310, 31338 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. May 18, 2016) (“[T]he Government points to no provision which requires, where no portion
of a line entry has been filled[,] . . . the purchaser to notate on the form that no portion of that entry
was received.”).
347. Id. (“[The investigator] did not identify a single instance in which a line item had actually
been shipped to [the r]espondent and the entry had not been made.”).
348. Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49843 n.49 (“The Government put forward no
evidence . . . that [r]espondent had actually received any of the drugs listed in the line items which
were left blank.” (emphasis added)).
349. 21 C.F.R. § 1305.13(b) (2017) (“A supplier . . . must record on Copies 1 and 2 the number
of commercial or bulk containers furnished on each item and the date on which the containers are
shipped to the purchaser.”); id. § 1305.13(d) (“The supplier must . . . forward Copy 2 to the Special
Agent in Charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration in the area in which the supplier is located.”).
350. See id. § 1305.13(e).
351. Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49843.
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obligation will not be without its challenges when the registrant leaves the
forms entirely blank. The Agency’s precedent could cynically be read to create
something of a potential disincentive to fully complete the DEA-222 form,
particularly where no other available paperwork maintained by a pharmacy
registrant (or at least no paperwork shared with or available to the DEA)
establishes the receipt of the controlled medication ordered on the DEA-222.
If a pharmacy registrant declines to present testimony and presents no
paperwork demonstrating delivery of the controlled substances, it creates the
potential for a virtual absolution of culpability related to incomplete paperwork.
Contrariwise, the same purchaser who makes an inadvertent mistake on a DEA222 (such as recording the “No. of Packages Received,” but leaving off the
“Date Received”) but otherwise keeps meticulous records (such as a separate
inventory document that reflects all controlled substances received and the date
on which they were received) is arguably rendered more vulnerable to a
potential sanction because the incomplete entries will facilitate the
Government’s ability to demonstrate receipt.352 In the first scenario, there is
simply no way to determine whether the substances have stayed within the
closed regulatory system; in the latter, at least the (albeit technically noncompliant) records can be put together to determine whether or not there is a
leak in the system.
F. The Rebirth of Community Impact Evidence
Agency pharmacy precedent took another fascinating turn in Perry County
Food & Drug, where the Agency’s final order held that long-disfavored
community impact evidence can potentially be used by a pharmacy registrant
to defend against a sanction proposed by the Agency.353 By way of background,
the Agency was once willing to consider evidence of community impact in
determining whether the public interest would best be served by revoking or
maintaining a registration.354 In 1999, in Pettigrew Rexall Drugs, the Agency
352. See Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49843 (“Two of the order forms contain a notation that
a number of packages were received but no entry for the date the package was received . . . thus
violat[ing] 21 C.F.R. [§] 1305.13(e) by failing to notate the date these two packages were received.”);
Alexander Drug Co., Inc., 66 Fed. Reg. 18299, 18303 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 6, 2001) (finding a
violation of the regulations because, although the respondent kept records which “arguably detailed
sufficient information to determine that the controlled substances were not diverted to an illicit
purpose,” it did not properly execute its DEA-222s).
353. Perry County Food & Drug, 80 Fed. Reg. 70084, 70091–92 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 12,
2015).
354. Marta I. Blesa, M.D., 60 Fed. Reg. 53434, 53436 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 13, 1995)
(“[T]estimony given which described the medical services provided by the [r]espondent to her
community impacts upon the need for her continued medical contributions to that community.”).
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considered the pharmacy’s value to an underserved area to the registrant’s
benefit.355 Over time, however, the Agency developed a body of final orders
that have consistently declined to consider community impact evidence offered
by practitioners.356 In Gregory D. Owens, D.D.S., the Agency compellingly
justified its decision to abandon the practice of considering community impact
evidence.357 The Agency set forth its rationale this way:
The diversion of prescription drugs has become an
increasingly serious societal problem, which is particularly
significant in poorer communities whether they are located in
rural or urban areas. . . . The residents of this Nation’s poorer
areas are as deserving of protection from diverters as are the
citizens of its wealthier communities, and there is no legitimate
reason why practitioners should be treated any differently
because of where they practice or the socioeconomic status of
their patients.358
Significantly, the CSA definition of “practitioners” includes both
prescribers (such as physicians, dentists, veterinarians) and pharmacies,359 and
the justification for the abandonment of community impact evidence referenced
practitioners.360 It thus appeared that the Agency was no longer willing to
consider community impact evidence when adjudicating any practitioner cases.
Two years after Owens, in Linda Sue Cheek, M.D., the Agency reaffirmed
its position that “community impact evidence is not relevant in determining
whether to grant [or revoke] a prescribing practitioner’s” registration, and held
that, “to the extent . . . any . . . case involving a prescribing practitioner[]
suggests otherwise, it is overruled.”361 In that decision, the Agency noted that
“there are no workable standards for determining whether other doctors are
reasonably available” and that it is “unworkable” to determine “what
constitutes a patient with a limited income or finances and how many patients

355. Pettigrew Rexall Drugs, 64 Fed. Reg. 8855, 8859–60 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 23, 1999)
(ameliorating a sanction based upon a finding by the Agency that the respondent pharmacy was one of
only two pharmacies “serving a poor, medically underserved population”).
356. E.g., Kwan Bo Jin, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 35021, 35021 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 12, 2012);
Linda Sue Cheek, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 66972, 66972–73 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 28, 2011); Gregory
D. Owens, D.D.S., 74 Fed. Reg. 36751, 36757 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 24, 2009).
357. Owens, 74 Fed. Reg. at 36757.
358. Id. (citations omitted).
359. 21 U.S.C. § 802(21) (2012).
360. Owens, 74 Fed. Reg. at 36757.
361. Cheek, 76 Fed. Reg. at 66972–73.
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(or what percentage of patients) a [prescribing] practitioner must have to claim”
an impact.362
Cheek neither stated that Pettigrew was being specifically overruled, nor
carved out an exception for pharmacy registrants.363 It just said that community
impact evidence would no longer be considered on behalf of prescribing
practitioners.364 However, Physicians Pharmacy, L.L.C., a pharmacy case
published one year after Cheek, suggested that the Agency would not consider
community impact relating to pharmacy registrants, for the same reasons
provided in Cheek and Owens.365 In that case, the Government urged the
Agency to consider the “nature and amount of diversion of controlled
substances in a geographical area . . . when determining whether an applicant
should be granted a DEA registration,” but the Agency held that such evidence
“is simply the other side of the community impact coin,” evidence of which the
“DEA has held . . . is not relevant to any of the public interest factors
and . . . [consideration of which] is completely unworkable.”366 While the
signals from the Agency were admittedly mixed, Physician’s Pharmacy
provided a none-too-subtle signal that the Agency was no longer interested in
considering community impact evidence to meet a registration sanction sought
by the Government against any practitioners.
Given this background, the Agency’s recent decision re-embracing
community impact for pharmacy practitioners is surprising. In Perry County
Food & Drug, the Agency acknowledged that it had, “in multiple cases[,]
rejected the contention that community impact is a relevant consideration” in
prescriber practitioner cases, and noted that “the reasoning of these decisions
calls into question the continuing vitality of [Pettigrew] even as applied to a
pharmacy,” but emphasized that, contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion, the Agency
“has not formally overruled the case.”367 The Agency, referring to its
discussion of community impact in Physicians Pharmacy as dicta, points out
that no reference was made to Pettigrew in that decision, and thus it “cannot be
read as overruling” Pettigrew.368 The Agency then explicitly stated that “the
362. Id. at 66973 n.4.
363. See Cheek, 76 Fed. Reg. 66972.
364. Id. at 66973.
365. Physicians Pharmacy, L.L.C., 77 Fed. Reg. 47096, 47096 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 7,
2012).
366. Id. (first citing Cheek, 76 Fed. Reg. at 66973 n.4; then citing Gregory D. Owens, D.D.S.,
74 Fed. Reg. 36751, 36757 & n.22 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 24, 2009)).
367. Perry County Food & Drug, 80 Fed. Reg. 70084, 70091 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 12, 2015).
368. Id. at 70091 n.20. The Agency added, in another footnote, that while it “decline[d] to
overrule” Pettigrew, it found the reasoning in that decision to be “problematic” due to the weight given
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Agency’s reasons for rejecting consideration of community impact evidence in
cases involving prescribing practitioners apply with equal force to
pharmacies,”369 and also discussed Owens, but faulted the Government for not
addressing whether Pettigrew “remains viable as precedent,” and ultimately
considered the evidence but found it unpersuasive.370
The obvious contention between its statements that the reasons for rejecting
consideration of community impact in prescribing practitioner cases “apply
with equal force to pharmacies,”371 but that Pettigrew still “remains viable as
precedent,”372 leaves significant ambiguity as to how community impact
evidence will be considered by the Agency in future cases. Analytically, the
Agency now appears to be sending the message that underserved communities
are not better served by prescriber practitioners who commit acts inconsistent
with the public interest, but are still benefitted by pharmacy practitioners who
commit acts inconsistent with the public interest. If an inherent danger
associated with all practitioners who commit acts that are inconsistent with the
public interest is the potential for controlled substance diversion, it is
challenging to distinguish why dangerous and powerful narcotics diverted due
to pharmacies’ conduct are somehow more beneficial to underserved
communities than those same drugs diverted due to prescribing doctors’
conduct. Counsel on both sides of pharmacy litigation (and, perhaps, litigation
involving manufactures or distributors) should remain prepared to provide and
address community impact evidence. By specifically declining to overrule
Pettigrew, the Agency has left open the ability of pharmacy registrants to
introduce community impact evidence and arguments, and conscientious
Government counsel must now once again introduce evidence that the
community impact of revoking (or not granting) registration is nominal when
juxtaposed against the potential risks. In addition to affecting pharmacy
litigation, Perry County has potentially reopened the door for counsel on both
sides of prescriber-registrant cases as well. Counsel for prescribers should have
their equal protection arguments at the ready, because the view that underserved
communities are no more benefitted by drug-diverter-prescribers than those
more affluent neighborhoods would seem to apply with equal analytical force
to the community impact evidence, particularly given other evolving Agency case law since that
decision was issued, including the addition of the requirement that the registrant/applicant
acknowledge misconduct to rebut the Government’s prima facie case, as well as the Agency’s
emphasis on candor. Id. at 70092 n.23.
371. Id. at 70091.
370. Id. at 70092.
371. Id. at 70091.
372. Id. at 70092.
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to drug-diverter-pharmacies, and the Government should be prepared to defend
the continuing vitality of Owens and its progeny in the face of Perry County.
G. The Sins of Our Relatives
In Cove Inc., the Agency re-affirmed its longstanding willingness to
negatively consider CSA violations committed by relatives in denying an
application for registration.373 In Cove, the Agency denied a registration
application because the applicant’s husband had previously “violated his [sic]
corresponding responsibility and the CSA,” while employed by a formerlyregistered pharmacy.374 Interestingly, Cove represents another installment in
an increasingly-expanding complement of cases where, notwithstanding the
absence of exceptions filed by either side to the ALJ’s recommended decision,
the Agency issued its own, contrary factual findings and legal conclusions.375
In its final order, the Administrator “reject[ed] the ALJ’s conclusion that the
links between the applicant and [her former registrant-employed husband] are
sufficiently attenuated to conclude that he will exercise no influence or control
over [r]espondent.”376
This area of familial imputation basis for sanction remains available to
Agency prosecutors contemplating the opposition of registration applications,
and is an important concept for the bar to consider when providing advice to
prospective registration holders.
H. Ninety-Day Prescription Rule Narrowed?
In Wesley Pope, M.D., the Agency addressed an argument made under one
of its regulations that allows multiple controlled substance prescriptions to be
issued simultaneously, and potentially narrowed the availability of that
regulation as a defense for unwitting prescriber registrants.377 Under
373. Cove Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 29037, 29043 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015); see, e.g., City
Drug Co., 64 Fed. Reg. 59212, 59214 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 2, 1999); Carriage Apothecary, Inc.,
52 Fed. Reg. 27599, 27599 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 22, 1987); Monk’s Pharmacy, 52 Fed. Reg. 8988,
8989 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 20, 1987); Unarex of Plymouth Road, 50 Fed. Reg. 6077, 6079 (Drug
Enf’t Admin. Feb. 13, 1985); Lawson & Sons Pharmacy, 48 Fed. Reg. 16140, 16141 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. Apr. 14, 1983); see also Terese, Inc., 76 Fed. Reg. 46843, 46845–47 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug.
3, 2011) (showing that the Agency emphasized that the only reason it did not revoke based on the
misconduct of the applicant’s husband was that the record did not adequately support violations of the
CSA or state controlled substance laws on his part).
374. Cove, 80 Fed. Reg. at 29041. It is the pharmacy that is registered with the DEA, not the
pharmacist. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(21), 823(f) (2012).
375. See id. at 29043.
376. Id.
377. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14973 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017).
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longstanding DEA regulations, a prescriber registrant may issue multiple
controlled substance prescriptions at one time that will provide controlled
substances for up to a ninety-day period, provided that five conditions are
met378: (1) “[e]ach separate prescription [must be] issued for a legitimate
medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of
professional practice;” (2) the prescriber must provide written instructions on
each prescription to indicate the earliest date on which a pharmacy may fill each
prescription; (3) the prescriber must conclude that providing multiple
prescriptions “does not create an undue risk of diversion or abuse;” (4) state
law must allow “[t]he issuance of multiple prescriptions as described” within
the regulations; and (5) the prescriber must “compl[y] fully with all other
applicable requirements” under the CSA, the regulations, and state law.379
In Pope, a prescriber registrant took over care of a patient in a practice and
saw the patient for three visits, each about two weeks apart,380 before the
prescriber decided that the patient could “go into the three-month” schedule for
his prescriptions.381 For the two months following that visit,382 the patient
would request a new prescription when his prior thirty-day-supply ran out, a
prescription monitoring program report would be obtained, the patient’s file
would be pulled, and the prescription would be issued by the prescriber and left
for the patient to pick up.383 The prescriber registrant argued that, under the
regulation, he did not need to see the patient every month, and he could issue
up to a 90-day-supply based on the visit at the beginning of the three months
(and those visits that occurred prior).384
The Agency held that the ninety-day-supply regulation “does not provide
a safe harbor”385 for the registrant, in part because the provision “contemplates
the issuance of multiple prescriptions at one time,”386 so “it is not directly
applicable” to the registrant’s situation,387 and in part because the
Administrator, contrary to the ALJ’s findings, concluded that all of “the
prescriptions [r]espondent issued at the three previous office visits were issued
378. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.12(b) (2017).
379. Id. § 1306.12(b)(i)–(v).
380. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14954 (September 22, 2011 visit), 14956 (October 6, 2011 visit),
14957 (October 20, 2011 visit).
381. Id. at 14973 (quoting the prescriber’s testimony).
382. Id. (November and December, 2011).
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 14973 n.44.
387. Id.
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outside of the usual course of professional practice and lacked a legitimate
medical purpose.”388 Thus, the Agency found that the regulation’s first
condition—that “[e]ach separate prescription is issued for a legitimate medical
purpose” by a prescriber “acting in the usual course of professional
practice”389—was not met because the prescriber “acted outside of the usual
course of professional practice and lacked a legitimate medical purpose in
issuing the [controlled substance] prescriptions without requiring an office
visit.”390 The Agency faulted the prescriber for not insisting upon an office
visit, and for not considering two aberrant drug screens from several months
prior to the prescriptions issued without an office visit, which the Agency said
constituted a “fail[ure] to determine whether issuing the prescriptions created
an undue risk of diversion.”391
During a subsequent ninety-day time period, the prescriber registrant again
saw the patient on day one of the ninety-day period, issued a thirty-day supply,
and then issued new thirty-day-supply prescriptions for the two months that
followed, without additional office visits.392 The Agency again held that there
should have been an office visit each month and faulted the prescriber for not
considering the same aberrant drug screens from over six months prior, also
crediting the Government’s expert testimony that the prescriber “needed to
obtain a consultation with a specialist in addiction.”393 In addition to the
conduct that it deemed deficient to establish legitimate medical purpose at the
visit on day one, the Agency also noted that, by the two later dates where the
respondent wrote new prescriptions without an office visit—based on the idea
that the first visit justified the subsequent ninety days of prescribing—the
prescriber “likely had the results” of a drug screen obtained at the first visit,
which it found to be aberrant.394 Had the prescriber issued all of the controlled
substance prescriptions simultaneously at the initial visit, labeled appropriately
to designate the earliest date on which each could be filled, and not seen the
patient again for ninety days, the evidence of the aberrant drug screen that was
used against him in regards to the two subsequent dates would not have been
available to the Government to support a sanction.
The implications for attorneys advising prescriber clients are not yet
altogether clear, and Pope may signal potential adverse consequences to a
388. Id. at 14973.
389. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.12(b)(i) (2017).
390. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14973.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 14958 (January 19, 2012 visit and prescriptions), 14960 (February 13, 2012
prescriptions), 14961 (March 13, 2012 prescriptions).
393. Id. at 14977.
394. Id. at 14976.
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prescriber registrant regardless of the prescriber’s choice of how to proceed.
One choice is for the prescriber to issue all three prescriptions at a single visit,
as the Agency says 21 C.F.R. § 1306.12(b) contemplates, in which case only
that visit (and presumably only the circumstances known to the prescriber on
that visit date) would be properly considered when evaluating the legality of all
three prescriptions covering the subsequent ninety-day period. While this
choice seemingly insulates a prescriber from having negative circumstances
that arise after the visit considered against him, if the Agency finds the first
visit to be deficient then it will undoubtedly find all three prescriptions to be
deficient. Another choice is for the prescriber to issue only one prescription at
the first visit, then issue two additional prescriptions at thirty-day intervals,
without seeing the patient again. But as the prescriber in Pope discovered, the
Agency may find that an office visit should have occurred during the two latter
months and will consider the lack of an office visit and any circumstances that
arise between prescription issuances against the registrant.395 The third choice
is for the prescriber to simply not avail himself of the ninety-day prescription
option and write one prescription per visit per thirty days. His patients may not
appreciate having to return (and pay for a visit) so frequently, but he may be
better situated to justify prescribing with records that correspond with each
prescribing event date, unless, of course, those records are found to be
insufficient. If the prescriber chooses the last option and sees his patients every
thirty days, it is unclear based on Pope whether the Agency might be amenable
to his notes from visit day one potentially serving as a safety net for the
subsequent two visits—such that the latter two visits are considered in the
aggregate with visit one—since he could have issued all three prescriptions at
visit one, anyway. Clients will likely be asking whether seeing their patients
and issuing prescriptions more frequently than once every ninety days
demonstrates attention to their responsibilities, or whether it merely creates an
enhanced source of adverse evidence available to the Government in
enforcement proceedings, and they will almost certainly be asking why the
DEA is in a superior position to dictate how frequently an office visit is required
in connection with prescribing controlled substances.
I.

To Stay or Not to Stay

Judson J. Somerville, M.D., a case involving no more than the relatively
routine adjudication of a matter where the registrant lost his state authority,396
395. See id.
396. Judson J. Somerville, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 21408, 21409 & n.3 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 8,
2017).
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morphed into another interesting final order. In Somerville, the Agency reclarified its prior statement from Grider Drug #1 & Grider Drug #2, where the
Agency had indicated that “a stay in administrative enforcement proceedings is
‘unlikely ever to be justified’ due to ancillary proceedings involving the
[r]espondent,”397 and sought to distinguish its prior precedent in Odette L.
Campbell, M.D., wherein it granted lengthy stays of proceedings based on an
ancillary criminal matter and an ancillary state board matter involving the
respondent. 398
The respondent in Somerville sought a stay of DEA administrative
proceedings because state board proceedings—which had resulted in the
summary suspension of his state controlled substance privileges and, in turn,
the commencement of the DEA revocation action—were ongoing.399 The ALJ
denied the respondent’s request for a stay of proceedings, citing the Agency’s
prior statement in Grider #1 & #2 that stays are “‘unlikely to ever be justified’
due to ancillary proceedings,”400 but also citing Campbell as contrary
authority.401
The Agency did not dispute that it issued a lengthy stay for state
administrative proceedings and federal criminal proceedings in Campbell, but
explained that three features about the Campbell case made it “the rare case
where withholding the issuance of a final decision was warranted”: (1) the
Campbell case involved a DEA registration that had expired shortly after the
evidentiary hearing, so it was an application case, rather than a revocation case;
(2) the state criminal charges, which were brought shortly before the
evidentiary hearing, could have resulted in an additional basis for sanction if
the respondent had been convicted; and (3) the state administrative proceedings

397. Somerville, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21409 n.3 (quoting Grider Drug #1 & Grider Drug #2, 77 Fed.
Reg. 44070, 44104 n.97 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 26, 2012)); see also Lawrence E. Stewart, M.D., 81
Fed. Reg. 54822, 54827 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 17, 2016).
398. Odette L. Campbell, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 41062, 41064 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 14, 2015).
While the Grider final order contains no specific dates or other indications as to when the
Administrator issued specific stays or abeyance orders in the proceedings, it is worthy of note that the
ALJ’s (second) recommended decision was issued on October 26, 2010 and the final order was issued
nearly five years later, on July 14, 2015. Id. at 41062. The only dates referenced in the final order are
an August 27, 2010 date where the state medical board initiated administrative proceedings, a “new
formal complaint against [r]espondent” filed by the state medical board on September 19, 2014, and a
March 27, 2013 pre-trial diversion agreement relating to the pending criminal matter. Id. at 41063–
64.
399. Somerville, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21408.
400. Id. at 21409 n.3 (quoting Grider #1 & #2, 77 Fed. Reg. at 44014 n.97) (discussing ALJ
decision).
401. Id. (citing Campbell, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41062).
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could have resulted in suspension or denial of her state license, and “denial of
her application would have been required under the CSA.”402
However, upon objective, comparative analysis of Campbell and
Somerville, it is challenging to reconcile the sua sponte granting of the lengthy
stay by the Administrator in Campbell from the denial of the stay sought in
Somerville. Under the Agency’s analysis in Grider #1 & #2, there is nothing
facially apparent about proceedings that involve only an application, as
opposed to a revocation, that would render a long stay more appealing,
particularly when a registrant is effectively unable to conduct any regulated
activity under the registrant’s existing DEA registration due to limitations on
practice imposed at the state level.403 Similarly, the fact that the ancillary
proceedings in Campbell could conceivably have raised additional grounds for
sanction that had not been noticed in the present DEA proceedings, a potential
that was not discussed but was also potentially present in Somerville and other
cases where ancillary proceedings are ongoing, bears no readily apparent
logical relationship to the wisdom of granting or denying a stay of proceedings.
If the Agency can revoke based upon the grounds existing before a stay is
requested, any additional grounds that ultimately arise will be superfluous; and
alternatively, if additional grounds ultimately arise out of the ancillary matters,
they can be charged against a respondent in future proceedings brought to
revoke a registration or deny an application, if necessary. While Somerville’s
discussion of Campbell provided little clarity as to the Agency’s reasoning for
granting stays in that case, it remains apparent that the Agency disfavors stays
and is unlikely to grant lengthy stays as a matter of course.
J. Summary Disposition and State Due Process
In addition to the discussion regarding the imposition of a stay, another key
aspect of Campbell also reared its head in the Somerville case. In Campbell,
the ALJ initially granted summary disposition, but the Agency remanded the
matter back to the ALJ because “[o]n review, the Administrator noted that it
appeared that under Texas law and regulations, [r]espondent was not entitled to
a hearing before [the state board that suspended her controlled substance
privileges] to challenge [the board’s] suspension or the denial of her application

402. Id. (discussing Campbell, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41063).
403. See Grider #1 & #2, 77 Fed. Reg. at 44104 n.97. In Campbell, the Agency had issued an
Immediate Suspension Order, so the practitioner could not have continued regulated activity during
the pendency of administrative proceedings, even before her registration expired. See Campbell, 80
Fed. Reg. at 41063 n.3. Thus, it cannot be that the Agency is worried about lengthy delays where the
registrant maintains the ability to conduct authorized activity pursuant to his DEA registration.
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for a new [state] registration.”404 Under Texas state law, Dr. Campbell was
unequivocally deprived of the state authority required to handle controlled
substances, but the lack of state authority was due to the issuance of the DEA
immediate suspension order,405 creating an apparent circular problem for the
Agency. The Agency sent the case back to the ALJ for a determination as to
whether the state “would provide [the respondent] with a hearing on the
allegations,” and ruled that she would only be subject to summary disposition
based on her lack of state authority if the state afforded her the ability to
challenge the state board action (of suspending her based on the DEA ISO) at
a state board hearing.406 Thus, the Administrator remanded the matter back to
the ALJ to essentially conduct a due process analysis regarding Texas state
law.407
In Somerville, in contrast, although the respondent made the argument that
the state board was acting in violation of Texas law by failing to provide him
with an informal settlement conference or formal administrative proceedings
within the time frame required under Texas law, the Agency adopted the ALJ’s
summary disposition recommendation and cited another previously-issued final
order,408 stating that the DEA “accepts as valid and lawful the actions of a state
regulatory board unless that action is overturned by a state court . . . pursuant
to state law.”409 Thus, while the Agency has indicated that it will not generally
entertain a respondent’s allegations related to purported infirmities in state law
and board proceedings as bases to withhold summary disposition,410 it has also
signaled that, where the Agency believes that state proceedings do not measure
up to some undefined DEA standard of due process, no summary disposition
based on an absence of state authority will issue.411
Given the limited authority of the Agency in enforcement adjudications,412
litigators on both sides of the aisle can likely assume that the Agency will not
lightly re-travel into adjudications which evaluate the legality of state licensing
schemes, but both sides should be vigilant to brief the issue where there is a
404. Campbell, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41063 n.3.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Judson J. Somerville, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 21408, 21409–10 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 8,
2017).
409. Somerville, 82 Fed. Reg. at 21409–10 (alteration in original) (quoting Kamal Tiwari, M.D.,
76 Fed. Reg. 71604, 71607 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 18, 2011)).
410. See id. at 21408–09.
411. Id.
412. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274 (2006).
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possibility that state due process does not measure up to the DEA’s standards
with state law features similar to those Texas provisions that the DEA found
violative of due process.
K. Notice This, Consent to That
The issue of notice and the related issue of litigation by consent have
received some level of attention in recent Agency final orders, but still exist in
some level of flux. Admittedly, the Agency’s handling of notice under the APA
in the past has not been marked with unwavering consistency,413 but more
recent Agency precedent on the issue of notice bears a marked level of new
potential dangers for practitioners on both sides of the litigation aisle.
1. Notice Requirements
The level and specificity of notice that the Agency is required to furnish
those it seeks to sanction has been the subject of a fair amount of recent
attention in Agency final orders.414 Inasmuch as the current state of what notice
is required in DEA administrative proceedings is not entirely clear, a proper
analysis is best commenced with an examination of the bedrock sources of
authority that underpin the requirements. The notice requirements that
Congress placed on agency administrative practice under the APA are
relatively modest.415 APA notice in this context requires only that “[p]ersons
entitled to notice of an agency hearing shall be timely informed of—(1) the
time, place, and nature of the hearing; (2) the legal authority and jurisdiction
under which the hearing is to be held; and (3) the matters of fact and law
asserted.”416 The Attorney General’s Manual on the APA provides that the
APA notice requirement in this provision “is not required to set forth
evidentiary facts or legal argument. All that is necessary is to advise the parties
of the legal and factual issues involved.”417

413. Compare, e.g., Jose Raul S. Villavicencio, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 3624, 3630 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. Jan. 23, 2015) (showing loss of state authority considered without notice), and Fiaz Afzal, 79
Fed. Reg. 61651, 61655 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 14, 2014) (same), with Ideal Pharmacy Care, Inc.,
76 Fed. Reg. 51415, 51416 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2011) (showing loss of state authority
not considered due to lack of Government notice).
414. See, e.g., Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. 29053, 29059 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015);
Jana Marjenhoff, D.O., 80 Fed. Reg. 29067, 29068 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015).
415. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2012).
416. Id.
417. TOM CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947) § 5(a)(3), at 47 [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
MANUAL].
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The notice requirements included in the DEA’s longstanding implementing
regulations are similarly modest, providing only that “[t]he [OSC]
shall . . . contain a statement of the legal basis for such hearing and for the
denial, revocation, or suspension of registration and a summary of the matters
of fact and law asserted.”418 In evaluating its obligations under the APA and
its own regulations, the Agency, in some of its more vintage precedent, has long
held that in DEA administrative proceedings, “the parameters of the hearing are
determined by the prehearing statements.”419 While the Agency has previously
embraced the principle that “[p]leadings in administrative proceedings are not
judged by the standards applied to an indictment at common law,”420 and “[t]he
rules governing DEA hearings do not require the formality of amending a show
cause order to comply with the evidence,”421 some newer Agency precedent
imposed what appears to be significantly tighter notice requirements on the
Government.422
In Farmacia Yani, for example, the Agency scolded its prosecutors because
the charging document and prehearing statement did not include a citation to a
particular regulation subsection, and the Agency addressed the issue by parsing
each subsection, finding that no evidence was put forth under one subsection,
and that another subsection did not apply to the facts of the case.423 The Agency
then found that the conduct alleged violated an entirely different regulatory
section, leaving the reader to ponder the purpose for the scolding.424 In another
final order, Jana Marjenhoff, D.O., the Agency refused to allow the
Government to rely on certain noticed conduct,425 which it found was “clearly

418. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.37(c) (2017) (emphasis added).
419. CBS Wholesale Distribs., 74 Fed. Reg. 36746, 36750 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 24, 2009)
(quoting Darrell Risner, D.M.D., P.S.C., 61 Fed. Reg. 728, 730 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 10, 1996)).
420. Clair L. Pettinger, M.D., 78 Fed. Reg. 61591, 61596 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 3, 2013)
(quoting Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 598 F.2d 250, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
421. Id.; Roy E. Berkowitz, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 36758, 36759–60 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 24,
2009).
422. Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. 29053, 29053 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015).
423. Id. at 29064 & n.28. To the extent that the Agency found that the evidence supported a
successful Government theory under any subsection, the message to the parties from the Agency
appears to be that an allegation that does not specify the specific subsection will be rejected based on
lack of adequate notice. Discounting the improbable possibility that this aspect of the decision
reflected some manner of gratuitous grousing at its prosecutors, where the Agency has determined that
no subsection can be sustained as a factual matter, pointing out the absence of a specified subsection
in the OSC would have little other utility in the final order.
424. Id.
425. Jana Marjenhoff, D.O., 80 Fed. Reg. 29067, 29068–69 (Drug Enf’t. Admin. May 20, 2015).
The Agency found that the “[r]espondent clearly had notice that her conduct . . . would be at issue in
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probative of [an] allegation [set forth in the OSC] that [the r]espondent engaged
in obtaining controlled substances through fraud,”426 because it failed to specify
that the conduct would be specifically considered under Factor Five.427 This
was a somewhat eyebrow-raising development in view of Clair L. Pettinger,
M.D., a final order issued two years earlier, wherein the Agency had indicated
that the Government was not required to specify which Public Interest Factor
noticed misconduct was to be considered under.428 Thus, without specifically
saying as much, it appeared that the Agency was indicating either that it is not
necessary to specify the public interest factor relied upon, unless it sought to
rely on Factor Five, or saying (also without saying) that it was now increasing
the notice requirements imposed on its prosecutors in administrative
proceedings in general.
Although it appeared after Marjenhoff that evidence to be considered under
Factor Five, if not the other factors also, required particularly detailed notice,
the Agency then issued Roberto Zayas, M.D. In Zayas, upon its review of the
respondent’s hearing testimony, the Agency determined that the respondent
gave “false testimony” at his hearing in support of his actions (i.e., in presenting
his defense) and held that “his provision of false testimony . . . constitutes
actionable misconduct under Factor Five.”429 No notice, no problem. So it thus
appears that, under the Agency’s current precedent when considered as a whole,
Factor Five allegations may require enhanced notice even when the conduct
itself is alleged to be against the public interest generally, unless the
Administrator decides, during the preparation of the final order, that the Agency
does not believe the respondent’s explanation for his or her conduct, in which
case the testimony—the provision of the respondent’s defense itself—will be
deemed adverse conduct held against the respondent under Factor Five with no
opportunity to respond at all beyond petition to the courts.430 Further
confounding the issue, in Peter F. Kelly, D.P.M., the Agency considered
conduct under Factor Five that was not noticed by the Government, based on

the proceeding” because the Government provided the respondent with notice in its prehearing
statement that it would elicit testimony from the pharmacist regarding the conduct. Id.
426. Id. at 29068.
427. Id. at 29068–69.
428. Clair L. Pettinger, M.D., 78 Fed. Reg. 61591, 61596 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 3, 2013).
429. Roberto Zayas, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 21410, 21428 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 8, 2017).
430. While the ALJ’s recommended decision regarding the same testimony concluded that “it is
clear that he made it up” and the respondent could have filed exceptions relating to that finding, the
ALJ only considered the respondent’s testimony incredible, not as actionable misconduct, and
therefore the respondent had no notice that his testimony would be considered against him under Factor
Five. See id. (discussing the ALJ’s characterization of the respondent’s testimony).
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its assessment that “[n]otwithstanding that the Government did not cite Factor
Five with reference to this allegation, [r]espondent clearly knew that his
conduct . . . was at issue.”431 So the rule presently appears to be that notice of
the specific factor the evidence is to be offered under is not important—unless
the evidence is offered under Factor Five—unless the Agency says notice is not
important there either.432
Perhaps lending support to the old wisdom that continuously sawing off
pieces of chair legs seldom leads to a more balanced chair, the Agency issued
a lengthy final order in Wesley Pope M.D., in which it sought, inter alia, to
clarify its position on both the administrative notice requirements and,
relatedly, litigation by consent.433 In Pope, the Agency insisted that it has not
tightened notice requirements, that it has not changed its litigation-by-consent
requirements, and that any claims to the contrary are the unfortunate product of
misreading its precedents.434 With regards to its view of notice, the Agency
focused on Farmacia Yani and Marjenhoff, declaring that “[a] review of these
[two] decisions shows . . . that the Agency has not ‘imposed an increased
standard of notice’ but simply applied the extensive body of judicial precedent
that addresses the adequacy of notice in administrative adjudication.”435 The
presented explanation—that it has not increased notice standards, but has
chosen to now apply what it describes as an “extensive body of judicial
precedent”436 on the issue of notice—presents at least a risk of some level of

431. Peter F. Kelly, D.P.M., 82 Fed. Reg. 28676, 28687 n.30 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 23, 2017).
432. See id.
433. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14946–48 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017).
434. Id. at 14946–47.
435. Id. (footnote omitted).
436. In NLRB v. I.W.G., Inc., one of the two cases that comprise the Agency’s “extensive body
of judicial precedent,” the Tenth Circuit, in discussing the bounds of acceptable notice and whether
one of the parties could be sanctioned where an administrative charging document was at variance with
the findings, reaffirmed its long-held view that, “variation between an unfair labor practice charged in
the complaint and one found by the [NLRB] does not deprive a respondent of due process where it is
clear that the respondent ‘understood the issue and was afforded full opportunity to justify [its
actions].’” 144 F.3d 685, 687 (10th Cir. 1998) (final alteration in original) (citations omitted). The
court clarified that, “[t]he introduction of evidence relevant to an issue already in the case may not be
used to show consent to trial of a new issue absent a clear indication that the party who introduced the
evidence was attempting to raise a new issue.” Id. at 688 (quoting Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d
1355, 1372 (D.C.Cir. 1983)). In Pergament United Sales, Inc. v. NLRB, the other half of the “extensive
body of judicial precedent” relied upon by the Agency, the court sustained NLRB’s charge,
notwithstanding a variation that it characterized as “a minor distinction without significant legal
consequences on the facts of th[e] case.” 920 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1990). Interestingly, the
Pergament court focused on the second prong of the litigation-by-consent principle, to wit, whether
the case had been fully and fairly litigated based on a review of the record. The court instructed that
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confusion. It could potentially be viewed as incongruous to maintain that
Agency notice requirements were indeed remaining static, while
simultaneously announcing a sudden reliance on a body of judicial precedent
(extensive or otherwise) to justify them. Further, in contravention of the
longstanding principle that “[t]he grounds upon which an administrative order
must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was
based,”437 the Pope final order cites internal procedural filings by the parties in
those cases that the bar and regulated community have no reasonable ability to
review.438 Unavailable references cited in defense of otherwise-unexplainable
shifts in Agency precedent risk the perception that the Agency is telling the
practicing bar: ‘Move along, folks, nothing to see here.’
As already mentioned in greater detail,439 the Zayas final order, which came
after Pope, held that “misconduct is misconduct” and that because “the inquiry
focuses on protecting the public interest[,] what matters is the seriousness of
the registrant’s or applicant’s misconduct.”440 Thus, it is unclear whether Yani,
Marjenhoff, Pope, or some combination thereof currently represents the
Agency’s view of required notice, as the Agency now appears to be of the view
that it does not matter whether misconduct is considered under any, some, or
all of the Public Interest Factors. If specificity is vital as to all Public Interest
Factors, to only Factor Five, or to none of the Public Interest Factors because
“misconduct is misconduct,”441 it will be difficult to divine what the applicable
notice requirements are in any reliable way. Even with the help of a scorecard,
managing litigation under this evolving notice standard will likely present
challenges on both sides of the litigation aisle, and it is difficult to know
whether another Agency order seeking to “clarify” this issue will help or saw a
little more off another chair leg.
Reliability in legal interpretation helps representatives on both sides of the
aisle in providing advice and planning strategy. The very real risk of the
Agency’s current approach to notice is the inadvertent creation of a perception
that the Agency may retroactively choose which Public Interest Factor(s)
require increased notice scrutiny well after proceedings are completed. The
“whether a charge has been fully and fairly litigated is so peculiarly fact-bound as to make every case
unique; a determination of whether there has been full and fair litigation must therefore be made on
the record in each case.” Id. at 136.
437. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
438. Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14946 n.4 (citing to hearing briefs in final order filed by the parties
before the ALJ).
439. See supra Section III.A.3.
440. Roberto Zayas, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 21410, 21422 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 8, 2017).
441. Id.
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absence of a consistently articulated approach carries the potential of
complicating the business of formulating a coherent litigation strategy for both
sides of the litigation equation. Further, the Agency’s determination that a
registrant’s testimony that is not found credible by the Administrator will
constitute adverse conduct considered under Factor Five,442 bears potentially
serious consequences for members of the bar advising clients about the wisdom
of testifying, and also for the Government in assessing the investment
appropriately devoted to cross examination. Both sides of the litigation
equation must be cognizant of these precedents in crafting hearing strategy,
challenging and defending notice sufficiency, and presenting arguments in
post-hearing submissions. The status of the level of notice required in DEA
administrative enforcement proceedings will likely be the subject of litigation,
adjustment, and additional clarification in the future.
2. Litigation by Consent
The notice-related issue of litigation by consent also saw some attention in
recent Agency precedent. It has long been the case under Agency practice that
a failure on the part of the Government to disclose an allegation in the OSC can
be rectified if it discloses such allegation in its prehearing statements or
“otherwise timely notifies a [r]espondent of its intent to litigate the issue.”443
Moving a step further, the Agency explicitly embraced the concept of litigation
by consent in its own administrative enforcement proceedings a few years ago
in Grider Drug #1 & Grider Drug #2.444 There, the Agency announced that
where the Government has failed to adequately notice its intent to litigate an
issue, “the parties, in the absence of objection, can be deemed to have litigated”
an unnoticed basis for sanction “by consent where they fully litigate the
issue.”445 Thus, the two basic elements required for the application of the
concept are: (1) lack of objection to insufficiently noticed misconduct; and (2)
a full litigation of the issue in question.446
In further refinement of its litigation-by-consent adoption, the Agency
issued Cove Inc., a case where the ALJ recommended that certain evidence be
considered against the respondent as a materially false statement.447
442. Id. at 21428.
443. E.g., CBS Wholesale Distribs., 74 Fed. Reg. 36746, 36750 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 24,
2009).
444. Grider Drug #1 & Grider Drug #2, 77 Fed. Reg. 44070, 44077 n.23 (Drug Enf’t Admin.
July 26, 2012).
445. Id.
446. See id.
447. Cove Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 29037, 29039 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015).
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Notwithstanding the absence of any objection by the respondent to either the
introduction of the evidence at the hearing or the ALJ’s consideration of it as a
materially false statement in his recommended decision, the Agency rejected
the ALJ’s recommendation, citing inadequate notice of the allegation, and
further held that a litigation-by-consent theory was unavailable to the
Government because it did not pursue that position in its closing brief or its
exceptions to the ALJ’s decision.448 Shortly thereafter, in Odette L. Campbell,
M.D., the ALJ declined to consider certain evidence because the Government
did not provide notice of the evidence.449 Even though, once again, there was
no corresponding respondent objection to the ALJ’s analysis of the evidence in
Campbell, the Agency again held that the Government waived its ability to rely
on litigation by consent because it did not raise the theory in exceptions to the
ALJ’s decision.450 The Agency recently sought to clarify Campbell in Pope,
noting that, in Pope, the day was saved for the Government by raising litigation
by consent, not before the ALJ, but in its exceptions.451
Cove and Campbell were particularly remarkable notice cases in that the
respondents in those cases did not interpose a claim of unfair surprise regarding
the issues the Agency ultimately refused to consider based on lack of adequate
notice.452 Even where neither side interposed any objection or raised issues
regarding surprise, prejudice, or even a mistake, the Agency took it upon itself
to issue lengthy final orders in those cases, addressing self-identified legal
topics453—a sort of law review article within an adjudication. These were cases
where the Agency decided to hold the Government’s level of notice to be
inadequate, noted its own prior willingness to embrace litigation by consent,
and then ruled out litigation by consent because the Government (who never
had the opportunity to field a notice objection from the respondents at the
hearing) did not seek to pursue this theory (which it could not have known it

448. Id.
449. Odette L. Campbell, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 41062, 41062 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 14,
2015).
450. Id.
451. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14947 n.5 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017).
Interestingly, as a procedural matter, where both parties have filed exceptions and one side raises
litigation by consent for the first time in filed exceptions, no means exist under the regulations for the
opposing party to object or argue contrary law. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.66(c) (2017) (“[E]ach party shall be
entitled to only one filing . . . [;] that is, either a set of exceptions or a response thereto.”).
452. Campbell, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41063 (showing that only the Government filed an exception to
the recommended decision); Cove, 80 Fed. Reg. at 29037 (showing that neither side filed any
exceptions to the recommended decision).
453. See Campbell, 80 Fed. Reg. 41062; Cove, 80 Fed. Reg. 29037.
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would have needed) in its closing brief or exceptions.454 Pursuit of unraised
issues by the Agency is at some variance with the adjudicative approach
embraced by the courts. While in reviewing trial court proceedings, the federal
circuit courts of appeal are precluded, in the absence of plain and prejudicial
error, from considering errors and defects,455 the Agency’s current approach to
litigation by consent and other issues has expanded its reach to expound upon
unraised issues of legal interest on a sua sponte basis.
Theoretically, escalation of notice requirements, coupled with a more
robust application of litigation by consent, could result in something of a wash,
although it does carry the prospect of some level of confusion for those engaged
in the Agency’s administrative litigation. It could be argued that the Agency’s
current approach places the primary analytical emphasis in litigation by consent
cases on the absence of objection and mere introduction of evidence, rather than
whether the record makes it “clear that the respondent ‘understood the issue
and was afforded full opportunity to justify [its actions]’”456 and whether there
was “a clear indication that the party who introduced the evidence was
attempting to raise a new issue.”457 If subsequent final orders maintain the same
trajectory, this approach could prove unwieldy to both sides of the litigation
equation, and may be challenging for the Agency to defend on appeal.
3. Notice and Lack of State Authority
Supporters and detractors of the current Agency view on the issue likely
found much to be surprised about regarding the Agency’s handling of notice as
it applies (or does not apply) to cases where a registrant lacks state controlled
substance authority. All other Agency analysis tendered on the issue of notice
metaphorically goes out the window with lack of state authority cases. Previous
precedents of the Agency have sometimes considered lack of state authority
against a registrant without prior notice,458 and at other times have declined to
consider lack of state authority due to lack of notice.459 It is on this backdrop
454. While the Government might have been able to pursue the litigation-by-consent theory in
Campbell because the ALJ declined to consider the evidence, it would not have known of the need for
a litigation-by-consent theory in Cove until after the Agency’s final order.
455. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52; Fed R. Civ. P. 61; see O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 441 (1995)
(suggesting that the civil and criminal harmless error standards are the same).
456. NLRB v. I.W.G., Inc., 144 F.3d 685, 687 (10th Cir. 1998) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
457. Id. at 688 (citations omitted).
458. E.g., Jose Raul S. Villavicencio, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 3624, 3630 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan.
23, 2015); Fiaz Afzal, 79 Fed. Reg. 61651, 61655 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 14, 2014).
459. Ideal Pharmacy Care, Inc., 76 Fed. Reg. 51415, 51416 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18,
2011).
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that the Agency issued Hatem Ataya, M.D., wherein, over Government
objection based on lack of notice to the registrant,460 the Agency definitively
announced that “[b]ecause the possession of state authority is a prerequisite for
obtaining a registration and for maintaining a registration, the issue [of no state
authority] can be raised sua sponte even [during the preparation of the Agency
final order].”461 Thus, the Agency unequivocally declared that, not only did it
possess the authority to issue conclusive findings and issue sanctions based on
lack of state authority without any prior notice to either party, but it can also
(and presumably will continue to) do so on its own motion.462
The Agency’s approach in Ataya creates an intriguing dynamic and an
engaging ethical decision point for Agency prosecutors. If an Agency
prosecutor is aware that a respondent no longer possesses the state authority
required to maintain a registration, but intentionally declines to include that
ground among the bases for sanction charged in the OSC, the respondent will
have no ability to challenge, meet, or even address that ground at a due process
hearing. Thus, it now ironically stands as a basis for sanction that can
theoretically be insulated from challenge by declining to charge it. ALJs’
authority in enforcement matters extends only to matters charged by the
Agency that are the subject of a timely request for hearing,463 and so, in cases
where the Government has not alleged or introduced evidence on the issue of
lack of state authority, evidence offered by the respondent regarding that issue
at an administrative hearing could correctly be viewed as beyond the scope of
the hearing, notwithstanding its conclusive post-hearing impact when the
Agency renders its final order. Inasmuch as the Agency has indicated its
amenability to taking up the matter sua sponte,464 and, as discussed in greater
detail below,465 has increasingly engaged in the process of having the
Administrator’s adjudication staff check state board websites to determine state
460. Hatem M. Ataya, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 8221, 8244 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 18, 2016). In
its order, the Agency specifically criticizes the DEA prosecutor’s notice position as being
“fundamentally inconsistent with the position [the Government] ha[d] taken in numerous cases” where
OSCs had been issued. Id. The final order acknowledges that Agency prosecutors had argued that
considering lack of state authority where it had not been noticed “could arguably upend basic
protections afforded to DEA registrants and would surely diminish the perceived fairness of
the . . . administrative process.” Id. (alteration in original). The Administrator was unconvinced by
the due process arguments the prosecutor advanced on behalf of this respondent in particular and the
regulated community in general. See id.
461. Id.
462. See id.
463. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.42–43, 1316.47(a), 1301.52 (2017).
464. Ataya, 81 Fed. Reg. at 8244 n.55.
465. See supra Section III.L.6.
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licensure status,466 from a purely tactical standpoint, there is little advantage for
Government counsel to raise the issue during the respondent’s due process
administrative hearing. To the extent that the Agency increasingly relies on
state board websites, the nuances of which Agency staff may not be familiar
with, respondents lose the ability to defend against the legal and factual call
that state authority has been compromised, or completely abrogated.467 Thus,
the Agency, through its precedent, has arguably created a situation that
precludes a respondent who has timely requested a hearing from defending
against a ground of sanction that the Agency has determined to be conclusive.
The litigation takeaway here is that, where lack of state authority is raised
by the facts within their knowledge, Government prosecutors must decide
whether, as a matter of fairness, to charge lack of state authority in the OSC.
Where it is alleged as a basis for sanction, the respondent can challenge the law
and evidence to defend against the charge. Even where it is not alleged as a
basis for sanction, respondent’s counsel may wish to introduce evidence on the
matter if the status of a client’s state authority is at all questionable, because the
Agency has made it clear that its adjudicative staff will search applicable state
websites, and accept post-hearing filings regarding a lack of state authority.
Beyond state authority, both parties should closely examine both noticed
and unnoticed evidence at the conclusion of a hearing for possible use in pursuit
of a sanction, and both counsel should evaluate multiple permutations of
evidence (particularly those which were the subject of defective notice) for a
potential post-hearing Government litigation-by-consent request. The failure
to do so could well result in a surprise in the Agency’s final order,468 though it
could be a welcome or unwelcome surprise, depending on where counsel sits
in the ligation equation. Even in the absence of a hearing objection, assignment
of error in a post-hearing brief, or in the absence of exceptions filed by either
side, both parties need to consider whether the Agency will potentially preclude
admitted evidence or findings during the preparation of the final order.
Contrariwise, if a registrant or applicant stands at any risk of an interruption of
state controlled substance authority, the parties’ election to brief or ignore
evidence may have little impact on the outcome.
L. Proceedings
While much of the discussion regarding changes in Agency precedent has
focused on the law to be applied by the ALJ and, ultimately, the Agency in its
466. See, e.g., Steven Bernhard, D.O., 82 Fed. Reg. 23298, 23299 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 22,
2017); David D. Moon, D.O., 82 Fed. Reg. 19385, 19387 n.5 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 27, 2017).
467. See supra Section III.L.6.
468. See, e.g., Ataya, 81 Fed. Reg. 8221.
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final orders, there have also been a host of developments related to the hearing
proceedings themselves.
1. Regulation by Adjudication
The fact that the Agency’s rudimentary hearing regulations exist today
substantially as they did when first promulgated over four decades ago tends to
magnify the significance of the increasingly ubiquitous procedural edicts that
the Agency disseminates through adjudication final orders. To be sure, the
concept of creating procedural and substantive rules through adjudication, in
lieu of notice and comment regulation promulgation under the APA,469 can
present a dubious strategy where the regulated community, the bar, and the
public are deprived of the ability to supply input. But even more
fundamentally, the APA’s adjudication apparatus was not designed by
Congress to replace promulgated regulations, is not well suited for doing so,
and carries the very real dangers of inconsistency and confusion. Adjudications
are designed to resolve conflicts between two parties, not set policy and
procedure for an agency and an enormous regulated community. Beyond the
tension created between the Agency’s practice in this regard and the APA, there
are powerful practical considerations that militate against this approach.
It is well settled that “‘when Congress has not specified the level of
specificity expected of [an] agency’ . . . ‘the agency is entitled to broad
deference in picking the suitable level.’”470 The APA “does not require that all
the specific applications of a rule evolve by further, more precise rules rather
than by adjudication.”471 Federal agencies are “‘not precluded from
announcing new principles in an adjudication proceeding’ . . . . Rather, ‘the
choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the
[agency’s] discretion.’”472 That said, an agency’s authority to issue principles
through rulemaking is by no means absolute. An action that results in a
substantive change to (or abandonment of) an existing rule must proceed
through the APA’s notice and comment procedure.473 While agencies are not
469. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
470. Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Cement Kiln Recycling Coal.
v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
471. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96 (1995).
472. Cassell v. FCC, 154 F.3d 478, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (alterations in original) (quoting NLRB
v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974)); see also Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d
713, 719 (D.C. Cir 1985) (“[I]t is . . . beyond dispute that an agency may articulate its general policy
in a particular proceeding . . . rather than in a rulemaking.”).
473. U.S. Telecom Ass’n. v. FCC, 400 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Appalachian Power Co. v.
EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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permitted to “slip by the notice and comment rule-making requirements needed
to amend a rule by merely adopting a de facto amendment to its regulation
through adjudication,” where a genuine ambiguity exists, the courts will permit
the resolution of the issue through an adjudication.474 However, unless and
until an existing regulation (irrespective of its value) is amended or repealed, it
continues to carry the force of law, and may not be modified by an agency
adjudication.475 A critical factor in ascertaining whether an existing regulation
binds the agency’s action will be whether the subsequent principle in question
that has been delivered by the Agency “spells out a duty fairly encompassed
within the regulation that the interpretation purports to construe.”476 Thus, it is
beyond argument that where a regulation contains some level of ambiguity or
flexibility, the courts will endure some level of agency clarification of its legal
interpretation through an adjudication where warranted.477
In Peter F. Kelly, D.P.M., the Agency blatantly announced that it was
creating several new duties upon prescribing registrants under very specific
circumstances with precise obligations.478 The language chosen by the Agency
in its final order left no reasonable doubt that the intent was to create new duties
upon registrants and anticipated sanctions for those who run afoul of those
requirements in the future. In his final order, the Administrator stated:
I now hold that where a registrant is provided with credible
information that his state prescribing authority is being used to
divert a state-controlled (but not federally-controlled) drug,
such information triggers the duty to investigate whether his
DEA registration is also being used to divert federally
controlled substances. However, as this is a new and
additional duty beyond that which was announced in [a
previous final order], which applies only to a practitioner’s
receipt of information that his DEA registration is being
misused, I conclude that it cannot be retroactively imposed on
[r]espondent.479
Regarding the Agency’s intention to impose a new, actionable standard
upon the regulated community, the Administrator’s language that “this is a new
474. Marseilles Land and Water Co. v. FERC, 345 F.3d 916, 920 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
475. Tunik v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 407 F.3d 1326, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695–96 (1974)); see also Nat’l Family Planning and Reprod. Health Ass’n v.
Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (to same effect).
476. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. FAA, 291 F.3d 49, 55–56 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
477. See Marseilles Land and Water Co., 345 F.3d at 920.
478. Peter F. Kelly, D.P.M., 82 Fed. Reg. 28676, 28685–86 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 23, 2017).
479. Id. at 28686 (emphasis added).
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and additional duty”480 leaves precious little to the imagination. The Agency
“now hold[s]” that it has created this new duty, and concedes (as it must) that
based on the fact that this “new and additional duty”481 has been spawned in an
adjudication, due process precludes a sanction in the same case.482
The Kelly final order also creates other new obligations on the part of
registrants, wherein the Administrator rendered the following announcement:
[W]here a practitioner receives credible information that
fraudulent prescriptions under his name are being presented for
state but not federally-controlled drugs, and the state
[prescription monitoring program] permits a practitioner to
obtain information as to his controlled substance prescribings
[sic], that practitioner has a duty to obtain that information and
to determine whether unlawful prescriptions for federally
controlled substances are also being dispensed under his
registration. Moreover, even if state law does not authorize a
practitioner to obtain a [prescription monitoring program]
report of the dispensings [sic] which have been attributed to
him, a practitioner is obligated to obtain that information from
a pharmacy that reports a fraudulent prescription to him. If
information obtained from either the [prescription monitoring
program] or a pharmacy shows that one’s registration is being
misused, a registrant must report that information to the DEA
(as well as local law enforcement authorities) even if the
practitioner concludes that no employee or agent is involved in
the misuse of his registration. A practitioner is not excused
from this duty because others, who also have responsibilities
to investigate, such as law enforcement officers and
pharmacists, failed to carry out those responsibilities.483
By dropping new duties unceremoniously in the midst of an adjudication,
the Agency is spared the laborious tasks of publishing its now-established new
registrant duties in the Federal Register, explaining and defending its actions in
annotated commentary, and having to address potentially disquieting comments
from the public, including the regulated community. Likewise, the Agency is
spared the arduous internal approval process attendant upon promulgation,
including review of those in the executive branch charged with evaluating the
possbility for potential responsive congressional action. Under this approach,
those arduous undertakings are supplanted by the more efficient act of placing
the Administrator’s signature on the adjudication. Just like that.
480.
481.
482.
483.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (footnote with an additional new duty omitted).
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Although this streamlined approach to rulemaking may present obvious
time and effort dividends for the Agency, it is likely that the view from the
regulated community may not be as supportive. Even accepting the Agency’s
oft-quoted position that controlled substance registrants operate in a highlyregulated activity,484 it strains credulity and every reasonable common-sensebased expectation to assume that busy practitioners will be regularly pouring
over obscure (and increasingly lengthy and esoteric) Agency final orders to
divine the latest outpouring of extra-regulatory obligations upon which
continuation of their registration (and often their livelihood) depends. Busy
practitioners possess neither the legal acumen to understand the Agency’s
increasingly legalistic and nuanced final orders, nor the resources to maintain a
specialized cadre of regulatory attorneys devoted to perpetually scouring the
Federal Register to locate and explain new duties conjured up by the latest
Agency adjudication(s). To require knowledge of, and compliance with, the
applicable regulations should be enough. Regulations require publication,
notice, and comment from the public,485 which is often a messy process. That
said, there have arguably been more procedural and substantive developments
effected by DEA final orders through adjudications in the last few years than at
any other time during the Agency’s existence.
These concerns notwithstanding, in Masters Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. DEA,
the court was unpersuaded by the distributor respondent’s contention that the
Agency’s imposition of a high volume of new duties imposed on distributors
through adjudication was impermissible, holding that the extensive list of extraregulatory obligations were not new duties at all, but merely an “expla[nation
of] what a distributor in [the respondent’s] position must do” when it elects to
fill an order instead of declining to do so and filing a suspicious order report
with the DEA.486 The explicit nature in which the Agency unambiguously
explained the creation of numerous new obligations in Kelly provides an
enlightening window into the Agency’s actual objectives in this approach and
arguably stands in some tension with the Masters holding.
2. Representations by Counsel
From the very outset of the most rudimentary litigation at
conventions have developed between the litigants that have
expectations and the orderly development of issues in virtually
of forum where issues are contested. One of the most basic

common law,
given rise to
every manner
tenets of any

484. E.g., Keith Ky Ly, D.O., 80 Fed. Reg. 29025, 29037 n.36 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20,
2015).
485. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).
486. Masters Pharm., Inc. v. DEA, 861 F. 3d 206, 222 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW (DRAFT)

420

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW VOL. 101

[101:333

litigation is the right of a party on either side to rely on the representations made
by opposing counsel. The courts have long recognized the principle that the
representatives of a party can render binding admissions in a forum. The
principle has been succinctly articulated as follows:
A judicial admission is usually treated as absolutely
binding, but such admissions go to matters of fact which,
otherwise, would require evidentiary proof. They serve a
highly useful purpose in dispensing with proof of formal
matters and of facts about which there is no real dispute. Once
made, the subject matter ought not to be reopened in the
absence of a showing of exceptional circumstances, but a
court, unquestionably, has the right to relieve a party of his
judicial admission if it appears that the admitted fact is clearly
untrue and that the party was laboring under a mistake when
he made the admission.487
Despite the history and practice of both sides relying on concessions of
counsel in contested litigation, the Agency recently indicated its unwillingness
to find itself bound by the concessions of its own prosecutors. In Perry County
Food & Drug, Government counsel conceded the timeliness of the respondent’s
registration renewal application, but the Administrator, in the Agency’s final
order, and without substantive analysis, disregarded that concession with the
dismissive explanation, in a footnote, that “[i]n this matter, I am not bound by
the Government’s agreement not to contest the timeliness of [r]espondent’s
renewal application.”488 The impact of this sua sponte ruling is magnified even
further by the fact that at no time did the Government even ask to be relieved
of its concession,489 and at no time prior to the issuance of the final order did
the respondent have any inkling that the once-settled factual issue was not only
in play, but would be summarily decided to its detriment at a level where it had
no notice or opportunity for input.490 Irrespective of the relative merits of the
Agency’s apparent disregard of the time-honored litigation convention of
honoring concessions made by the representatives of the parties, it is presently
unclear whether any concession or stipulation tendered by DEA counsel can be
afforded any weight by conscientious opposing counsel. The effect of this
potentially significant procedural sea change is yet to be determined, but
Government counsel must consider whether and to what extent they are
authorized to concede any point, and respondents’ counsel must be wary of
487.
488.
2015).
489.
490.

New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 24 (4th Cir. 1963).
Perry County Food & Drug, 80 Fed. Reg. 70084, 70089 n.17 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 12,
Id.
See id.
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accepting any proposed concession stipulation offered by Agency counsel, lest
the agreement be disregarded and found against their clients on review by the
Administrator.
3. Requested Hearings, Subsequent Waivers, and Statements of Position
Among the more remarkable procedural cases recently issued by the
Agency is Edge Pharmacy.491 In Edge, the respondent pharmacy timely
requested a hearing through counsel, but subsequent counsel agreed to waive a
hearing so long as his client was afforded the ability to submit a statement of
position.492 As designed, everyone associated with the litigation equation
appeared to benefit. By electing to proceed in that manner, the expenses
associated with conducting a contested hearing could be avoided, the Agency
would avoid the risks inherent in contested litigation and could seek a favorable
final order based on evidence virtually impervious to objection, and the
pharmacy would secure the modest ability to file its position on paper. While
it may have appeared to even an experienced observer that nothing could
possibly go wrong, what actually resulted was continued and protracted
litigation, which was managed, not by the ALJ, but by the Administrator and
his staff. In the course of its review, the Agency reversed the ALJ’s
discretionary decision to allow the pharmacy respondent to file a statement of
position along with its waiver of the hearing that it had previously requested.493
In Edge, the respondent pharmacy’s counsel sought,494 and the ALJ
granted, additional time to file a statement of position that was to accompany
his client’s hearing waiver.495 While the ALJ found that there was good cause
to extend the respondent’s ability to respond to the OSC and accepted the
statement on behalf of the Agency (along with the hearing waiver), the
Agency’s final order held that the demonstration of good cause by the
respondent’s counsel was insufficient.496 Thus, the only part of the equation
that the Agency deemed worthy of keeping intact was the waiver of the

491. Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. 72092 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 19, 2016).
492. Id. at 72094.
493. Id. at 72098–99, 72098 n.10 (noting that the respondent could have, but did not, seek an
extension of time under 21 C.F.R. § 1316.47(b)). But see 21 C.F.R. §§ 1309.53(b), 1316.47(b) (2017).
494. While the Agency’s order states that the respondent “never requested an extension of time
to file its written statement,” Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 72098, it also acknowledges that the
respondent “filed a pleading in which [it] waived its right to a hearing while seeking leave to file a
written statement.” Id. at 72094.
495. Id. at 72098.
496. Id. at 72097–98.
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respondent-pharmacy’s hearing rights.497 The Agency went further, and held
that on these facts, notwithstanding the fact that the pharmacy was permitted
by the ALJ to submit a statement of position, it had (contrary to what it believed
it had agreed) “waived its right to submit any evidence in refutation of the
Government’s case.”498 The practical result here was that the respondent’s
counsel (and perforce the hapless pharmacy respondent) was, in effect, the
victim of a bait and switch; the respondent’s tactical decision to waive a hearing
was no doubt informed by the ALJ’s ruling that its position would be contained
in a statement of position available to the Agency to review in making its final
determination,499 and only after it had done so was it informed that its position
statement would not, in fact, be considered.500 But the waiver of the pharmacy’s
hearing rights stood firm.501
The Agency’s narrow reading502 of the amount of discretion afforded to the
ALJ in permitting the untimely filed position statement under the regulations503
thus resulted in the Agency essentially refusing to engage in the arguably
modest exercise of merely considering the respondent’s position in the
preparation of the final order.504 So, the respondent was at once without the
ability to have affirmatively raised any and all issues,505 and at the same time it
made a bona fides tender of its legal analysis to the Agency so that the final
order could address any potential bases for appeal raised therein;506 essentially
a legal double whammy. To make matters worse, lending credibility to the old
adage that “no good deed shall go unpunished,” this legal double whammy was

497. See id. at 72108.
498. Id. at 72098.
499. Id. at 72094.
500. Id. at 72113.
501. Id. at 72098.
502. Interestingly, the Agency’s restrictive interpretation of the ALJ’s authority under 21 C.F.R.
§ 1316.47(b) in this case arguably stands in some level of tension with a more broad interpretation of
the ALJ’s authority in its recent holding in John P. Moore, III, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 10398 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. Feb. 10, 2017). In Moore, the Agency held that “where an ALJ receives an untimely hearing
request it is within [the ALJ’s] authority to conduct such proceedings as are necessary to determine
whether the respondent has established good cause[]” and that this authority (nowhere set forth in the
text of the regulation) continues until “the Government submits a request for final agency action to
[the Administrator.]” Id. at 10399 n.2 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). Thus, at this
juncture, it would be difficult to prognosticate whether the Agency is moving toward a more broad or
more restrictive interpretation of the ALJ’s authority under § 1316.41(b).
503. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.47(b).
504. See Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 72113–14.
505. Id. at 72099.
506. Id. at 72097.
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inflicted upon the respondent based on its offer to save the Agency the expense
and risks associated with proving its allegations at a hearing.507
In an unprecedented procedural environment, the Agency, after refusing to
consider the respondent pharmacy’s statement of position, issued a series of
orders directing briefings on various legal issues, including “whether . . . the
ALJ had authority to admit [the pharmacy’s] [s]tatement of [p]osition[,]”508 and
whether the Agency should allow the pharmacy to withdraw its renewal
application;509 both of which were (predictably) answered in the negative.510
To put this in context, the registrant’s counsel, who conveyed his client’s
hearing waiver, was directed to brief the issue of whether the condition that was
accepted by the Agency’s own ALJ was lawful, and whether his client should
be permitted to withdraw the renewal application it submitted as part of its
hearing request on the revocation action.511
4. Administrator’s Staff as Pseudo-ALJs
The procedural dynamic in an increasing number of Agency final orders
merits particular attention. The structure Congress crafted into the APA,
coupled with the complimentary structure laced into the DEA’s own
regulations, provides a dichotomy of functions created to ensure a just result
and an appearance of fairness.512 The APA provides federal agencies with the
authority to hire and assign cases to ALJs, but places unalterable duties and
bright-line restrictions on the individuals who hold those positions.513
The APA provides ALJs presiding at hearings with the authority and
responsibility over specified enumerated powers, to wit:
(1) [to] administer oaths and affirmations;
(2) [to] issue subp[o]enas authorized by law;
(3) [to] rule on offers of proof and receive relevant evidence;
(4) [to] take depositions or have depositions taken when the
ends of justice would be served;
(5) [to] regulate the course of the hearing;
(6) [to] hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of
the issues by consent of the parties or by the use of alternative
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
(2017).
513.

Id. at 72094.
Id. at 72095.
Id. at 72102.
See id. at 72095, 72102.
See id. at 72095.
Compare Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2012), with 21 C.F.R. § 1316.52
5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 3105.
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means of dispute resolution . . . ;
(7) [to] inform the parties as the to the availability of one or
more alternative means of dispute resolution, and encourage
the use of such methods;
(8) [to] require the attendance at any conference held . . . ;
(9) [to] dispose of procedural requests or similar matters;
(10) [to] make or recommend decisions . . . ;
(11) [to] take other action authorized by agency rule consistent
with [the APA].514
A federal “agency is without power to withhold such powers from its
[ALJ]s.”515
The DEA regulations unequivocally direct that DEA ALJs “shall have the
duty to conduct a fair hearing, to take all necessary action to avoid delay, and
to maintain order.”516 The Agency regulations also supply DEA ALJs with
their own set of exclusively-held, enumerated powers, some of which overlap
with those of the APA.517 The regulations provide that DEA ALJs
shall have all powers necessary to . . . [avoid delay and
maintain order], including (but not limited to) the power to:
(a) Arrange and change the date, time, and place of
hearings . . . .
(b) Hold conferences to settle, simplify, or determine the
issues in a hearing, or to consider other matters that may
aid in the expeditious disposition of the hearing.
(c) Require parties to state their position in writing with
respect to the various issues in the hearing and to exchange
such statements with all other parties.
(d) Sign and issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of
witnesses and the production of documents and materials
to the extent necessary to conduct administrative hearings
pending before him.
(e) Examine witnesses and direct witnesses to testify.
(f) Receive, rule on, exclude, or limit evidence.
(g) Rule on procedural items pending before him.
(h) Take any action permitted to the [ALJ] as authorized
by [the DEA regulations] or by the provisions of the

514.
515.
516.
517.

Id. § 556.
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 417, § 7(b) at 74.
21 C.F.R. § 1316.52.
Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556, with 21 C.F.R § 1316.52.
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[APA].518
To protect their decisional independence, ALJs enjoy lifetime
appointments and are only subject to removal for good cause.519 ALJs “may
not perform duties inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as
[ALJ]s,”520 may not be arbitrarily replaced in the midst of commenced
litigation,521 are not subject to probation522 or performance reviews by the
agencies that employ them,523 may not consider extra-record524 or ex parte
communications,525 are statutorily ineligible to preside over any case where
they have participated in any way in the investigative or prosecuting functions
of the case,526 and may disqualify themselves where appropriate.527
In providing a defined structure of adjudicatory duties and insulation,
Congress provided litigants with a built-in assurance that, whatever the ultimate
outcome of an enforcement action might be, the evidence will be amassed and
evaluated by an impartial judge who has the freedom to operate without fear of
reprisal, and, of equal importance, without undue interference by the agency.528
The DEA regulations provide that, at the conclusion of hearing proceedings,
the ALJ is required to assemble a record of proceedings and a recommended
decision to the DEA Administrator, who is charged with the responsibility to,
“[a]s soon as practicable,” prepare a “final order in the proceeding, which shall
set forth the final rule and the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon
which the rule is based.”529
It is thus beyond serious argument that both the APA and the DEA
regulations have placed the control of the procedural aspects of administrative
hearings within the exclusive control of the Agency ALJ presiding at the
hearing, and charged the Agency with responsibility for the ultimate
decision.530 In an agency such as the DEA, where there is no formal board
518. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.52.
519. 5 U.S.C. § 7521.
520. Id. § 3105.
521. See id. § 554(d).
522. 5 C.F.R. § 930.204(a).
523. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2).
524. Id. § 556(e).
525. Id. § 557(d); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1316.51(c) (2017).
526. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2).
527. Id. § 556(b).
528. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 1316.
529. Id. § 1316.67.
530. Even the standard of proof between the two functions is distinguishable. While the standard
of proof at the hearing before the ALJ is a preponderance of the evidence, Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S.
91, 100–01 (1981), the standard of review of the final agency action is whether the decision is
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tasked with rendering the final Agency determination, the overwhelming
likelihood is that orders are being managed, prepared, and issued at the final
order level not by the agency head, who bears a myriad of other responsibilities,
but by employees under the agency head’s supervision, who are unknown to
the registrants and the practicing bar. Such agency employees assisting in the
review and preparation of decisions for an agency head enjoy none of the
protections, preclusions, or obligations enjoyed by and levied on its ALJs.
Despite the defined structure and delineated responsibilities described
previously, with increasing frequency in final orders issued by the Agency,
every credibility, evidentiary, and procedural ruling, is being re-weighed, reevaluated, and frequently reversed on final order review.531 Additionally, the
Agency has demonstrated an increasing proclivity for conducting active
litigation outside the reach of the ALJ; it has become increasingly frequent
practice for the Administrator’s staff to direct the parties to submit evidence
and brief legal issues that were not raised in front of the DEA ALJ. In so
directing, the anonymous staff members step into the role of pseudo-ALJs and
manage contested litigation—without offering any of the protections that the
ALJ structure affords to litigants.
The DEA regulations provide no legal mechanism for administrative
litigation to be managed by the Administrator or his staff. The Administrator’s
duties regarding adjudication are specifically enumerated in the regulations,532
and are restricted to issuing an Agency final order “set[ting] forth the final rule
and the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the rule is based,”
publishing the final order in the Federal Register, and accomplishing these
modest tasks “[a]s soon as practicable.”533 In the APA, Congress has
categorically limited the ability to conduct hearings534 “in every case of [an]
adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing,”535 which specifically include DEA

“supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 556(d).
531. See, e.g., Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14946–48 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23,
2017) (re-weighing, in the Agency final order, every credibility finding rendered by the hearing ALJ,
including the testimony of the Government’s expert witness); Superior Pharmacy I and Superior
Pharmacy II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310, 31320–25, 31332 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 18, 2016) (showing
virtually every ruling on every objection ruled upon by the hearing ALJ scrutinized in detail and reweighed and re-ruled upon in the final order without any perceptible deference).
532. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.46, 1316.67.
533. Id. § 1316.67.
534. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(c).
535. Id. § 554(a).
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administrative hearings,536 to administrative law judges.537 When the
Administrator or his staff “preside” over contested administrative proceedings
where the statute mandates on-the-record proceedings with an opportunity to
request an agency hearing, the Agency risks a determination that the
“proceedings” were ultra vires and per se violative of due process. The
Administrator could no more delegate the enumerated powers in the APA to an
Agency investigator or prosecutor than he could retain them to himself or task
a legal advisor, special agent, or contract security guard, to act in the role of an
ALJ.538
In Edge, the parties were directed to file briefs as part of the final order
process,539 which is ultra vires under both the APA and the Agency’s
regulations,540 and has little to commend it as a matter of trial practice or even
common sense. Further, the manner in which the practice of conducting
litigation at the final order level has expanded highlights some of the stronger
arguments for expeditiously abandoning the illegal process. An ALJ “shall
have the duty to conduct a fair hearing,”541 but this is an obligation that is not
imposed on other employees of the Agency. Lest it seem to be an unfounded
concern that one party may have an advantage when litigation is conducted by
those who think of themselves as pseudo-ALJs, the Agency’s order in Edge
provides a striking example of the dangers that lurk in such a situation. In Edge,
in vacating the ALJ’s finding of good cause for accepting an untimely statement
of position, the Agency applied the rigorous “excusable neglect” standard
against the registrant’s counsel.542 But that was not the standard applied to both
sides of the litigation equation. In its review of the Government’s submitted
evidence, the Agency discovered that one of the declarations submitted by the
Government was unsigned.543 The Government was afforded the opportunity
to resubmit a signed version, which was received into the record (apparently by
the non-ALJ employee in his capacity as pseudo-ALJ) over the respondent’s
objection.544 The rigorous excusable neglect standard that had been wielded
against the registrant was supplanted—for the Government only—by the

536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.

21 U.S.C. § 824(c) (2012).
5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(2).
See id. § 554(d).
Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. 72092, 72095 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 19, 2016).
See 5 U.S.C § 556(e); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.52 (2017).
21 C.F.R. § 1316.52.
Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 72097–98.
Id. at 72100–101.
Id. at 72101.
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gentler “simple inadvertence” standard,545 and the evidence was successfully
resubmitted by the Government and used against the respondent.546
Another example of treatment that risks the perception of being preferential
to the Government can be seen in Robert Clark Maiocco, M.D., wherein, during
the final order preparation process, the Agency sua sponte acted to correct the
Government’s errant reliance on the wrong statutory provision in its charging
document, without even a corresponding request to do so by the Government,
with no more than a passing reference in a footnote.547 Yet one week earlier,
in William H. Wyttenbach, M.D., the Agency had entirely declined to consider
a motion to reconsider a summary disposition order because it was filed beyond
the authorized regulatory deadline for filing exceptions.548 Indeed, at a time
when the Agency has been more actively engaged in creating an active
litigation environment at the final order level, it has concomitantly
demonstrated a markedly more aggressive posture in applying technical bases
to disregard issues raised in exceptions filed by respondents.549
However well intentioned, even copious, highly-nuanced legal verbiage
carefully set out in a final order could do little in dissipating the appearance that
the potential for disparate treatment is exacerbated where evidentiary
determinations and briefings are conducted by those not charged, qualified, or
even permitted under the law to preside over litigation. While this Article has
striven to examine both sides of the issues raised by recent shifts in Agency
procedures, it is difficult to perceive a silver lining in tasking non-ALJs with
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Robert Clark Maiocco, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 19383, 19383 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 27,
2017).
548. William H. Wyttenbach, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 18777, 18777 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 21,
2017). See generally 21 C.F.R. § 1316.66(a) (2017).
549. See, e.g., Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 79188, 79189 & n.5
(Drug Enf’t Admin Nov. 10, 2016) (ruling that the legal issue in timely-filed exceptions was
disregarded for failure to include “specific and complete citations of the pages of the transcript and
exhibits” requirement in 21 C.F.R. § 1316.66(a)); Superior Pharmacy I and Superior Pharmacy II, 81
Fed. Reg. 31310, 31319 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 18, 2016) (ruling filed exceptions be disregarded
because they were received two days after transmission of the record to the Administrator and thus
beyond the regulatory twenty-day time limit in 21 C.F.R. § 1316.66(a), even though the final order
was not issued until one year later); Perry County Food & Drug, 80 Fed. Reg. 70084, 70084 (Drug
Enf’t Admin. Nov. 12, 2015) (ruling that filed exceptions received four months prior to the Agency
final order were disregarded because they were filed beyond the regulatory twenty-day time limit in
21 C.F.R. § 1316.66(a)). But see Mark William Andrew Holder, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 71618, 71618
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 16, 2015) (permitting respondent’s counsel to file a corrected copy of
previously-filed exceptions where, based on a family emergency and a word processing system
breakdown, she had secured prior leave to move to do so by the assigned ALJ).
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litigation management and expecting such employees to properly execute
responsibilities where an ALJ is mandated. When acting in its role as neutral
adjudicator, it is imperative for the Agency to be as mindful of optics as it is
the ultimate adjudication. While not always as unambiguous as the disparate
standards imposed on the parties’ mistakes in Edge, the taking of sua sponte
actions at the final order stage of adjudication always enhances the risk of
appearing to favor one side—generally, at least in these cases, the enforcement
side—of the litigation.
5. Excluded by the ALJ Means Excluded
In the APA, Congress was unambiguous in extending to a party the right
“to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit
rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required
for a full and true disclosure of the facts.”550 Simply stated, a respondent in
APA proceedings must be afforded the opportunity to meet the evidence
offered by the Government as a precondition to the Agency’s ability to use that
evidence in support of a sanction. In Lawrence E. Stewart, M.D., the Agency
reversed its ALJ’s evidentiary ruling which had excluded a Food and Drug
Administration package insert.551 Once the package insert had been excluded,
the respondent had no need to challenge it or present evidence to contradict the
document.552 The Agency disregarded the ALJ’s exclusion of the document
and considered it in support of the sanction ultimately imposed.553
A similar practice was met with disapproval by the court in Masters
Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. DEA, wherein the court found that the DEA committed
error when, in issuing its final order, it considered evidence that had been
excluded by the ALJ at the hearing.554 The Masters court ultimately found the
error harmless in light of the strength of other admitted evidence and the
representation in the final order that the Administrator did not base his ruling
on the re-included evidence, but the court, in no uncertain terms, held that the
practice of holding ALJ-excluded evidence against a respondent in support of
a sanction constitutes error.555 The court acknowledged that the Agency had
the authority to overrule the ALJ’s evidentiary ruling, but held that
the Administrator could not proceed to rely on the excluded
550.
551.
2016).
552.
553.
554.
555.

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012).
Lawrence E. Stewart, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 54822, 54822–23 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 17,
Id.
Id. at 54823.
Masters Pharm., Inc. v. DEA, 861 F. 3d 206, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Id.
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evidence of [the respondent’s] misconduct . . . [because]
[d]oing so would be in derogation of [the respondent’s] right
to respond to it. Because the ALJ had excluded the evidence,
however, [the respondent] had no need or opportunity during
the administrative trial to exercise its right to respond.556
As discussed elsewhere in this Article, the revisiting and refashioning of
even the most pedestrian of procedural rulings by the impartial ALJ presents
obvious risks to the perception of fairness that litigants can attach to the due
process actually afforded by the DEA under the APA.557 The concept that
evidence excluded by the ALJ could only be available to the Agency for
consideration following a remand where the respondent is afforded an
opportunity to respond strikes as self-evident, but to the extent that judicial
precedent was necessary to confirm this principle, it now exists.
6. Official Notice in Final Agency Orders
Similar dangers lurk for both sides of the litigation equation due to the
Agency’s ever-increasing enamor for the prolific use of official notice. The
taking of official notice (like judicial notice in courts of record) is authorized
by the APA558 and the DEA regulations.559 In its explanatory commentary, the
Attorney General’s Manual explains that the Agency can take official notice in
its final orders, and that official notice is designed to be broader than “the
traditional matters of judicial notice [and] extends properly to all matters as to
which the agency by reason of its functions is presumed to be expert, such as
technical or scientific facts within its specialized knowledge.”560 However, the
manner in which official notice has been utilized in recent DEA final orders
may be arguably broader than seemingly anticipated by that language,
encompassing an ever-widening scope of matters, and, perhaps more
significantly, it has been exclusively used for the benefit of the Government,
and respondents are often not afforded a real opportunity to contest the facts
before the Agency’s final decision is published in the Federal Register.
On the more benign side of the spectrum, the Agency regularly takes
official notice of its own records regarding a registrant’s registration status. For
example, the Agency has taken official notice of its own records to determine

556.
557.
558.
559.
560.

Id.
See supra Section III.K.1.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (2012).
21 C.F.R. § 1316.59(e) (2017).
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 417, § 7(d), at 80.
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a registration’s expiration date.561 In cases where a respondent’s registration
expired by its terms while a case was pending and no renewal application or
application for a new registration had been filed by the time the Agency decided
the matter, the Agency has taken official notice of a registration’s expiration
date in Agency databases.562 Similarly, in cases where a respondent’s license
expired during the proceedings but he filed an application to renew the license,
the Agency has taken official notice of its own database records to determine
whether the renewal application was timely filed, thus extending the existing
registration,563 or whether it was untimely, in which case only the pending

561. E.g., Christina B. Paylan, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 69979, 69979 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov.
12, 2015); Devra Hamilton, N.P., 80 Fed. Reg. 50034, 50034 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2015);
Pedro E. Lopez, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 46324, 46324 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 4, 2015); Adeline
Davies Essien, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 46322, 46322 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 4, 2015); Karen S.
Dunning, N.P., 80 Fed. Reg. 28640, 28641 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 2015). But see Robert
Clark Maiocco, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 19383, 19384–85, 19385 n.4 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 27, 2017)
(taking official notice of the respondent’s registration record with the Agency, but noting that the
Government has the burden of providing evidence establishing the Agency’s jurisdiction as part of its
motion and the ALJ is obligated to make findings as to the Agency’s jurisdiction); James Alvin
Chaney, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 57391, 57391 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 23, 2015) (taking official
notice of the respondent’s registration record with the Agency to find that his registration was not
expired, but noting that “in the future, where a recommended decision lacks the requisite finding” the
Agency has jurisdiction to act because the registration is valid, and the Agency “will remand the
matter” for the purpose of determining that the respondent “retains an active registration or has
submitted an application for registration”).
562. E.g., Patricia A. Newton, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 26516, 26516 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 7,
2017); Geoffrey D. Peterson, N.P., 81 Fed. Reg. 49266, 49266 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 27, 2016);
Rezik A. Saqer, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22123 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 14, 2016); Victor B.
Williams, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 50029 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2015); Tin T. Win, M.D., 78 Fed.
Reg. 52802, 52803 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 26, 2013); Donald Brooks Reece II, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg.
35054, 35054–55 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 12, 2012); James Edgar Lundeen, Sr., M.D., 77 Fed. Reg.
29696, 29696 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 18, 2012); Lousiana All Snax, Inc., 76 Fed. Reg. 20034, 20034
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 11, 2011); Kermit B. Gosnell, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 4938, 4938 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. Jan. 27, 2011); Sylvester A. Nathan, 74 Fed. Reg. 17516, 17516–17 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr.
15, 2009); Elmer P. Manalo, M.D., 73 Fed. Reg. 50353, 50353 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 26, 2008);
William W. Nucklos, M.D., 73 Fed. Reg. 34330, 34330 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 17, 2008); Benjamin
Levine, M.D., 73 Fed. Reg. 34329, 34329–30, 34329 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 17, 2008); David
L. Wood, M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 54936, 54937 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 27, 2007).
563. See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.36(i) (“In the event that an applicant for reregistration (who is doing
business under a registration previously granted and not revoked or suspended) has applied for
reregistration at least 45 days before the date on which the existing registration is due to expire, and
the Administrator has issued no order on the application on the date on which the existing registration
is due to expire, the existing registration of the applicant shall automatically be extended and continue
in effect until the date on which the Administrator so issues his/her order.”).
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application remained before the Agency for determination.564 The Agency has
also taken official notice of its own records to determine that the Agency was
not in possession of other documents that could be relevant to the issues, such
as a power of attorney.565
On the other side of the spectrum, the Agency has shown an increasing
willingness to widen the scope of facts that it is willing to find through the
taking of official notice at the final, post-hearing stage, where it makes its final
determination regarding a respondent’s registration.566 One prevalent example
is the Agency’s increasingly prolific use of state medical board websites to
determine, through official notice, a registrant’s current state licensure status.567
This practice is of particular concern in view of the fact that there is no
guarantee that the information contained on the various state board websites is
accurate or current, and no transparent ability on the part of the regulated
community to ascertain which DEA employee is making the queries and
whether that employee is correctly interpreting the website entries.
Additionally, even on the best of the state board websites, the information may
be modified or deleted at any moment, making it all but impossible for a
registrant (and, even more importantly, a reviewing court) to determine what
the Agency decision-maker was looking at when he or she took official notice
564. E.g., Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 79188, 79188 n.3 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. Nov. 10, 2016); Perry County Food & Drug, 80 Fed. Reg. 70084, 70089 n.17 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. Nov. 12, 2015); Sharad C. Patel, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 28693, 28694 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May
19, 2015); Ralph J. Chambers, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 4962, 4962 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 30, 2014).
565. Glenn R. Unger, D.D.S., 79 Fed. Reg. 49339, 49340 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 20, 2014)
(taking official notice of the Agency’s registration records to determine that the registrant had not
submitted a power of attorney allowing any person other than himself to sign an application for a
registration and consequently finding that the registration granted pursuant to an application signed by
someone else was void ab initio).
566. See Steven Bernhard, D.O., 82 Fed. Reg. 23298 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 22, 2017); David
D. Moon, D.O., 82 Fed. Reg. 19385, 19387 n.5 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 27, 2017); William H.
Wyttenbach, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 18777, 18778 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 21, 2017).
567. E.g., Bernhard, 82 Fed. Reg. at 23298; Moon, 82 Fed. Reg. at 19387 n.5; Wyttenbach, 82
Fed. Reg. at 18778; Robert Markman, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 11369, 11370 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 22,
2017); Frank D. Li, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 11238, 11239 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 21, 2017); Paul E.
Pilgram, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 11058, 11059 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 17, 2017); John P. Moore, III,
M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 10398, 10400 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 10, 2017); Thomas Horiagon, M.D., 81
Fed. Reg. 79051, 79052 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 10, 2016); Nicholas J. Nardacci, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg.
47409, 47410 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 21, 2016); Ibem R. Borges, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 23521, 23522
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 21, 2016); William Mikaitis, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 73833, 73834 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. Nov. 25, 2015); Chambers, 79 Fed. Reg. at 4963 n.7; Kamal Tiwari, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 71604,
71606 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 18, 2011); Hicham K. Riba, D.D.S., 73 Fed. Reg. 75773, 75773
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Dec. 12, 2008); Piyush V. Patel, M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 18274, 18275 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. Apr. 11, 2007).
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and whether the “fact” was accurate and interpreted correctly. The problem
here is that, even assuming benign intention, in conducting a search to find a
state board website, crafting and entering a query to the website, and
interpreting the results reflected on the website in order to drop “facts” into a
final order, some unnamed employee568 is simultaneously conducting an
investigatory function and participating and advising in the Agency
adjudication.569 When an Agency employee embarks upon an internet search
to identify state board websites for inclusion of his or her interpretation of that
search into an Agency final order, it would take a highly-tortured definition to
place that activity outside the realm of conducting an investigatory function.
The Attorney General’s Manual addresses the utilization of agency employees
for the drafting of final orders as follows:
Nothing in the [APA] is intended to preclude agency heads
from utilizing the services of agency employees as assistants
for analysis and drafting. Of course, in adjudicatory cases
subject to [5 U.S.C. § 557(c)], such assistants could not have
performed investigative or prosecuting functions in the cases
(or in factually related cases) in which they are so employed.
Also, the agency heads are free to employ the [ALJ] who heard
a particular case as the draftsman of their final decision and
otherwise to assist in its formulation.570

568. As discussed, there is no formal reviewing board at the DEA, and the likelihood of the DEA
Administrator taking time from his massive Agency oversight and management responsibilities to
conduct internet searches to identify state board websites, query them, and craft the information he
gleans in those sites into Agency final orders in a host of cases can safely be characterized as remote.
Thus, the reality is that the employee tasked with preparing the draft final order is also conducting
investigative functions and simultaneously providing the Administrator with advice and drafting final
orders. Unless an employee on the investigative or Government counsel side is supplying the
information (which is contrary to the apparent language in the decisions and would be ex parte in any
event), this practice, where the same person is drafting and otherwise participating in the final
adjudication, constitutes a violation of the unambiguous prohibition that is set forth in the APA.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012).
569. In some cases, the Agency issues orders to the parties to provide information, but in others,
it is apparently finding the information on its own. See Franklyn Seabrooks, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 44196,
44197 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 30, 2014) (“An internet search of the [state board]’s public record
actions Web page reveals . . . .”); Gregory White, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 24754, 24755 (Drug Enf’t Admin.
May 1, 2014) (“An internet search of the [state board]’s public record actions Web page found . . . .”);
William G. Hamilton, Jr., M.D., 71 Fed. Reg. 39129, 39129 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 11, 2006) (noting
that since the time a state suspension order was issued (which was in the investigative file),
Administrator “ha[d] become aware of further proceedings involving [r]espondent’s state medical
license”).
570. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 417, § 8(b) at 87 (citing Morgan v. United
States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936)).
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To the extent that decision drafters in the Agency are regularly conducting
internet searches to glean information that is seamlessly incorporated into
Agency final orders, this may run in some tension with the restrictions of the
APA.571
Even more tenuous than the Agency’s practice of using state board websites
in an attempt to essentially confirm that facts supported in a record have not
staled with time, is its use of official notice to actually add additional facts and
materials to the record, and use those materials against respondents without
providing a meaningful opportunity to challenge them.572 In four cases where
the Government alleged only that a registrant’s state license had been
suspended, state board orders (and their contents) that were issued after the ALJ
transmitted the records to the Administrator were held against the respondents
where the Agency took official notice of the board orders573—in one case even
stating that it “made [the order] part of the record”574—and revoked the
respondents’ DEA registrations based on the later-issued board revocation
orders.575 On one occasion, the Agency limited its official notice of a state
medical board order by only taking official notice of the order to the extent it
established that the respondent was no longer authorized to practice medicine
in the state, while declining to take official notice of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law set forth in that order because, the Agency said, the
Government could have—but did not—give the respondent notice that it
intended to rely on prescribing events at issue in that order.576 Even more
571. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d).
572. See Geoffrey D. Peterson, N.P., 81 Fed. Reg. 49266, 49267 n.3 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July
27, 2016).
573. Id. at 49266; John R. Kregenow, D.D.S., 80 Fed. Reg. 50029, 50030 (Drug Enf’t Admin.
Aug. 18, 2015); Roy Chi Lung, M.D., 74 Fed. Reg. 20346, 20346–47 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 1,
2009); Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 Fed. Reg. 39130, 39130–31 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 11, 2006).
574. Peterson, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49267 n.3.
575. Id. at 49268; Kregenow, D.D.S., 80 Fed. Reg. at 50030 & n.3; Lung, 74 Fed. Reg. at 20347;
Yeates, 71 Fed. Reg. at 39131.
576. Jose Raul S. Villavicencio, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 3624, 3627 n.5 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 23,
2015). The Agency concluded that it could take notice of the board’s action on the respondent’s state
medical license because “the Agency has long held that it lacks authority to continue a practitioner’s
registration where a practitioner no longer holds state authority to dispense controlled substances,”
noting that “the Agency has consistently taken official notice of state board decisions suspending or
revoking a practitioner’s state authority notwithstanding that the state did not take action until after the
issuance of a[n OSC].” Id. The Agency added that “adequate notice is provided either by the
Government’s filing of a Motion for Summary Disposition (in a case where a hearing was requested)
or by taking official notice and providing the applicant/registrant with the opportunity to refute the
finding (when no hearing request was filed).” Id. The circular nature of that statement—that taking
official notice, by itself, provides adequate notice that the Agency intends to take official notice—only
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recently, in responding to an argument interposed by the Government that doing
so would be contrary to due process, the Agency found and took official notice
of evidence of a state license revocation where lack of state authority was not
alleged at any point during the proceeding.577 The use of official notice to
include information from state board websites can also prove confusing (and
potentially unfairly prejudicial) when the Agency includes information about
state suspensions or revocations that were not only not noticed, but are also
unrelated to the licensure status of the respondent in the state at issue in the
proceeding.578
In addition to state board licensure information, the Agency has also taken
official notice of the following: facts and circumstances relating to ancillary
criminal proceedings involving a respondent;579 Food and Drug Administration

adds to the confusion surrounding what notice is adequate for an extra-record fact (or document) to be
held against the respondent.
577. Hatem M. Ataya, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 8221, 8244 & n.55 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 18, 2016)
(taking official notice that a state medical board revoked a respondent’s medical license during the
course of proceedings and relied on that fact in revoking respondent’s registrations and denying
pending applications, despite the Government’s argument that it did not allege lack of state authority
in its OSC and relying on that fact would be contrary to due process because the issue was raised sua
sponte by the Agency).
578. Zizhuang Li, M.D., 78 Fed. Reg. 71660, 71661 n.4 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 29, 2013)
(taking official notice that the Medical Board of California issued an accusation/petition to revoke a
respondent’s state medical license based on the results of an action taken by the Mississippi Board and
taking official notice that the respondent voluntarily surrendered his Louisiana medical license, without
stating where any of that information was found or why it took official notice of those facts in a case
where the proposed denial of a respondent’s application to be registered in California was based
exclusively on findings made by the Mississippi Board).
579. Ibem R. Borges, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 23521, 23523 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 21, 2016)
(taking official notice of state court records to establish that the respondent was charged with
committing particular crimes relating to controlled substances and had a jury trial scheduled but then
declining to consider that information because it was not alleged as a basis for revocation in the order
to show cause); Odette L. Campbell, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 41062, 41063 n.5 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July
14, 2015) (taking official notice of “the Docket Sheet Entries in [the respondent’s criminal case], as
well as Document # 27 [from that case], which sets forth the disposition of . . . [a] hearing conducted
by the district court on [r]espondent’s violation of the conditions of her pretrial release, wherein the
[district court] modified the conditions of her release to prohibit her from writing any controlled
substance prescriptions,” after the Government alerted the Agency to the indictment of the criminal
case in a post-hearing filing after being directed by the Agency to address the status of state board
proceedings against the respondent); Wayne E. Ellison, 42 Fed. Reg. 43136, 43136 & n.1 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. Aug. 26, 1977) (revoking registration based on the respondent’s conviction of a felony offense
relating to controlled substances and taking official notice of the fact that the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the respondent’s convictions after the record was certified and
transmitted).
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National Drug Code (NDC) information;580 zip code information;581 posthearing Mapquest queries, including determinations of how far patients reside
from prescribing doctor’s offices582 and how many pharmacies exist in a certain
geographic area;583 supplementary information about doctor-prescribers in
pharmacy cases, including whether the prescribers had action taken against
their licenses,584 whether the doctors held any board certifications,585 and even
whether the doctors were still alive;586 statistics “established” by prior agency

580. Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 79188, 79189 n.7 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. Nov. 10, 2016) (taking official notice that, “according to the FDA’s National Drug Code
Directory website,” a National Drug Code number on a prescription label in evidence is the drug code
for a particular controlled substance).
581. Mark P. Koch, D.O., 79 Fed. Reg. 18714, 18719 & n.15 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 3, 2014)
(taking official notice, “using the Web site of the U.S. Postal Service,” that a particular zip code
corresponds with Erie, Pennsylvania when the Certification of Registration history listed only “Erie”
and the zip code).
582. Jones Total Health, 81 Fed. Reg. at 79194 n.18 (taking official notice of “a query conducted
on Mapquest” to determine approximately how far a patient resided from a prescribing doctor’s office).
583. Perry County Food & Drug, 80 Fed. Reg. 70084, 70092 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 12, 2015)
(taking official notice of “the results of a Mapquest search for pharmacies in the Perryville[, Arkansas]
area[, which] . . . show that there are six pharmacies located in Morrilton[, Arkansas],” a town “which
is only fourteen miles from Perryville,” to reject the respondent pharmacy’s claim that its closure will
create a monopoly because there is only one other pharmacy in Perryville).
584. Jones Total Health, 81 Fed. Reg. at 79193 n.13 (taking official notice that the Agency had
revoked, through a prior Agency final order, the license of a doctor whose patients filled their
prescriptions at the respondent pharmacy); id. at 79199 n.31 (taking official notice that the Agency had
suspended and later revoked the licenses of several doctors whose patients filled their prescriptions at
the respondent pharmacy); Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. 72092, 72103 n.28 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct.
19, 2016) (taking official notice of state board records to find that the board restricted a doctor’s state
license—on a date after the DEA’s inspection of the pharmacy—for cause, and that the doctor
ultimately surrendered his state license).
585. Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 72103 n.28 (taking official notice that “[a]ccording to the
online records of the Florida Department of Health” a particular doctor whose prescriptions were filled
at the respondent pharmacy was not board certified in pain medicine or anesthesiology).
586. Hills Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 49816, 49830 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 28, 2016)
(taking official notice of the date of death of a doctor based on his “online obituary” in a pharmacy
case where the pharmacist in charge testified that many of his customers visited a particular pain clinic
because the (now deceased) doctor was famous).
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orders;587 and, most recently, “that morphine does not metabolize into
oxymorphone” in the human body.588
Some of the facts the Agency now establishes through the use of official
notice might be incontrovertible, such as NDC codes and zip code information.
Some of the information it currently pours into the record at the final order stage
might be accurate, but the registrant that it was used against may not have had
reason (or ability) to access the information, such as doctor-prescriber license
information. Other information that the Agency has found as fact through
official notice is potentially susceptible to reasonable dispute by experts, such
as whether statistics set forth in a prior Agency order are relevant to the facts
of a newer case, or whether particular controlled substances metabolize into
particular chemicals. And, of course, there is always the potential that the
Agency could simply get the facts wrong when it takes official notice.
The APA offers some ability to challenge the facts found through official
notice, providing that “[w]hen an agency decision rests on official notice of a
material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on
timely request, to an opportunity to show the contrary.”589 However, a
meaningful opportunity and procedure to challenge facts is not consistently

587. Vernor Prescription Ctr., 59 Fed. Reg. 6305, 6306 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 10, 1994)
(taking official notice of a statistic regarding average purchases of a certain drug by pharmacies in
Michigan, which was “established” in a prior agency order issued three years prior, to determine that
the respondent’s purchases remained excessive despite the ALJ’s finding that declining purchases of
the drug could be a mitigating factor).
588. Wesley Pope, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 14944, 14964 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Mar. 23, 2017) (citing
Edward J. Cone et al., Evidence that Morphine is Metabolized to Hydromorphone But Not to
Oxymorphone, 32 J. ANALYTIC TOXICOLOGY 319, 319, 323 (2008)) (“Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. [§] 556(e)
(2012), I take official notice that morphine does not metabolize into oxymorphone.”).
589. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (2012).
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offered by the Agency,590 is sometimes not offered at all,591 and has been
offered only in words but not in substance in the Agency’s more recent
decisions, because the final orders have already been published in the Federal
Register before the time offered to the respondent to challenge the facts has
elapsed.592
590. See, e.g., Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14964 n.33 (affording “[twenty] calendar days” from the
date of the order to file “properly supported motion for reconsideration” and affording the Government
twenty days to respond to such a motion); Robert Markman, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 11369, 11370 n.1
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 22, 2017) (affording “[fifteen] calendar days [from] the date of service” to
“file a motion for reconsideration”); Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 79188,
79188 n.3 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 10, 2016) (affording “ten days” from the date of the order to “fil[e]
a properly supported motion”); Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49823 n.11 (affording fifteen calendar
days from the mailing of the order to “fil[e] a properly supported motion”); Piyush V. Patel, M.D., 72
Fed. Reg. 18274, 18275 n.1 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 11, 2007) (affording fifteen days after “receipt
of th[e] order” to “fil[e] a request for reconsideration which includes supporting documentation”);
Edmund Chein, M.D., 72 Fed. Reg. 6580, 6583 n.4 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 12, 2007) (noting that
“publication of [the] order will be withheld for a fifteen day period in order to provide [r]espondent
with ‘an opportunity to show the contrary’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 556(e))).
591. See David D. Moon, D.O., 82 Fed. Reg. 19385, 19387 n.5 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 27,
2017) (taking official notice of the online records of two state medical boards to find that the
respondent does not currently possess a license in either jurisdiction, but providing no opportunity to
refute that fact); Edge Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. 72092, 72103 n.28 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 19, 2016)
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)) (taking official notice of the Florida Department of Health “online records”
and providing a citation to 5 U.S.C. § 557(c), which affords an opportunity to submit arguments and
exceptions to “employees participating in the decision[] [on agency review],” but which does not
provide an opportunity for parties to challenge facts found through official notice in a final agency
decision); Richard J. Settles, D.O., 81 Fed. Reg. 64940, 64944 n.13 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Sept. 21, 2016)
(citing to the New Mexico Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners website to find that certain state
licenses were expired, but not stating that the Agency is taking official notice of the expiration dates
or offering any opportunity to the respondent to challenge whether the licenses were, in fact, expired);
Gregory White, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 24754, 24755 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 1, 2014) (citing an
“internet search” to establish the respondent’s state licensure status, but providing no opportunity for
the respondent to challenge the finding).
592. See, e.g., Pope, 82 Fed. Reg. at 14964 n.33 (purporting, in the Agency’s decision signed on
March 16, 2017, to afford the respondent twenty calendar days after that date to “fil[e] a properly
supported motion for reconsideration” with the Office of the Administrator, while affording the
Government twenty days to respond to such a motion, if filed, but the final order was published in the
Federal Register only seven days after it was signed, on March 23, 2017); Frank D. Li, M.D., 82 Fed.
Reg. 11238, 11239 & n.2, 11241 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 21, 2017) (purporting, in the Agency’s
decision signed on February 13, 2017, to afford the respondent 15 calendar days from the date the
order was mailed to “file a motion for reconsideration,” but the final order was published in the Federal
Register only eight days after it was signed, on February 21, 2017); Jones Total Health, 81 Fed. Reg.
at 79188 n.3, 79203 (purporting, in the Agency’s decision, which was signed on October 31, 2016, to
afford the respondent ten days to “dispute . . . any . . . finding[s] which [are] the subject of official
notice[] by filing a properly supported motion,” but the final order was published in the Federal
Register exactly ten days later, on November 10, 2016); Hills Pharmacy, 81 Fed. Reg. at 49817, 49823
n.11 (purporting, in the Agency’s decision, which was signed on July 19, 2016, to afford the respondent
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Even when a respondent is provided with an opportunity to rebut the
information found through official notice, Federal Register publication puts the
information in the public domain for the respondent’s patients, customers,
peers, colleagues, and families to see before any dispute is resolved, unless the
Agency delays publication in order to resolve the dispute. In practice, the
Agency’s final order is published long before a respondent is able to refute the
facts found through official notice.593 On one occasion where the Administrator
took official notice of numerous documents that were not included in the
administrative record594 the Agency published its final Agency order seven
days after it was signed and eight days before the time afforded to the
respondent to file a motion for reconsideration expired.595 In that case, the
respondent objected to the inclusion of the extra-hearing documents and
requested an opportunity to respond to that evidence.596 Even then, the
Administrator did not remand the case to the ALJ to allow the respondent to
introduce new documents in order to refute those documents that were included
via official notice.597 Instead, the Administrator ordered that the parties litigate
the issue via filings—with the Administrator598—and ultimately took official
15 calendar days from the mailing of the order to dispute the fact found by official notice “by filing a
properly supported motion,” but the final order was published in the Federal Register only nine days
after it was signed, on July 28, 2016). That the orders sometimes reflect a delayed effective date
changes nothing about the potential injury to fragile professional reputations resulting from this
practice.
593. See supra note 592.
594. Lyle E. Craker, 74 Fed. Reg. 2101, 2108 n.24 (Drug Enf’t Admin. January 14, 2009) (taking
official notice of National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) letter, “which appears on [the
Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies (MAPS)]’s website,” to find the bases upon
which NIDA denied a doctor’s application to use marijuana in a research study); id. at 2109 n.30
(taking official notice of two reports available on the MAPS website); id. at 2111 n.41 (taking official
notice “of the FDA’s Guideline for Drug Master Files,” and providing website link); id. at 2115 n.56
(taking official notice of a report authored by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB)); id.
at 2116 n.57 (taking official notice of a press release issued by the INCB).
595. Id. at 2133 (signing order on January 7, 2009); id. at 2108 n. 24 (“To allow [r]espondent
the opportunity to refute the facts of which I take official notice, [r]espondent may file a motion for
reconsideration within fifteen days of service of this order which shall commence with the mailing of
the order.”).
596. See Lyle E. Craker, PhD, 76 Fed. Reg. 51403, 51404 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2011)
(describing the post-Final Order filings that resulted from the 2009 Agency final order).
597. Id. (filing a motion for reconsideration, wherein the respondent requested “that the
administrative hearing be reopened so that he may call additional witnesses in view of certain
documents of which [the Administrator] took official notice in the final order,” but the Administrator
denied that request).
598. Id. (directing the respondent, in Administrator’s “interim order,” “to submit a list of all
witnesses he would call if his request to reopen the administrative hearing were granted[,] to provide
a summary of the proposed testimony for each witness,” and to “indicate precisely which documents
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notice of several documents submitted by the respondent.599 The entire process
took more than two years, and during that time the Agency’s final order with
the officially-noticed documents—which was already published—remained
unchallenged, at least in the public’s view.600 Even if a registrant were
ultimately to prevail on an official notice issue, the effects on the registrant’s
patient or customer base would be catastrophic and irreparable.
Also, whether the officially-noticed facts prove to be incontrovertibly true,
probably true, arguably true, sort of true, or not true at all, the ever-escalating
use of official notice still raises the unattractive specter of an unidentified
Government employee sitting at a computer terminal somewhere in the office
of the final adjudicator, performing investigative research into state board
websites, other agency websites, and even biology reference materials and other
sources. This phenomenon runs the risk of violating the APA’s unambiguous
provision that, subject to exceptions not relevant here:
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of
investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case
may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise
in the decision, recommended decision, or agency
review . . . [of initial decisions], except as witness or counsel
in public proceedings.601
The Agency’s decision drafter certainly is not a “witness or counsel in
public proceedings,” and he or she certainly is “participat[ing] or advis[ing]”
the final Agency decision maker by drafting what will ultimately become the
final decision of the Agency.602 Therefore, the APA provision unequivocally
prohibits him or her from “engag[ing] in the performance of investigative or
prosecuting functions” for the Agency.603 But the language of the Agency’s
final orders gives at least the appearance that this dynamic has become standard
he sought to introduce for purposes of his motion for reconsideration” and whether he was requesting
official notice be taken of the documents or whether they would be introduced through witnesses if his
request to reopen the hearing were granted); id. (“[h]aving ruled on which new documents would be
considered part of the record (through [her] taking official notice thereof),” the Administrator afforded
the respondent “an additional opportunity to file a final brief” and afforded the Government time to
respond to that brief).
599. Id. (taking official notice of four documents and declining to take official notice of seven
documents, noting that those seven documents “will not be considered part of the administrative record
considered by the agency in this adjudication,” which indicates that the other four were considered to
be part of the record).
600. The first Craker final order was published on January 14, 2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 2101, and the
second was published on August 18, 2011. Craker, 76 Fed. Reg. 51403.
601. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012).
602. See id.
603. Id. § 554(d)(2).
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operating procedure through the increasingly aggressive use of official
notice.604
While official notice is certainly authorized in administrative enforcement
proceedings, the essential question is whether the Agency’s decision makers
(and decision drafters), in their roles as impartial adjudicators, will be able to
resist the temptation to shore up the Government’s case through the use of
official notice in preparing the Agency’s final orders. Even if the bar
representing the regulated community is actually afforded the opportunity (and
instructions for how) to confront officially noticed facts, it does little to dispel
the inescapable sense that the purportedly-neutral Agency final order
adjudicator is being placed in the role of minding that the Government has
dotted its “i’s” and crossed its “t’s,” assisting in filling in gaps at the last
moment where needed. With the current practice, the Government could be
perceived by the regulated community and the public as essentially working
with a safety net in the event that one of its prosecutors misses an important
detail, forgets a declaration signature, or has its evidence staled through the
passage of adjudication time. Respondents, on the other hand, are afforded
little more than a passing moment, if anything, to refute the new evidence used
against them and—even if they did manage to challenge the facts found through
official notice before the final order was published—the Agency has rendered
no hint that it would be willing to defer Federal Register publication in order to
resolve the dispute (which it would presumably need to do by remanding the
matter back to the impartial adjudicator), before the respondents would need to
appeal the entire final order, rather than merely challenging an officiallynoticed fact found within it.
M. Is the Agency Marginalizing its ALJs, and its Due Process Hearings?
1. Restraining (and Overruling) Decisional Independence
There is little doubt that the Agency’s more recent final orders could be
read as conveying an increasing discomfiture with the decisional independence
of its own independent ALJs.605 In one recent line of final orders, the Agency
accepted and published the recommended decisions of its ALJs, but deleted
604. E.g., Franklyn Seabrooks, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 44196, 44197 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 30,
2014) (“An internet search of the [state board]’s public record actions Web page reveals . . . .”);
Gregory White, M.D., 79 Fed. Reg. 24754, 24755 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 1, 2014) (“An internet
search of the [state board]’s public record actions Web page found the following . . . .”).
605. See generally John A. Gilbert, Jr. & Andrew J. Hull, A Matter of Substantial Discretion: A
Recent Rift Between DEA and its ALJs Could Significantly Impact Registrants, FOOD AND DRUG L.
INST. MAG., November/December 2015, at 9.
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those portions of the ALJ’s recommended decisions which cited Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB,606 a decision wherein the Supreme Court set forth the
level of deference properly accorded to the factual determinations rendered by
federal agency ALJs.607 In JM Pharmacy, the Agency adopted most of the
ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law but, citing the ALJ’s discussion
of Universal Camera, included the statement that “[t]o make clear, the Agency
is the ultimate factfinder.”608 Even setting aside the fact that the Agency, by its
regulations, has qualified its own authority over aspects of the adjudication,609
it is not so much the accuracy of the statement that presents an issue, but the
Agency’s election to include the seemingly confrontational declaration in its
final order. Setting aside considerations regarding the wisdom of supplanting
and qualifying clear Supreme Court precedent with pronouncements ensconced
in prior Agency final orders, the Agency’s decisions risk the appearance of an
increasing willingness on the part of the Agency to disregard facts found by
impartial ALJs and substitute its own, different facts.
There can also be little doubt that the Agency’s precedents have
demonstrated an increasing aggressiveness in publicly scolding its ALJs in final
orders published in the Federal Register.610 The Agency has also, in a published
606. See, e.g., Trenton F. Horst, D.O., 80 Fed. Reg. 41079, 41079 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July
14, 2015) (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951)); Jana Marjenhoff, D.O.,
80 Fed. Reg. 29067, 29070 n.9 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015) (citing Universal Camera Corp.,
340 U.S. at 496).
607. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 496.
608. JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 28667, 28667 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 19, 2015).
609. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012) (“On appeal from or review of the
initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except
as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.” (emphasis added)); 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.52, 1316.67
(2017) (regarding the respective duties of the ALJ and the Administrator as limited by Agency
regulations).
610. See, e.g., Syed Jawed Akhtar-Zaidi, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 42962, 42962 n.2 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. July 20, 2015) (criticising the ALJ including the pointed observation that “every Administrator
and Deputy Administrator who has exercised [Agency authority] . . . has rejected the ALJ’s view”);
Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. 29053, 29063 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015) (stinging in an Agency
final order that the correct legal analysis was “[c]ontrary to the ALJ’s understanding”); Moore Clinical
Trials, L.L.C., 79 Fed. Reg. 40145, 40155, 40157 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 11, 2014) (stating that
“[n]ot only is the ALJ’s reasoning counterfactual, it reflects a stunning misunderstanding of the CSA,”
and, while addressing another portion of the ALJ’s analysis, stated “I reject the ALJ’S rumination as
totally irrelevant”); Clair L. Pettinger, M.D., 78 Fed. Reg. 61591, 61596–61600 (Drug Enf’t Admin.
Oct. 3, 2013) (reasoning by ALJ dismissed as “illogical,” that the correct legal analysis was “[c]ontrary
to the ALJ’s understanding,” and that “in future cases . . . the ALJ should rest assured that” the
Agency’s legal analysis is the correct one); T.J. McNichol, M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 57133, 57144–49 (Drug
Enf’t Admin. Sept. 17, 2012) (excoriating ALJ throughout the Agency final order for legal and factual
analysis, with characterizations such as “reflects a stunning disregard for Federal law,” “[c]ontrary to
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decision, recently reminded its ALJs that “[o]nce the [A]gency has ruled on a
given matter . . . it is not open to reargument by the [ALJ].”611 The effect on
the level of decisional accuracy or fairness resulting from chastising
independent Agency ALJs is not altogether clear, and neither is the purpose for
doing so in published decisions readily apparent. The extent to which a federal
agency head differs in legal analysis from one of the agency’s ALJs seemingly
presents as a concept capable of dispassionate expression without gratuitous
vitriol. Further, an analysis included by an ALJ that differs in some respect
from prior final orders could prove to be more legally correct, and could
persuade the current or future DEA Administrators to engage a legal issue in a
different light. This is particularly so in the recommended decision structure of
the APA612 which is utilized by the Agency in its decisional structure.613 It is
hardly hyperbole to observe that the fostering of an environment where the
Agency’s final orders communicate hostility towards recommendations not to
its liking by its own ALJs does not further the purposes of Congress in creating
a recommended decisional structure. The obvious concern in the gratuitous
chastisement of ALJs by their employing agency is that intemperate language
set forth in published Agency final orders risks the perception that the Agency
is seeking an improper means to impact future hearing decisions.
the ALJ’s ludicrous suggestion,” “absurd,” “ignor[ing] numerous decisions of both federal and state
courts in criminal cases,” and other phrases evincing disdain for the ALJ’s ability and judgment), aff’d,
T.J. McNichol v. DEA, 539 Fed.Appx. (11th Cir. 2013); Grider Drug #1 & Grider Drug #2, 77 Fed.
Reg. 44070, 44070, 44082 n.40 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 26, 2012) (mocking openly, in Agency’s final
order, ALJ by equating the proceedings conducted by the ALJ to a portion of “Justice Douglas’s
dissenting opinion in Sierra Club v. Morton,” 405 U.S. 727, 742–744 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting),
wherein Douglas analyzed whether a tree or other inanimate object should be accorded legal standing
in court proceedings; declaring that “the ALJ’s sole function is to make findings that are relevant and
material to the allegations raised by the Government[]”; and accusing the ALJ of “fail[ing] to exercise
anything more than minimal control over the parties’ respective presentations”); Randall L. Wolff,
M.D., 77 Fed. Reg. 5106, 5112 n.15 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 1, 2012) (dismissing ALJ’s legal analysis
as a “rumination”); George Mathew, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 66138, 66140, 66148 (Drug Enf’t Admin.
Oct. 27, 2010) (accusing ALJ of “ignor[ing] extensive Agency precedent,” and dismissing her legal
analysis, stating that the correct legal analysis is “[c]ontrary to the ALJ’s understanding”); East Main
Street Pharmacy, 75 Fed. Reg. 66149, 66150 n.2 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Oct. 27, 2010) (dismissing ALJ’s
analysis as “reflect[ing] a clear misunderstanding of her role,” and characterizing her procedural ruling
and case time management as “disturbing”); Jeri Hassman, M.D., 75 Fed. Reg. 8194, 8235 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. Feb 23, 2010) (dismissing ALJ’s legal analysis as “erroneous”). These examples, which are
not intended to constitute an exhaustive list, involve the work of multiple ALJs.
611. Pettinger, 78 Fed. Reg. at 61600 n.13 (penultimate alteration in original) (citing Iran Air v.
Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Joseph Zwerdlin, Reflections on the Role
of an Administrative Law Judge, 25 ADMIN. L. REV. 9, 12–13 (1973))).
612. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b).
613. 21 U.S.C. § 824(c) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.65(a).
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In fact, in Superior Pharmacy I & Superior Pharmacy II, the Agency was
forced to address the respondent’s contention that the Agency’s “public
scolding” of the assigned ALJ in a prior case caused the ALJ to have a general
bias against respondents.614 The Agency did not deny the fact or severity of its
prior reprobation aimed at the ALJ in that case, but dismissed the assignment
of error based on the “extensive protections provided to ALJs under federal law
to ensure decisional independence, including that they are not subject to
performance appraisals, their pay is set . . . independent of any evaluation by
the Agency, and they are subject to discipline only upon a showing of good
cause by the [Merit Systems Protection Board].”615 The arguably dismissive
attention devoted to this issue by the Agency misses the point that, although
ALJs are endowed with statutory protections and their own personal integrity,
subjecting impartial Agency judges to gratuitous personal criticism in decisions
published in the Federal Register risks eroding the confidence that the public
places in the fairness of adjudications by the Agency under the APA. In
conjunction with the more recent practice of the Agency revisiting all of the
evidence and making findings without regard to the findings of the ALJ, such
practice conveys the message (accurate or not) that the underlying purpose
could be to bully the ALJs into issuing recommended decisions more in line
with the wishes of the Agency and its Administrator.
2. Summary Disposition Without Motion or ALJ Recommendation
It has long been the practice of the Agency, even in the face of a timely
hearing request, to grant its prosecutors summary disposition against a
respondent where the Government has alleged that the respondent does not
possess the state authority required to issue or maintain a DEA registration.616
This practice, while authorized nowhere in statute or regulation, is ostensibly
founded in the notion that the CSA authorizes the Agency to issue registrations
to “practitioners,” and that by definition under the CSA,617 a practitioner must
possess “authority under state law to handle controlled substances.”618
Although in the revocation section of the CSA, Congress provided that the
614. Superior Pharmacy I & Superior Pharmacy II, 81 Fed. Reg. 31310, 31339 n.66 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. May 18, 2016).
615. Id. (citation omitted).
616. See, e.g., Emmanuel O. Nwaokocha, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 26516, 26518 (Drug Enf’t Admin.
June 7, 2017); Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 Fed. Reg. 27616, 27617 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June
26, 1978).
617. 21 U.S.C. § 802(21).
618. James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 Fed. Reg. 71371, 71372 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Nov. 17, 2011),
pet. for rev. denied, Hooper v. Holder, 481 F. App’x 826 (4th Cir. 2012).
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abridgement of state authority is a discretionary basis for sanction,619 the
Agency has taken the position that its view of the other provisions essentially
renders the discretionary revocation provisions related to state authority as
meaningless surplusage.620
While summary disposition has been used historically by the Agency’s
prosecutors, the Agency recently confirmed in Phong Tran, M.D. that summary
disposition is also available to respondents.621 In that case, the Agency alleged
that the respondent lacked the state authority to handle controlled substances
required to maintain his multiple certificates of registration in the state of
California.622 Specifically, the Government alleged that, in response to state
criminal charges relating to unlawful billing which had been levied against the
registrant, the Medical Board of California petitioned the court handling the
criminal charges for an order suspending the registrant’s state “medical license
during the pendency of the criminal proceedings,” and the court imposed a
condition of bail which prohibited the registrant from practicing medicine
during the pendency of his criminal matter.623 The Government filed for
summary disposition, but the motion was denied because the prohibition on
practice was uncontrovertibly a condition of bail release, not a suspension or
encumberment of the medical license itself.624 In other words, the ALJ
concluded that the “[r]espondent (albeit at the peril of his release conditions)
maintains the state authority requisite to retain his DEA . . . [registrations],”
despite the Government’s argument to the contrary.625 After the Government’s
motion was denied, the respondent was granted leave to file, and did file, a
motion for summary disposition of his own, which was granted by the ALJ.626
In its final decision, the Agency likewise concluded that the registrant’s state
medical license was neither suspended nor revoked.627
619. 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(3).
620. Rezik A. Saqer, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22126 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 14, 2016)
(stating that “[i]t is not clear . . . why using the word ‘shall’ rather than ‘may’ would make any
difference, as [21 U.S.C. §] 824(a) grants the Agency authority to either revoke or suspend”). Thus,
in Saqer, the Agency essentially held that its prospective exercise of discretion would be to revoke in
every case. See id. The treatment of a compelled result offered by the Agency as a meaningful exercise
of discretion is likely to be an interesting issue to the extent it is evaluated by the courts on review.
621. Phong Tran, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 31070, 31075 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 5, 2017).
622. Id. at 31070.
623. Id.
624. Id. at 31074.
625. Id. at 31071 (all but first alteration in original) (citation omitted).
626. Id. at 31071–72.
627. Id. at 31072, 31075. The Agency declined to adopt the decision of the ALJ, id. at 31072
n.10, instead issuing its own decision with different analysis. The Agency’s decision that the registrant
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While the Agency’s confirmation of the availability of summary
disposition to respondents seemed to somewhat balance the playing field for
respondents, in the case of Richard J. Blackburn, D.O., the Agency took an
even more aggressive stance regarding its ability to find facts without a due
process hearing despite a timely request for such a hearing.628 In response to a
doctor’s registration application, DEA prosecutors filed an OSC alleging that
he lacked the requisite state authority and that he had made a materially false
statement.629 The respondent timely requested a hearing on both counts.630 The
ALJ granted a summary disposition motion filed by the Government regarding
lack of state authority, but, finding the state authority issue case dispositive,
declined to decide the issue of the material false statement allegation and
forwarded the case to the Administrator for a final order.631 Notwithstanding
the fact that the Government never made a summary disposition motion
regarding the material false statement allegation before the ALJ,632 and the fact
that the ALJ declined to make findings or recommendations on that allegation,
the Agency sustained both the lack of state authority and material false
statement allegations.633 In support of its factual determinations, the Agency
cited “attachments” filed by the Government in its no-state-authority motion,
and referred to the material in the “attachments” as “reliable and probative
evidence.”634
The ALJ assigned to hear the case had determined that the respondent had
raised a triable issue of fact by asserting that any irregularities were mistakes,
and not intentional false statements.635 The Agency dismissed the ALJ’s
maintained the requisite state authority despite the bail condition prohibiting practice was based, in
part, on the Government’s concession in its opposition to the respondent’s motion for summary
disposition that the respondent maintained such authority. Id. at 31075.
628. Richard Jay Blackburn, D.O., 82 Fed. Reg. 18669 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 20, 2017).
629. Id. at 18669.
630. Id.
631. Id. at 18670.
632. The Government styled its request for relief before the ALJ as a “Motion for Partial
Summary Disposition,” and sought merely to press its right to prove up the material false statement
charge at a contested hearing. Id. at 18669. It was not until it filed exceptions to the ALJ’s refusal to
grant a hearing on the material false statement charge that the Government broadened the scope of
relief to include both a remand for the hearing that had been requested before the ALJ or a ruling in its
favor as a matter of law. Id. at 18670. The Agency found that this portion of the Government’s
exceptions constituted sufficient notice to the respondent of the summary disposition issue and ruled
in the Government’s favor. Id. at 18673 & n.6.
633. Id. at 18673.
634. Id. at 18672–73. One of the “attachments” relied upon by the Agency was actually a
printout from a state medical board webpage. Id. at 18670.
635. Id. at 18672.
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determination, considered the “attachments” filed by the Government as
evidence in support of its no-state-authority summary disposition motion on the
issue of the material false statement, and found against the respondent without
conducting the hearing he had requested.636
Although the Agency
acknowledged that, in ruling upon summary judgment motions, “the ‘usual rule
[is] that all doubts are resolved against the moving party,’”637 it was unfettered
by that convention in Blackburn.638 Even though there was not even a motion
filed for summary disposition of the material falsification allegation, the
Agency reasoned that summary disposition on the material falsification issue
was appropriate because the respondent did not “offer counter-affidavits or
other evidentiary material supporting the opposing contention that an issue of
fact remains, [and did not] show a good reason . . . why he [was] unable to
present facts justifying opposition to the motion.”639 Thus, the respondent and
his counsel were unable to challenge any of the evidence offered against him,
despite having timely requested an evidentiary hearing.640
Even more concerning than the Agency’s troublesome reliance on
“attachments,” is language in numerous final orders placing conclusive factual
reliance on something even less. In several cases, the Agency found a hearing
waiver based exclusively on the representations by the Government that no
hearing request had been filed.641
The Agency’s decision to embrace a more robust view of its ability to find
facts without a hearing, like its increasing inclination to disregard the factual
and legal findings of its ALJs, may significantly impact the manner in which
both sides litigate administrative enforcement cases before the Agency in the
future. All parties will need to consider whether Blackburn stands for the
proposition that, by merely “attaching” any manner of documents to charging
documents, requests for hearing, or motions, evidentiary challenges as to
reliability, authenticity, or other objections available at a contested hearing, can
be avoided. Further, on this current trajectory, if the Agency is willing to find
a hearing waiver based on no more than a “Government[] representation,”642 it
will be interesting to see if a more robust level of representations are permitted
636. Id. at 18672–73.
637. Id. at 18673 n.7 (alteration in original) (quoting 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2727.1 (4th ed. 2017)).
638. See id. at 18673 & n.6.
639. Id. at 18673 n.7 (penultimate alteration in original).
640. See id. at 18672, 18673 n.7.
641. John Warren Cox, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 29329, 29329 (Drug Enf’t Admin. June 28, 2017);
Lee B. Drake, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 11057, 11057 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Feb. 17, 2017); Gentry Reeves
Dunlop, M.D., 82 Fed. Reg. 8432, 8432 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Jan. 25, 2017).
642. Cox, 82 Fed. Reg. at 29329.
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to play a larger role in the Agency’s factfinding. The registrants’ bar in
particular will now need to consider whether a request for hearing under the
regulations could potentially result in summary disposition of the matter on
grounds other than lack of state authority, even in cases where the Government
has not made a motion for summary disposition on such other allegations.
IV. GOING FORWARD
It would be difficult to conceive of a world where diversion law would be
in a greater state of flux. The various components that have acted (Congress,
the Agency, and the diversion bar) have not acted as experience might have
predicted. In the face of expressed concern at rising opioid addiction and death,
Congress has imbued the regulated community with the right to submit CAPs,
and imposed upon the Agency the duty to consider those plans.643 Regarding
manufacturers and distributor registrants—but, notably, not practitioner
registrants—Congress has surgically pared back the evidence that may be
considered by the Agency in Public Interest Factor Five by narrowly redefining
“factors as may be relevant to and consistent with the public health and
safety,”644 and created a definition of “immediate danger to the public health
and safety”645 in a manner that renders Agency utilization of an immediate
suspension order against those types of registrants all but impossible to defend
in the federal courts. Whatever the relative merits of the Ensuring Patient
Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, there is little that can be
distilled from the legislation that either ensures patients enhanced access to
controlled medication or makes drug enforcement more effective. Access to
medication will likely remain largely unimpeded by federal enforcement
efforts, and law enforcement efforts aimed at curbing diversion may actually
be hampered by the loss of the DEA’s authority to effectively utilize immediate
suspension orders in cases involving manufacturers and distributors. Further,
if the Agency elects to delay proceedings while it adjudicates corrective action
plans submitted by respondents in administrative proceedings, the process of
enforcing anything could be substantially elongated.
The Agency’s approach has also evolved in a manner that arguably ran
contrary to what many may have expected, and it has seemingly attempted to
effect change through a robust utilization of adjudication in place of
rulemaking. While some news accounts have reported that the Agency’s

643. See supra Section II.A.
644. See supra Section II.C.
645. See supra Section II.B.
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administrative enforcement levels have decreased,646 as discussed throughout
this Article, it also appears that the notice and burden standards it places on its
own prosecutors may have increased. That said, once a case has been filed and
reaches the final order stage, the Agency has not been shy about holding the
respondents to strict procedural rules, and in the last few years, has rarely ruled
against the sanctions sought by its regulators.647 It could be persuasively argued
that the Agency’s aggressive expansion of the reach of its adjudications may
have extended to a level far beyond the legal or practical limits of that tool.
Agency final orders have more aggressively utilized official notice, summary
disposition, and litigation by consent, and have arguably demonstrated a
voracious appetite for supplanting the facts and law recommended by its
impartial ALJs with the Agency’s own facts and law based on its review of the

646. See, e.g., Bernstein & Higham, supra note 3, at A1; THE POST’S VIEW, supra note 3.
647. Of the twenty-eight final orders issued in 2016, all but three resulted in the respondents’
applications being denied or their registrations being revoked. Even those three cases where there was
not a denial or a revocation were hardly positive for the applicants/registrants. In one case, the
registration at issue had expired and thus no decision was made on whether the Agency could have
revoked based on the facts. Turning Tide, Inc., 81 Fed. Reg. 47411 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 21, 2016).
In the other two non-revocation/denial cases, the Agency restricted the respondents’ licenses to certain
schedules because the relevant state authority had so restricted those respondents’ state licenses.
Abolghasem Rezaei, M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 25425 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 28, 2016); Ibem R. Borges,
M.D., 81 Fed. Reg. 23521 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Apr. 21, 2016). In both of those cases, the Agency took
note that, had allegations been made other than lack of state authority, the Government would have
made a prima facie case for full revocation. Rezaei, 81 Fed. Reg. at 25426 n.2 (finding that the facts
“clearly would have supported a prima facie case for revocation under the public interest standard”);
Borges, 81 Fed. Reg. at 23523 (“The conduct . . . could serve as the basis for a request for total
revocation based on public interest grounds . . . [or] conviction of a felony related to controlled
substances[].”). In 2015, thirty-seven cases were published, and only ten of those did not result in
denial of an application or revocation of a registration. Two cases were dismissed because the
applications were withdrawn. Chung-Kuang Chen, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 57020 (Drug Enf’t Admin.
Sept. 21, 2015); Matthew Valentine/Liar Catchers, 80 Fed. Reg. 50042 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18,
2015). One application was granted pursuant to an earlier order setting forth conditions the applicant
had to meet in order to be granted a registration. Abbas E. Sina, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 53191 (Drug Enf’t
Admin. Sept. 2, 2015). Two cases were dismissed because the respondents’ registrations expired and
they filed no renewal application or new application. Victor B. Williams, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 50029
(Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2015); AIM Pharmacy & Surgical S. Corp., 80 Fed. Reg. 46326 (Drug
Enf’t Admin. Aug. 4, 2015). Two cases were dismissed because the respondents regained state
authority, lack of which was the only allegation in those cases. Nicholas Nardacci, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg.
50032 (Drug Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2015); Jeffrey S. Holverson, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 50033 (Drug
Enf’t Admin. Aug. 18, 2015). Two applications for registration were granted with conditions and an
initial suspension. Odette L. Campbell, M.D., 80 Fed. Reg. 41062 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 14, 2015);
Trenton F. Horst, D.O., 80 Fed. Reg. 41079 (Drug Enf’t Admin. July 14, 2015). One application case
was held in abeyance and the Agency ordered that the application be granted or denied based on certain
conditions. Farmacia Yani, 80 Fed. Reg. 29053 (Drug Enf’t Admin. May 20, 2015).
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record.648 The Agency has even experimented with conducting contested
proceedings outside the reach of its ALJs during the preparation of its final
orders.649 Left on its current trajectory of robust dependence on final orders
over formal APA rulemaking, the future could produce continued struggles
with consistency, temperance, and clarity in the guidance the Agency transmits
to the practicing bar and the regulated community.
The diversion bar has similarly responded in a surprising fashion. In the
face of arguably expansive Agency adjudications, one may argue that the
registrants’ bar has collectively exhibited an almost sheepish complicity in its
pursuit of redress in the courts.650 Likewise, Government counsel has not
sought adjustments to edicts announced in final orders that run contrary to or
otherwise cause detriment to their litigation positions, and sometimes even their
sense of fairness. Mark Twain once famously quoted his close friend, Charles
Dudley Warner, in observing that “Everyone complains about the weather, but
nobody does anything about it.”651 Changes in diversion practice have been
largely treated by the practicing bar with a similar sense of fatalistic
inevitability.
The many changes recently inflicted on diversion litigation present like
dangerous rocks hidden beneath the surface of shallow, murky, drug-infested
waters. Like ship captains negotiating unchartered, shallow waters, litigators
on both sides of the aisle would be wise to navigate slowly and cautiously based
on a study of what we know so far. That said, there are no guarantees that those

648. See supra Section III.G–M.
649. See supra Section III.L.4.
650. Since 2015, only five cases (six, if Superior I & II are counted separately) have been
appealed to a federal court of appeals. Of those, two remain pending as of the date of this Article.
Kelly v. DEA, No. 17-1175 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 18, 2017); Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy L.L.C. v.
DEA, No. 16-17346 (11th Cir. July 11, 2017). Two were dismissed because the petitions for review
were withdrawn. Stipulation of Dismissal, Superior Pharmacy I & Superior Pharmacy II v. DEA, No.
16-1167 (D.C. Cir. 2016), ECF No. 1636080; Stipulation of Dismissal, Hills Pharmacy v. DEA, No.
16-1295 (D.C. Cir. 2016), ECF No. 1636081. And one petition was denied in a published per curiam
order. Syed Jawed Akhtar-Zaidi v. DEA, 841 F.3d 707 (6th Cir. 2016). Of those cases that were
pending at the federal courts in 2015, one was affirmed and four petitions were denied. Memorandum
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Drug Enf’t Admin. at 3, Samimi v. DEA, No.14-71315 (9th
Cir. 2017) (affirmed); On Petition for Review of an Order of the Drug Enf’t Admin. at 6, White v.
DEA, No. 14-60832 (5th Cir. 2015) (denied); Memorandum On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Drug Enf’t Admin. at 4, Ruben v. DEA, No. 13-72577 (9th Cir. 2015) (denied); On Petition for Review
of a Final Order of the Drug Enf’t Admin., Med. Shoppe v. Lynch, No. 14-1223 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(denied); On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the Drug Enf’t Admin. at 38, Masters Pharm.,
Inc. v. DEA., No. 15-1335 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (denied).
651. Tim Chuey, Everyone Complains About the Weather, But Nobody Does Anything About It,
EUGENE DAILY NEWS (Apr. 3, 2016), http://eugenedailynews.com/2016/04/everyone-complainsweather-nobody-anything/ [https://perma.cc/5BCZ-DWPF].
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with legislating and adjudicating authority will not be adding more perilous
boulders beneath the waterline, and faulting the helmsmen for failing to deduce
their existence and location prior to impact.

